

Cuk-H02353-52-P002819

VOLUME 95, No. 3

WHOLE No. 379

AMERICAN 405  
JOURNAL OF PHILOLOGY 002

Founded by B. L. GILDERSLEEVE

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52

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VOLUME 95, NUMBER 3  
FALL, 1974

BALTIMORE: THE JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY PRESS

1974

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The American Journal of Philology publishes original contributions in the field of Greek and Roman Antiquity, especially in the areas of philology, literature, history and philosophy. It is published quarterly, Spring, Summer, Fall, Winter, in issues of about 128 pages of text each. Subscription price: institutions, \$18.00; individuals, \$10.00 a year (foreign postage \$1.00 extra); single numbers, \$6.00 each.

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Whitehead Hall, 32nd and Charles Sts.  
Baltimore, Maryland, 21218

**The contents of the American Journal of Philology are indexed regularly in the International Index to Periodicals and in Book Review Index.**

Second-class postage paid at Baltimore, Maryland  
and additional mailing offices

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PRINTED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA  
BY EVERYBODY'S PRESS, HANOVER, PA. 17331

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# AMERICAN JOURNAL OF PHILOLOGY

VOL. 95, 3

WHOLE NO. 379

METRICAL VARIATIONS  
IN EURIPIDEAN PLAYS

## I. INTRODUCTION

The question of Euripides' metrical structures in his late lyrics is a topic of much discussion and interest.<sup>1</sup> Passages with metrically unusual formats have been used as indications that the text is corrupt and also as evidence of a breakdown in traditional metrical form. Supporting the former point of view is the belief that ancient metrical composition was rigorously delineated; supporting the latter proposition is the authority of the manuscript tradition and the possibility that the metrical form can be to some degree shaped by rhetorical phrasing.

The problem of exceptions to theory and of flexibility in colometry go to the very core of metrics. A. M. Dale, whose work in dramatic lyrics is at the foundation of any discussion of tragic meters, showed her sensitivity to Greek poetry in her treatment of passages with metrical irregularities. When theory and text conflicted, she admitted that the basic principles of meter might be abandoned on a few occasions, where the text seems otherwise sound; i.e. that quantity is surrendered in favor of syllable-counting in a few Euripidean lyrics (some anapestic<sup>2</sup> and some dactylic) and in a few comic lines (iambic and trochaic).

I would like to examine the concept of Euripidean licences in

<sup>1</sup> I am grateful to my colleague Mary R. Lefkowitz for her many useful suggestions in the preparation of this paper and Gregory Nagy for conversations in which he has shared his understanding of Greek poetry.

<sup>2</sup> A. M. Dale, *The Lyric Metres of Greek Drama*<sup>2</sup> (Cambridge 1968) 62-65. For the dactylic examples see 66; iambic 78-79; trochaic 88-91.

<sup>3</sup> *Troïades, Phœnissæ, Helen, Orestes, Bacchæ, Iphigenia in Aulis*: the plays, in Zieliński's terminology, of the Free Style and the Freest Style. This paper is restricted to his late plays both because his licenses were apparently progressive, so that the evidence is most clear at the end of his career, and also because a chronological limit will hopefully produce a unified view of Euripides' lyric practices which then can be compared with his actions at earlier points in his work.

his late lyrics, using examples from the plays dated in the last decade of his life.<sup>3</sup> Until now metrical irregularities have been treated as individual phenomena. Although Dale saw that at the end of his career,<sup>4</sup> Euripides allowed himself the liberty of ignoring quantities in double short meters, she did not pursue this, because of her wish to confine her assertions to what could be supported by evidence. There are precedents.<sup>5</sup> In particular J. D. Denniston's work in lyric iambs<sup>6</sup> complements Dale's. Although the focus of his argument is blurred by his broad interpretation of "iambic," he corroborates Dale's conclusions with evidence drawn from a single short meter. Each of these critics, however, was concerned with an individual meter rather than the overall process of metrical aberration. There is one exception: Dale briefly referred to the possibility of a general phenomenon in Euripidean lyrics which influenced comic meters, when she suggested that a "Euripidean license" may be operating in a comic anapestic tripody, Ar. Av. 242.<sup>7</sup>

I too suspect that some of the principles which underlie metrical irregularities can be recovered from the scattered examples in Euripides' late plays. If we are able to reconstruct the principles of organization in the lines which seem to violate the basic metrical tenets, then our concept of licence will change. In addition, if we can discover recognizable principles of organization in the meters which seem to violate the basic principles of defined metrical structures, we will gain a clearer understanding of Euripides' poetic technique and metrical aesthetics.

We can then begin to trace the priorities operating within Euripides' lyrics. The organizing force of quantity could be dropped, but in its place compensatory principles such as

<sup>3</sup> She did not state the chronological qualification, but it can be deduced, since all examples are drawn from roughly the last decade of Euripidean production: *Ion* 889, 900; *IT* 130, 197, 213, 220, 232; *Phoen.* 796/813. (The slash mark designates respension.)

<sup>5</sup> For example Wilamowitz's reluctant acceptance of "unreine Schlüsse," *Griechische Verskunst* (Hamburg 1962) 410-12.

<sup>6</sup> J. D. Denniston, in *Greek Poetry and Life, Essays Presented to G. Murray* (Freeport 1967) 121-44.

<sup>7</sup> Dale (*supra* n. 1) 65.

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syllable-counting, word-break and accent appear. By noting the priorities and the substitution of principles, we can understand better the function of cola as rhythmical units. Euripides appears to have gained new effects in two ways, by re-adjusting the internal make-up of common cola in homogeneous contexts and by blurring the limits of cola to turn some meters into their apparent antitheses (iambic to trochaic movement, dactylic to anapestic).

Finally, a better understanding of Euripides' innovations may help textual critics to accept without emendation some metrically unusual passages.


## II. VARIANCE IN AEOLIC COLA THROUGH AUDITORY EFFECTS

Cola<sup>8</sup> that are classified as "irregular" in fact conform to patterns readily recognized by ear, but our present system of notation prevents us from seeing these. One problem is our means of noting *anceps*,<sup>9</sup> which seem to imply that longs and shorts can be interchanged at will. But in practice an *anceps* is a point in a colon where quantity (and, as I hope to show, the number of syllables) can vary within limits in order to set up relationships with other syllables in the colon and with those in previous cola. For example, a common opening in Euripidean glyconics is  $\cup\cup\cup\cup$  where the initial long is resolved and followed by a single short *anceps*.<sup>10</sup> Apparently the increase in

<sup>8</sup> Colon is the ancient metrical term applied by modern critics to the recurrent rhythmic units which are combined to form lyrics. The convention in our texts is to print each colon on a separate line so that a confusion between the terms "lines" of poetry and "cola" is possible. Strictly speaking a line is both a location and the Greek words; a colon is a rhythm, e.g. in *Hel.* 1493, mentioned below, the line is 1493 *Μενέλεως ὅτι Δαρδάνου*, the colon is a glyconic.

<sup>9</sup> The convention is to cite common cola in a general form with an  $\times$  marking *incipitia* or syllables which can be either short or long e.g. glyconic  $\times - \cup \cup - \times$  or iambic dimeter  $\times - \cup -, \times - \cup -$ .

<sup>10</sup> An alternative opening with resolution and a long *anceps*  $\cup\cup - . .$  is extremely rare. A long *anceps* is sometimes marked  $\bar{x}$  to distinguish it from so called "true" longs. The physical realities of a long *anceps* and a true long are unclear; possibly the former was not as long, if quantity is sheerly a function of duration. But the convention of marking a long *anceps* is sometimes useful, because it reminds us that the marked syllable is related to other *incipitia* whether single or even double shorts (the result of a resolved long *anceps*) in the immediate context.



the number of syllables by resolution triggers the need for a short *anceps* in order to preserve the integrity of the glyconic's rhythm. The triple-short opening illustrates the function of the *anceps* within its colon; as for the use of an *anceps* in setting up relationships between its own colon and those around it, an analysis of individual contexts is necessary. The conventional notation  $\times$  for *anceps* is thus theoretical postulate and as such misleading. A second problem is our means for representing the resolution of long syllables, which is shown as either  $\overline{\sigma}$  or *res*. This type of notation presents difficulties. It does not take into account patterns of variation or developments in practice; preferences for resolutions of particular long syllables in a colon (as well as the choice of short or long *ancipitia*) not only varied from one author to another and from one phase of an author's career to another, but the combinations of resolutions and *ancipitia* varied likewise. Compiling statistics under this standard notation does not show us how a given colon functions in its context and all cola occur embedded in a metrical structure. I do not propose a new system of notation, but, while using convention terms, I shall try to discuss *ancipitia* and resolutions functionally. I do think that a name is needed for the general phenomenon of metrical irregularities which make sense to one's ear and propose the term "auditory effects."

Consider the following passage in which the  $\chi\rho\acute{o}\nu\omicron\iota$ <sup>11</sup> or quantitative values of the syllables produce an effect that edges the responding cola as far apart as the principle of quantity will permit.<sup>12</sup>

*Hel.*

1493 *Μενέλεως* ὅτι *Δαρδάνου*

1494 *πόιν* ἐλὼν δόμον ἤξει

1510 οὐκ ἐλθοῦσά (ποτ') Ἰλίου

1511 Φοιβείους ἐπὶ πύργους

the scansions are:

<sup>11</sup> A  $\chi\rho\acute{o}\nu\omicron\varsigma$ , which is identical to the Latin *mora* (a term first proposed by Hermann), usually refers to the quantity of a short syllable; a long syllable then equals two  $\chi\rho\acute{o}\nu\omicron\iota$ . S. Allen suggests that these quantities are not simply concerned with the duration of a syllable as a whole, but rather are a function of the syllabic ending. See S. Allen, *Vox Graeca* (Cambridge 1968) 100.

<sup>12</sup> The textual problem in 1510 where Bothe and Fix emend the manuscript reading ἐλθοῦσαν ἐς does not effect the argument. Murray's text, which includes Bothe's suggestion, is presented here.

1493  $\underline{UUU}-UU-U-$       1510  $---UU-U-$   
 1494  $\underline{UUU}-UU---$       1511  $---UU---$

the divergence between the strophe and antistrophe is shown by superimposing the scansion.

1493/1510  $\underline{UUU}-UU-U-$  glyconic  
 1494/1511  $\underline{UUU}-UU---$  pherecratean

Both the glyconic and pherecratean in the strophe open with a light fluttering effect, mentioned above, caused by the conjunction of a resolved initial long and a short *anceps*. The phenomenon's importance is emphasized by its repetition in the pherecratean (1494). The treatment of the antistrophe is quite different; the initial long is unresolved and the ensuing *ancipitia* are long in both cola (1510 and 1511). Three points are noteworthy: (1) The variations occur in the opening of the cola while the rest of the syllables are in the fixed, regular form. The congruence of the later syllables after the contrast in beginnings of the cola gives stability to the responsion. (2) Without the violation of responsion the effect of equivalence between cola is diminished. Aeolic cola are based on syllable-counting as well as quantity, but in this case the three syllables in the openings of 1493 and 1494, equal to three *χρόνοι*, are answered by only two syllables but four *χρόνοι*. The quantity of the long *anceps* in the antistrophe is appropriate for offsetting the number of syllables in the strophe. As I hope to show with further examples, quantity is becoming more responsive to the nuances of syllable-countings than is usually supposed. (3) The repetition of this effect makes this example more secure than the many cases of single pairs of responding cola. Without repetition the phenomenon could be attributed to accidental factors such as the proper name in 1493, but as the text stands the effect achieved is a conscious one.

A passage of aeolics from the *Bacchae* contains an unusual form of pherecratean in which resolution in the *anceps* seems to obscure the colon's kinship to the glyconics in the immediate context, but the auditory relationship between the pherecratean and the surrounding cola is clear.

*Bacch.*

.154 *Τῶλον χρυσορόου χλιδᾶ*

$---UU-U-$  glyconic

|                             |                            |
|-----------------------------|----------------------------|
| 155 μέλπετε τὸν Διόνυσον    | — υ υ — υ υ — pherecratean |
| 156 βαρυβρόμων ὑπὸ τυμπάνων | υ υ υ — υ υ — glyconic     |

Again the focus of interest is in the openings, —, —, — υ υ, and υ υ υ respectively. The first and third combinations are common, although as in *Hel.* 1493-94/1510-11 they are as dissimilar as possible within the limits of glyconics. Line 155, however, is a step further away from aeolic acceptability and is a pherecratean of the form —<sup>res</sup>— υ υ — with an unusual resolved long *anceps*.<sup>13</sup> The sequence of 154-56 shows a progression in the openings, from —<sup>res</sup> to —<sup>res</sup> to <sup>res</sup> υ. In 155 —<sup>res</sup> is a variation on its predecessor, —<sup>res</sup>, which preserves the *χοῳνοί* exactly and in 156, υ υ υ shows a sensitivity to syllable-counting by equating — υ υ to υ υ υ. It is important to note once again that the variations appear at the beginnings of the cola and that resolutions are absent from the latter parts. The invariable shape of the later syllables in the line enables one to hear the rhythmical theme on which 155 is the variation.<sup>14</sup>

<sup>13</sup> Attempts to overcome this anomaly such as Dodds' preferred analysis in his edition of the *Bacchae*, choriamb plus ionic, (see ad loc.) replace the issue of expanding the concept of a pherecratean to include the appearance of a double short in the *anceps* position with the loss of metrical coherence. The intrusion of a single ionic metron is unlikely because there is no other trace of ionic in the immediate context. Although his analysis works out on paper, it does not help us to perceive how the song works rhythmically and nomenclature should not only describe scansion, but also illuminate a song's structure. Not all commentators have followed Dodds' impulse to explain away this colon; Koster, while recognizing that cola of the form — υ υ — υ υ — are usually dactylic trimeters, asserts that *Bacch.* 155 is a pherecratean and cites the non-tragic parallel Pindar *Paeon* VI 177. See W. J. W. Koster, *Traité de métrique grecque suivi d'un précis de métrique latine*<sup>4</sup> (Leiden 1966) 225, note 1.

<sup>14</sup> Wilamowitz's transposition of 155 and 156 is attractive on grounds of syntax and meter, since it would put *Διόνυσον* in emphatic position at the end of its clause and in clausal position at the end of its period. This would entail pause before the ritual interjection and a change of meter at the beginning of a new period, a likely collocation. The sense and the meter, therefore, build to a crescendo. The resulting sequence of cola-openings is then —<sup>res</sup>, υ υ υ, — υ υ or glyconics with acceptable bases, followed by an aberrant pherecratean. A standard rhythmical arrangement for aeolics is that glyconics, which have eight syllables and end with the pattern . . . υ — (called "blunt" by Dale), have as clausulae pherecrateans, which have seven syllables and end . . . υ — (called "pendant"). In this instance the pherecratean in line 155 is a pendant octosyllable; a hybrid between the usual blunt octo-syllabic glyconic and the pendant heptasyllabic pherecratean.



A passage from *Iphigenia in Aulis* is another example of a sensitivity to syllable-counting. Consider 1093, which appears in the context of an aeolic stasimon.

|      |                             |   |
|------|-----------------------------|---|
| IA   |                             |   |
| 1092 | δοῦτε τὸ μὲν ἄσπετον ἔχει   | υ̅υ̅ υ̅ υ̅υ̅ υ̅, — υ̅ υ̅ — chor. dim. B <sup>15</sup> |
| 1093 | δύνασιν, ἃ δ' Ἀρετὰ κατόπι- | υ̅υ̅ υ̅ — υ̅ υ̅, — υ̅ υ̅ — ?                          |
| 1094 | σθεν θνατοῖς ἀμελείται      | — — — υ̅ υ̅ — — pherecratean                          |

Line 1093 is unusual, whether it is a glyconic υ̅υ̅ υ̅ — υ̅ υ̅ — υ̅υ̅ — or a choriambic dimeter υ̅υ̅ υ̅ — υ̅υ̅, — υ̅ υ̅ —. Possibly the music resolved this question but without such evidence the glyconic analysis is more likely, since word-overlap with the ensuing pherecratean suggests the dicolon period-close frequent in tragic aeolics, the priaean.<sup>16</sup> In any case, the auditory organization of this passage is based on the increase of one χρόνος between two lines with similar patterns. Both 1092 and 1093 open with tribrach words which are followed by parallel syntax: article, μέν/δέ, substantive.<sup>17</sup>

Euripides does not actually violate metrical principles but he expands them. In these cases he creates a tension between the expected form and the actual form of a colon by allowing syllable-counting to overcome strict quantitative responson. Syllable-counting is always an important factor in aeolics, but its role in this instance is increasing to the point that it is threatening quantity. Compensatory mechanisms, as in this case parallel syntax, seem to be needed to support such a shift in metrical principles.

A larger version of parallelism as a mode of compensation can be seen in *IA* 164-70/185-91. After a period of three glyconics and a pherecratean clausula (164-67/185-88) there occurs the following sequence:

<sup>15</sup> A choriambic dimeter B is so called because the choriamb (— υ̅ υ̅ —) appears in the second or B metron of the dimeter; the first or A metron consists of two longs and two *ancipitia* in a variety of combinations, x — x —, — x — x, x — — x.

<sup>16</sup> This practice of word-end after the first syllable of the following colon in aeolics and dochmiacs, called "dovetailing," is a common phenomenon in tragic lyrics. Cf. P. Maas, *Greek Metre*, transl. H. Lloyd-Jones (Oxford 1966) 44-45. A priaean is a glyconic bound by such word-overlap to an ensuing pherecratean.

<sup>17</sup> The one metrical variation is imbedded in the parallel structures, i.e. the quantities of the articles τό/ἃ.

## IA

|         |                                |   |     |                            |
|---------|--------------------------------|---|-----|----------------------------|
| 168     | Χαλκίδα πόλιν ἐμὴν προλιποῦσ', | - | 189 | ἀσπίδος ἔθρυμα καὶ κλισίας |
| 169     | ἀγγιγμάτων ὑδάτων τροφὸν       | - | 190 | ὀπλοφόρους Δαναῶν θέλουσ'  |
| 170     | τὰς κλεινὰς Ἀρεθούσας          | - | 191 | ἔππων τ' ὄχλον ἰδέσθαι     |
| 168/189 | — υ ὕ υ υ υ — ὕ υ —            |   |     | glyconic?                  |
| 169/190 | — ὕ υ — υ υ — υ —              |   |     | glyconic?                  |
| 170/191 | — — — υ υ — —                  |   |     | pherecratean               |

Prosodiac-enoplian labels could be used for 168-69/189-90, but they would obscure the song's unity. It is more helpful to see these cola as glyconic<sup>18</sup> variations on those in the preceding period through the resolution of long *ancipitia*. The presence of pherecratean clausulae (167/188 and 170/191) supports this as does the fact that all four pherecrateans are identical in form—i.e. long *ancipitia* and no resolutions. The pattern, then, of the song's first two periods is a simple one of theme and variation. The Euripidean glyconic in this example was able to bear considerable variation of its *χρόνοι*, provided that its basic rhythm had been previously established in the song.

We saw in the last passage of *Iphigenia in Aulis* that, in addition to *ancipitia* which produce dissimilar auditory effects in responsion, the treatment of resolutions can also create variations on standard cola. Euripides apparently went a step further by making standard forms of cola and their variations respond to each other. I have collected a few representative cases to illustrate the phenomenon.

## Phoen.

|     |                          |                     |                     |
|-----|--------------------------|---------------------|---------------------|
| 208 | 'Ιόνιον κατὰ πόντον ἔλα- | — υ υ — υ υ — υ ὕ υ | ibycean or glyconic |
|-----|--------------------------|---------------------|---------------------|

in responsion to

|     |                           |                   |          |
|-----|---------------------------|-------------------|----------|
| 220 | ἴσα δ' ἀγάλμασι χρυσστεύ- | ὕ υ υ — υ υ — υ — | glyconic |
|-----|---------------------------|-------------------|----------|

The initial double short in 208 could be explained as a resolved long *anceps* which responds to a short *anceps* in 220 and the anomaly could be attributed to the proper noun in 208 in order to achieve the responsion of two glyconics, but the fact remains that these lines have different rhythmical structures. Until the last syllable in 208 occurs as a short, the colon has a uniform

<sup>18</sup> A. M. Dale, "Lyrical Clausulae in Sophocles" *Collected Papers* (Cambridge 1969) 3 note 1; A. Kolář, *De re metrica poetarum Graecorum et Romanorum* (Prague 1947) 220; Wilamowitz (supra n. 4) 610.

double short, dactylic movement, while 220 shows the alternation between single and double shorts characteristic of aeolic rhythm. The bond between them seems to be a blend of syllable-counting and quantity with the former dominating the beginnings of the cola, the latter the ends; the double short at the end of 208 responds quantitatively to the final long in 220, but the opening syllables apparently respond on a counting basis  $-uu = uuu$ . Again these patterns can be brought into quantitative alignment for an aeolic basis,  $-uu = uu$ , but the point is that the trisyllabic resolution in the strophe seems to require a trisyllabic resolution in the antistrophe. The difference in the *χρόνοι* (four versus three) could happen in any aeolic responsion on account of the presence of *ancipitia*, but it is significant that this contrast is not suppressed by the increased emphasis on syllable-counting in the latter part of the colon, e.g.  $-uu-uu-u-$  in responsion to  $-u-uu-uu-$ .

Since *ancipitia* were used so widely to produce variant aeolic rhythms, it is reasonable to ask whether other mechanisms were used to produce the same kind of effects. The frequent responsion in Euripidean lyrics of a choriambic dimeter B to a glyconic indicates the equivalence which aeolic cola had, provided that syllable-counting and quantity were preserved.<sup>19</sup> The next step is to preserve the count but vary the *χρόνοι*.

Or.

813 ἤλυθε Τανταλίδαις

$-uu-uu-$  hemiepes?

in responsion to

825 θανάτου γὰρ αὐτοῖς ὄφρα

$(uu)-u-uu-$  blunt heptasyll. B

The two heptasyllables (the antistrophe with a resolution) respond, although the variation in *χρόνοι* cannot be accounted for by *ancipitia*, i.e. the equation of  $-uu$  and  $uu-u$ . As in earlier examples the variation takes place in the first half of the colon, leaving the choriambic shape in the latter half to supply a steadying force. Euripidean lyrics seemed to include the pattern of ambiguity and contrast followed by rhythmical congruence or what could be called variation and theme.

<sup>19</sup> This may be a reflex of an archaic practice. Such responsions occur in Corinna, Sappho and possibly Pindar and Bacchylides. See Maas (supra n. 15) 26-27 and B. Snell, *Griechische Metrik*<sup>3</sup> (Göttingen 1962) 29.

We need to learn more about the relative frequency of the types of metrical variation discussed above at particular points in time. Aeolics, given their combination of double and single short movement, have several metrical affinities in late Euripidean songs: one of these, the double short aspect which leads into dactylic and prosodiac-enoplian rhythms, was explored in the preceding examples from the *Orestes*, *Phoenissae*, and *Iphigenia in Aulis*. The single short aspect can lead into iambic rhythm<sup>20</sup> so that the responsion of aeolic to iambic cola becomes a possibility. In some cases the *χρόνοι* of an iambic dimeter and a glyconic can be identical. On account of this fact the analysis of *Hel.* 1308-9/1326-27 is ambiguous.

*Hel.*

|      |                              |      |      |                             |
|------|------------------------------|------|------|-----------------------------|
| 1308 | κρόταλα δὲ βρόμια διαπρύσιον | -    | 1326 | πέτρινα κατὰ δρῖα πολυνιφέα |
| 1309 | ἰέντα κέλαδον ἀνεβόα         | -    | 1327 | βροτοῖσι δ' ἄχλοα πεδία γᾶς |
|      | 1308/1326                    | UUUU | UUUU | UUUUUU                      |
|      | 1309/1327                    | U—U  | UUUU | UUUU—                       |

The spaces in the scansion reflect word-breaks. These lines are preceded by glyconics and choriambic dimeters B and could be resolved forms of those cola, but it is unlikely. The dimeter analysis would require four split resolutions on the first long of the choriamb, e.g. *βρόμια/δια-* and the glyconic analysis requires three on its choriamb's initial longs. In addition, aeolics do not normally resolve so completely as in 1308/1326. But iambics do, and the initial *anceps* in 1309/1327 plus a lack of split resolutions suggest iambic dimeters. Without more evidence such as the music, no firm answer can be given, but given the state of our knowledge we can say that in a homogeneous aeolic context Euripides introduced rhythmic variation by organizing aeolic octosyllables in an iambic way.

Euripides also carried his experiments into responsion.<sup>21</sup>

<sup>20</sup> I use the word "iambic" in strict sense, *x—u—x—u—* . . . Denniston's use of the term to cover a phenomenon such as choriambic dimeter is to be avoided, since that colon has two *ancipitia*, *x—x—, —uu—*, not one as in *x—u—, —uu—*.

<sup>21</sup> On the responsive structure of this passage, see Biehl in his edition ad loc. as well as Dale, *Metrical Analyses of Tragic Choruses: Fasc. I Dactylo-Epitríte*, Bulletin Supplement 21.1 (London 1970) 81-83 and Wilamowitz (supra n. 4) 172-77. Pace Murray.

Tro.

523 Τρωάδος ἀπὸ πέτρας σταθείς. —υυυυ, υ—υ— chor. dim. A.

in responsion to

543 νύχιον ἐπεὶ κνέφας παρήν, υυυυ—, υ—υ— iamb. dim.

The context makes it clear that 543 is an iambic dimeter, since the resolved opening υυυ appears at 519, 522/42, and 525/45. The choriambic analysis of 523 seems clear.<sup>22</sup> Although the responsion between two metrical families may be a surprising one,<sup>23</sup> several supporting mechanisms can be identified. Unlike cases where only aeolics were in question, any difference of *χρόνοι* is suppressed as syllable-counting takes over the burden of responsion; both the resolved choriamb and iambic monometer have six *χρόνοι*. In addition, the metra in question are mirror images of one another (as opposed to the possible equivalence of —υυυ and υ—υ—) and as has been noted before, the metrical variation takes place in the first part of the colon. The latter half has not only identical scansion, word-breaks and accentual pattern, but also an almost identical vowel patterns ε-ᾱ-ᾱ-ει versus ε-ᾱ-ᾱ-η).

The *Troiades* contains a second example of a choriambic metron responding to an iambic one in an otherwise iambic context.<sup>24</sup> Textual uncertainty, however, makes this case less convincing.

<sup>22</sup> Denniston was so concerned over this responsion that he posited a resolved molossus —υυυ in responsion to a full iambic dimeter, an unnecessarily complicated solution. See Denniston (supra n. 5) 128, 143.

<sup>23</sup> The responsion may also be old. Euripides may have been reviving an archaic metrical practice. See Snell (supra n. 18) 25 on Anacreon frag. 54 in which choriambic and iambic metra respond.

<sup>24</sup> Dale (supra n. 1) 116, Festa, *Ricerca metriche* (Palermo 1926) 199, as well as Grégoire and Biehl in their editions accept responsion. Again Murray resists. In fact the metrical aberrations in 308/325, which are under discussion here, are the major obstacles. These problems are outweighed by the frequency of responsion elsewhere in the stanza and the coincidence of content between the strophe and antistrophe. The text of 325 which is given here is based on Hermann's emendation, the insertion of *ἄναι*. An alternative reconstruction is Biehl's text, which accepts Theiler's solution, *πὸδ* (α σόν) in order to supply the necessary two short syllables. The resulting scansion of 308/25, υυυυυυ, —υυ, υυυυ— does not seriously affect the argument presented in this paper, because the first metron must be either an iambic monometer responding to a resolved choriamb υυυυυυ— —υυυυ or two choriambic

Tro.

308 ἄνεχε. πάρεχε. φῶς φέρ' ὦ. σέβω φλέγω υ̇υ̇υ̇υ̇υ̇, —υ̇—, υ̇—υ̇—

in responsion to

325 πάλλε πόδ' αἰθέριον ἄναγ' ἄναγε χρόνον —υ̇υ̇—, υ̇υ̇υ̇υ̇υ̇, υ̇υ̇υ̇υ̇υ̇

The *χρόνοι* of the initial metra correspond exactly, but the latter parts of the cola are not metrically identical. What is clear is the vowel pattern in 308, α-ε-ε; α-ε-ε; ω-ε-ω-ε-ω-ε-ω, which articulates the colon's structure. Assonance, then, is another possible compensatory device in late Euripidean lyrics.

### III. QUANTITATIVE FREEDOM

The examples adduced up to this point have illustrated the internal flexibility within recognizable cola which is supported by an emphasis on syllable-counting. If this principle of rhythmic organization became more important, then the question arises whether there is a coordinate phenomenon, a decreasing importance of quantity. I have collected a few examples which can be explained best by the occasional use of short syllables in place of long.

The line, Or. 838, contains an instance of quantitative freedom. As is often the case, context contributes to our understanding of the rhythm; other metrical aberrations precede it<sup>25</sup> and its immediate context is two choriambic dimeters B.

Or.

|     |                           |                  |               |
|-----|---------------------------|------------------|---------------|
| 836 | Εὐμένισι θήραμα, φόνον    | —υ̇υ̇υ̇—, —υ̇υ̇— | chor. dim. B  |
| 837 | δρομάσι δινεύων βλεφάροις | υ̇υ̇υ̇—, —υ̇υ̇—  | chor. dim. B  |
| 838 | Ἀγαμεμνόνης παῖς          | υ̇υ̇—υ̇υ̇—       | pherecratean? |

υ̇υ̇υ̇υ̇υ̇ ~ —υ̇υ̇υ̇υ̇. The latter analysis is doubtful, because the trisyllabic groupings in 308 suggest that the underlying rhythm is repetitive (as in an iambic metron). In any case, the rest of the colon seems to be two iambic metra, the first syncopated .—υ̇—, υ̇—υ̇—. If so, there is a theoretical conflict here. Dale strongly denies (Dale [supra n. 1] 73) the possibility of resolution of a long syllable immediately before syncopation, which would be the case in 308, if it is an iambic trimeter, υ̇υ̇υ̇υ̇υ̇, .—υ̇—, υ̇—υ̇—. Three alternatives are possible; 1) this passage is an exception to Dale's injunction; 2) the pattern of resolutions is trochaic and not iambic as in Biehl's analysis, υ̇υ̇υ̇υ̇υ̇, —υ̇—υ̇—υ̇—; 3) there is no syncopation and the colon is a metron (whether iambic or trochaic in 308 in responsion to a choriamb in 325) prefixed to common colon, a lekythion. See below Section IV. Prefixing of Metra Within Cola.

<sup>25</sup> See Or. 813/25 above.

A pendant heptasyllable pherecratean is the usual clausula to blunt aeolic octosyllables so that the colon is probably a pherecratean with a double short opening in place of the usual —x . . . .<sup>26</sup> Such an opening is rare in tragic lyrics, but it is common in archaic aeolics. Euripides seems to be turning to an earlier pattern for aeolics, the syllable-counting of Lesbian poetry, as can be seen in the precedent which Koster cites for the line Sapph. fr. 98, 4.<sup>27</sup> The significance of his citation is that it is non-tragic and that in the context of late fifth-century dramatic lyrics, such an anachronistic choice for the opening of an aeolic colon on Euripides' part has the effect of substituting a short for a long syllable.<sup>28</sup> This device is well within the limits of Greek metrics, but it is usually confined to the final syllable of a colon i.e. *syllaba brevis in elemento longo*. What seems to be happening is an encroachment of this phenomenon in which syllable count overrides quantity into the interior of cola. The usual assumption about *brevis in longo* is that a short pause follows, presumably one *χρόνος* in length, which compensates for the shortness of the final syllable. Whether this supposition should be extended to non-final positions in a colon or not is impossible to decide, given our present knowledge.

Examples of *brevis in longo* in non-final position where quantity is abandoned in anapestic and dactylic cola have already been recorded by Dale and were mentioned above.<sup>29</sup> Her examples follow. (Syllabic grouping and accents are indicated in the scansion.)

*Anapestic Cola*

*Tro.*

136 Πρίαμον, ἐμέ τε μελέαν 'Εκάβαν      ὕυυ ὕυυ ὕύ— ὕύ—

*Ion*

889 κρόκεα πέταλα φάρεσιν ἔδρεπον      ὕυυ ὕυυ ὕυυ ὕυυ

900 ἴνα με λέχεσι μελέαν μελέοις      ὕυυ ὕυυ ὕύ— ὕύ—

*IT*

130 πόδα παρθένιον δοιον δόας      ὕύ—ὕυυ ὕυυ ὕύ—

197 φόνος ἐτι φόνῳ ἄχεα ἄχεσιν      ὕυ ὕύ ὕ—ὕυυ ὕυυ

<sup>26</sup> Both Wilamowitz (supra n. 4) 212 and Koster (supra n. 12) 216 consider the colon to be a pherecratean with a "pyrrhic" i.e. double short, opening.

<sup>27</sup> Koster (supra n. 12) 216.

<sup>28</sup> The presence of a proper name may precipitate the scansion, but the important point here is that such a variant was acceptable.

<sup>29</sup> See n. 1.

|                      |  |                           |
|----------------------|--|---------------------------|
| 213                  | ἔτεκεν, ἔτρεφεν εὐκταίαν                   | ύ υ υ υ ύ υ υ — —         |
| 220                  | ἄγαμος ἄτεκνος ἄπολις ἄφιλος               | ύ υ υ υ ύ υ υ ύ υ υ ύ υ υ |
| 232                  | ἔτι βρέφος, ἔτι νέον, ἔτι θάλος            | ύ υ ύ υ ύ υ ύ υ ύ υ ύ υ   |
| <i>Dactylic Cola</i> |  |                           |
| <i>Phoen.</i>        |  |                           |
| 796                  | ἀσπιδοφέρμονα θίασον ἔνοπλον <sup>30</sup> | — υ υ — ύ υ υ ύ υ υ ύ υ υ |

in responsion to the normal dactylic tetrameter

|     |                                |                         |
|-----|--------------------------------|-------------------------|
| 813 | Οἰδιπόδα κατὰ δώματα καὶ πόλιν | — υ ύ — υ ύ — υ υ — ύ υ |
|-----|--------------------------------|-------------------------|

and the apparent adoneans<sup>31</sup>

|      |                |         |
|------|----------------|---------|
| 1498 | τίνα προσφῶδον | ύ υ υ — |
|------|----------------|---------|

and

|      |               |         |
|------|---------------|---------|
| 1557 | ἔλπει βερίθων | ύ υ υ — |
|------|---------------|---------|

Trisyllabic grouping where *brevis in longo* occurs (except for *IT* 232 and *Phoen.* 1498) and the appearance of acute accents on the majority of initial syllables of these groups act as compensatory mechanisms to support the underlying movement as Dale suggested.<sup>32</sup>

To these examples may be added a sequence from the *Troïades*. The lyrics of 122-52 begin with a spondaic and an anapestic paroemiac which are followed by two unusual cola (124-25) and then another spondaic paroemiac. The cola of interest are:

|             |                          |                     |
|-------------|--------------------------|---------------------|
| <i>Tro.</i> |                          |                     |
| 124         | δι' ἄλα πορφυροειδέα καὶ | υ ύ υ — υ υ — ύ υ — |
| 125         | λιμένας Ἑλλάδος εὐόρμους | υ ύ υ — ύ υ — —     |

Dale's analysis, two "free form of glyconic,"<sup>33</sup> is doubtful in the context of homogeneous anapests which begin at 98

<sup>30</sup> I follow the manuscripts' reading *ἐνοπλον* and reject the anonymous emendation *ἐνόπλιον*, accepted by Murray among others. The sole purpose of the emendation is to eliminate the metrically unusual phenomenon under discussion here. For a discussion of the inadvisability of emending 796 as well as the shortcomings of present attempts to do so see Dale (*supra* n. 1) 66 and Wilamowitz (*supra* n. 4) 360.

<sup>31</sup> The context of adoneans, often as clausulae, is clear; 1501, 1514, 1538, 1545, 550, 1559.

<sup>32</sup> Dale (*supra* n. 1) 64.

<sup>33</sup> Dale (*supra* n. 1) 58.



and continue to 229.<sup>34</sup> Far more understandable, given the appearance at 136 of the anapestic dimeter mentioned above with the form  $\acute{\upsilon}\acute{\upsilon}\acute{\upsilon}\ \acute{\upsilon}\acute{\upsilon}\acute{\upsilon}\ \acute{\upsilon}\acute{\upsilon}-\ \acute{\upsilon}\acute{\upsilon}-$  is the analysis of two paroemiacs, each of which has an initial "light" syllable, that is, a short syllable in place of a long. Trisyllabic grouping occurs. Accent is apparently not an obligatory device to sustain the underlying rhythm, since it does not appear on either of the initial "light" syllables.

The appearance of another "light" syllable may account for a manuscript reading which is usually emended. Murray transposed the words of *Or.* 1483 in order to create the two dochmiacs:

δὴ τότε διαπρεπεῖς τότ' ἐγένοντο Φρύγες  
—  $\acute{\upsilon}\acute{\upsilon}\ \acute{\upsilon}\acute{\upsilon}\ \acute{\upsilon}\ \text{—},\ \acute{\upsilon}\ \acute{\upsilon}\acute{\upsilon}\ \text{—}\ \acute{\upsilon}\ \acute{\upsilon}\acute{\upsilon}$

But the manuscripts have the more rhetorical phrasing:

τότε δὴ τότε διαπρεπεῖς ἐγένοντο Φρύγες  
 $\acute{\upsilon}\acute{\upsilon}-\ \acute{\upsilon}\acute{\upsilon}\ \acute{\upsilon}\acute{\upsilon}\acute{\upsilon}-\ \acute{\upsilon}\acute{\upsilon}-\ \acute{\upsilon}\acute{\upsilon}\acute{\upsilon}$

The metrical context helps us to understand the validity of this reading. Lines 1469-82 are iambic dimeters and trimeters. After the disputed line occur a dochmiac, four anapestic cola, an iambic dimeter and a trimeter. Lines 1483-84, then, are the rhythmic transitions between homogeneous, single short iambic movement and double short anapestic. Murray departed from the textual tradition and created a sequence of three dochmiacs. His choice of dochmiacs for 1483 seems to be based on the rhythm in the ensuing colon. If, however, the short syllable  $\delta\iota-$  is "light," then the line would consist of two anapestic cola (one an odd length not resolvable into dimeters, the other a monometer) which foreshadow the development of that rhythm in 1485-87. There is a pattern in the periods. The iambic run is ended by an anapestic clausula with final *brevis in longo*. The next period, after opening a fresh dochmiac rhythm, reverses the pattern: an anapestic passage is

<sup>34</sup> There is a differentiation in the anapests; they are non-lyrical or chanted from 98-121 and sung lyrics from 122-229. The unusual cola under discussion, therefore, occur at the transition from one mode of expression to another.

<sup>36</sup> Denniston (supra n. 5) 141-42.

resolutions similar to those in 1105. The problem is in 1069 where the second metron seems to have eight *χρόνοι*. The rhetorical balance (*τέρμονά τε - αἰθέρα τε*) and the coincidence of word-breaks between strophe and antistrophe affirm responson. The syllabic grouping is:

1069 —υ̣υ̣ —υ̣υ̣ —υ̣—  
1079 —υ̣υ̣ υ̣υ̣ —υ̣υ̣—

Similar word-breaks appear at the beginnings and ends of 1087/1105.

1087 —υ̣υ̣ —υ̣ υ̣υ̣—υ̣υ̣  
1105 —υ̣υ̣ υ̣υ̣ υ̣υ̣ υ̣υ̣.

The word containing the rhythmical irregularity *πρωτόβολον* shows the same paeonic resolution —υ̣υ̣υ̣ which occurs at the opening of all four cola (cf. *πρωτόβολον* and *ἑπλόβοτον*) so that I suspect that the *χρόνοι* of the *anceps* in the second iambic metron were allowed to increase in order to echo the opening pattern of the colon. This variation occurs in the context of metrical variation as the increase of *χρόνοι* in the ending of 1087 shows and the readings of VP at 1069/1079 should be reconsidered.

Impure endings in iambs, when the *anceps* is short to indicate the basic rhythm (υ̣— —), are not a surprising phenomenon, especially in dochmiac contexts where a long second *anceps* υ̣— —<sub>χ</sub>— is a common device for period-closure. A more startling case is one with a long *anceps* and an impure ending in the same metron in responson to a standard iambic metron as in the following instance:

*Tro.*  
308 ἰδοῦ, ἰδοῦ υ̣— υ̣—

in responson to

325 εὐάν, εὐοῖ — — —<sup>37</sup>

Word-breaks, accents, syllable-groupings, repetition and

<sup>37</sup> Biehl avoids the implications of this passage by considering only these phrases to be *extra metrum* in a context of responson, but the parallels between the phrases suggest that they are not heard as random interjection but are meant to echo each other.

the fact that the words are all cries underscore a responsive relationship between these metra. It is possible that so many compensatory devices are needed to preserve the equation of the metra, because the long anceps in 325 removes any trace of single short movement in the antistrophe.

There is even an example of a colon in which three short syllables are replaced by longs. In *Phoen.* 239-45/250-56 a series of seven lekythia appear, which are followed by the puzzling lines:

*Phoen.*

246 Φοινίσσα χάρα. φεῦ φεῦ. —————

in responson to

257 δειμαίνω τὰν σὰν ἀλκὰν —————

On the face of it these cola could be spondaic paroemiacs, but the metrical context eliminates such an analysis. The ensuing material is a trochaic dimeter (247/258) — u u, — u u, a trochaic trimeter syncopated and catalectic (248/259) — u — u, — u — u, — — — —, and a lekythion clausula (249/260) — u — u — u — so that the stanza strongly establishes iambo-trochaic movement before showing these aberrant cola and then tips briefly into a trochaic movement before returning to the original iambo-trochaic rhythm for closure. In this homogeneous metrical context, based on the alteration of single long and short syllables, an intrusion of a unique anapestic colon in spondaic form is not as illuminating a possibility as the observation that the seven-syllable length of the lekythion is preserved in the seven longs of 246/257. In this instance syllable-counting has taken such precedence over quantity that a “heavy” lekythion with seven longs is possible.

#### IV. PREFIXING OF METRA WITHIN COLA

The variations within cola which have clearly perceptible limits on account of their metrically homogeneous contexts have been treated in detail. Now the techniques creating variation through the blurring of cola boundaries can be examined. In these cases colometry is difficult because more than one rhythm seem to appear in a given colon. The metrical

shifts create an element of surprise which verges on punning. I suggest the term "pre-fixing" be applied when small amounts of material in one rhythm appear before a colon in an antithetical meter. I suspect that an entire spectrum of possibilities is covered by this device; the prefixed material ranges from one syllable to entire metra.

Denniston observed this phenomenon in his discussion of the appearance of iambic monometers before lekythia and ithyphallics.<sup>38</sup> Although two of his examples (*Andr.* 282-83 and *E. Supp.* 78-79) fall outside this paper's bounds, they serve as a reminder that the roots of Euripides' experimentation with metrical effects can be sought in his earlier works. The examples cited by Denniston which are relevant here are *Phoen.* 1723-27 and *Or.* 975. The passage from the *Phoenissae* follows:

Oedipus

1723 ἰὼ ἰώ, δυστυχεστάτας φυγὰς      U—U—, —U—U—U—

1724 ἐλαύγων τὸν γέροντά μ' ἐκ πάτρας.      U—., —U—U—U—

1725 ἰὼ ἰώ, δεινὰ δέιν' ἐγὼ τλάς      U—U—, —U—U—// Pause

Antigone

1726 τί τλάς; τί τλάς; οὐχ ὄρᾳ Δίκα κακοῦς,      U—U—, —U—U—U—

1727 οὐδ' ἀμείβεται βροτῶν ἀσυνεσίας.      —U—U—U—, U U U—

The grammatical sense in the case of the full prefixed iambic metra accentuates the division between the metra and the lekythion or ithyphallic (1723, 1725, and 1726); in the case of the syncopated prefix iambic metron (1724) word-break still segregates the metron from the lekythion, but grammatical sense fuses them. The overall effect of the passage is to have Oedipus set a metrical pattern in 1723, vary it in 1724 (as seen before, variation occurs at the colon's beginning) and return to his original formulation in 1725 (including the repetition of ἰὼ ἰώ) but end this line in a clausular rhythm. Antigone then takes up the basic metrical shape in 1726, complete with repetition in the prefixed monometer plus word-break and grammatical break between the full monometer and lekythion so that her emotional affinity for her father on the level of content is reflected on the level of form in her echo of his complex rhythms. In 1727 she introduces her variation which is to

<sup>38</sup> Denniston (*supra* n. 5), 122.

<sup>40</sup> Note in this context the strange colaria 967 *ῥῆματ' οἶκον* ~ 978 *μοῖρα βαίνει* — — which are trochaic clausulae to otherwise pure iambic periods. Dale recognizes them as shortened variants of the ithyphallics in 962 *αἰματηρὸν ἄταν* — — (the antistrophe 973 is corrupt) and in 970/81. See Dale (supra n. 17) 20 and Wilamowitz (supra n. 4) 298. The trochaic colaria are equivalent to a monometer length of the ithyphallic; that is, they have the trochaic opening and a pendant close (— —) of an ithyphallic, but they are only four syllables or one metron in length. As is the case in prefixing itself, these cola reflect a miniaturistic treatment in the length of their rhythms.

not unusual in Euripidean lyrics, but the treatment here is remarkable in its scale and regularity. The prefixed iambic metra set up one rhythm which is immediately tipped into a trochaic flow whether by the trochaic opening of a lekythion —u—u . . . or by an ithyphallic. The sense of a colon as a recognizable rhythmical unit is weakened as apparently conflicting movements appear in such small units; instead there is a concentration of interest on the immediate metrical context as minute shifts create cross-rhythms and surprises within that unit of time which was the building block of the stanza, the colon.

Prefixing, plus the possibility of a "light" syllable in the place of a long, may explain a troublesome line.

*Phoen.*

132 ἄλλος ἄλλος ὅδε τευχέων τρόπος —u—u, úu—u—u—

The colon could be identified as a trochaic monometer plus a dochmiac —u—u, úú—u—; the analysis is doubtful because it requires a combination of exceptions: synizesis of *εων*, a resolved long *anceps* in the dochmiac, and an unacceptable pause before *ὅδε*. (Pause is required at the conjunction of *ancipitia* and both the last syllable of a trochaic metron and the first of a dochmiac are *anceps*.) The pause is unacceptable because it violates the sense of the passage by separating adjectives from their noun. Alternatively, the colon could be called two hypodochmiacs —u—u úú, —u—u—. This analysis too has a severe liability; it does not fit the rhetorical phrasing of the line. The repetition in *ἄλλος ἄλλος* suggests a trochaic movement and *ὅδε . . . τρόπος* is a grammatically coherent unit. To append *ὅδε* to *ἄλλος ἄλλος* in order to have a hypodochmiac will work out on paper, but the sense of the line pulls in another direction. But, if Euripides is here using a "light" syllable in place of a long, the colon can be read as a trochaic monometer prefixed to a lekythion with a "light" initial long. Possibly the change of speaker in 133 echoes this rhythm, since Oedipus' reply has the auditory effect of a lekythion: *παῖς μὲν Οἰνέως* *ἔφν* —u—u—u—.

Prefixing was not simply used in short passages for

metrical finesse; the technique was used by Euripides as the basis for entire stanzas. Consider the second strophic pair of the Parodos in *Iphigenia in Aulis*.<sup>41</sup>

|         |   |
|---------|---|
| 231/242 | — . — . , — U — U — U —   |
| 232/243 | — U — U — U —   |
| 233/244 | — U — . , — U — U — U —   |
| 234/245 | — . — . , $\overline{\overline{U}}$ $\overline{\overline{U}}$ U — U — |
| 235/246 | $\overline{\overline{U}}$ U — U —                                     |
| 236/247 | $\overline{\overline{U}}$ U — U — U —                                 |
| 237/248 | — . — . , — U — U — U —   |
| 238/249 | — . — . , — U — U — U —   |
| 239/250 | — U — . , — U — U — U —   |
| 240/251 | — U — U — U — $\overline{\overline{U}}$                               |
| 241/252 | — . — . , — U — U — U —   |

It is possible to label the cola trochaic trimeter syncopated catalectic, lekythia, hypodochmiac and so on, but such an operation obscures the organization of the stanza. The steady repetition of lekythia occurs, with or without prefixing material which is always less than a full metron. The ambiguous iambo-trochaic nature of lekythia and the syncopation of prefixing material prevents the rhythm from settling into either a clear iambic or trochaic movement. Lines 235/46 are in auditory effect a shortened variant of the lekythia (cf. *Or.* 967/78 for a similar device). As in his aeolics Euripides seems to use a scheme of variation and then the theme.

Prefixing continues in the ensuing strophic pair which contains a colon inexplicable except through prefixing.

|     |  |
|-----|--|
| 1A  |  |
| 253 | Βοιωτῶν δ' ὀπλισμα πόντιον — . — U — U — U — |

in responsion to

|     |  |
|-----|--|
| 265 | Μυκήνας δὲ τᾶς Κυκλωπίας U — . — U — U — U — |
|-----|--|

As in the preceding strophe the prefixed material is less than a full metron, but here it seems to be free from the constraints of Greek metrical practices, since the unit U— does not have independent existence in Greek metrics. Syllable-counting seems to have such force that the prefixing of any two syllables (except for two shorts) is an acceptable device for

<sup>41</sup> The text used is that of Murray in the Oxford Classical Text.



variation. This phenomenon suggests that occasionally Euripides experimented with iambic and trochaic cola which were not based on lengths of a given meter, but rather on the contrast and surprise achieved by minute rhythmical changes. It is relatively simple to see such experiments in the easily syncopated single short meters. Did such practices occur in double short meters also?

#### V. PREFIXING AND EPIPOKE

The meters in the Parodos of the *Bacchae* are complex. One technique in that song is an exploration of the borderline between ionic and choriambic meters. Metrical ambiguity creates a rhythmic fluidity and rapid change which aptly reflect the *Bacchae*'s state of mind. At first a homogeneous ionic context is established in the Prooimion (64-71) which ends in a syncopated dimeter.

*Bacch.*

71 Διόνυσον ὑμνήσω                    υ υ — υ — — —

The entire colon is echoed in the next line, a choriambic dimeter A which opens a new strophe.

*Bacch.*

72 ὦ μάκαρ, ὅστις εὐδαίμων            — υ υ — υ — — —

in responsion to

88 ὅν ποτ' ἔχουσ' ἐν ᾠδίνων            — υ υ — υ — — —

The shared pattern υ υ — υ — — — forms a bridge between the preceding ionic movement and the aeolic colon. The metrical shift is achieved by the presence of an initial long which establishes the choriambic opening. The next line 73/89 moves the passage back to a homogeneous ionic movement (syncopated dimeters) until 75/91, when the sequence from choriambics to ionics is repeated.<sup>42</sup>

<sup>42</sup> Murray's analysis which makes the initial longs of 72/88 *extra metrum* collapses in the antistrophe because of the integral meaning of ὅν. Festa's alternative of regular aeolic dimeters with consistent word-overlap, — υ υ — υ — — (Festa [supra, n. 24] 96-98) is not convincing. As Dale pointed out, repeated *caesura* after a pendant close is improbable. See Dale (supra n. 1) 127.

*Bacch.*

|                         |                            |                 |
|-------------------------|----------------------------|-----------------|
| 73 τελετὰς θεῶν εἰδῶς   | - 89 λοχίαις ἀνάγκαισι     | υ υ — υ — — —   |
| 74 βιοτὰν ἀγιστεύει     | - 90 παμένας Διδὸς βροντᾶς | υ υ — υ — — —   |
| 75 καὶ θιασέυεται ψυχὰν | - 91 νηδύος ἔκβολον ματηρ  | — υ υ — υ — — — |
| 76 ἐν ὄρεσσι βακχεύων   | - 92 ἔτεκεν, λιποῦσ' αἰῶ-  | υ υ — υ — — —   |
| 77 δαίοις καθαρμοῖσιν   | - 93 να κεραννίῳ πληγῇ.    | υ υ — υ — — —   |

In this passage Euripides twice<sup>43</sup> uses what can be called a prefixing relationship between the syncopated ionic dimeter and the choriambic dimeter. That the initial longs of 72/88 and 75/91 do not have quite the independent existence that the prefixed syllables of *IA* 253/65 have (— — ~ υ —) is clear and important; Euripides achieved prefixing effects not only by placing before common cola whole metra and syllables, which seem to be shortened variants of metra, but also by juxtaposing forms of standard rhythms such as ionic and choriambic that differ only by the presence or absence of a single initial long. Prefixing, then, covers a spectrum of phenomena, which varies according to the independence of the prefixed material. In the center of the continuum is the full metron attached to an easily recognized colon so that two rhythms apparently coexist in one colon. One extreme of the spectrum is reached by syncopating the prefixed metron until it is reduced to two syllables and then allowing syllable-counting to overcome quantitative principles; the result is *IA* 253/65 and the abandonment of metra in meters which are normally *κατὰ μέτρον*.<sup>44</sup> The other limit of the spectrum is the juxtaposition of standard meters which do not have conflicting rhythms within their cola and conform to accepted metrical principles, but differ by one long syllable. Euripides' innovation of prefixing, then, appears both in cola in conformity with accepted metrical theory and in cola where syllable-counting encroaches on quantity. Prefixing, because it links acceptable and "irregular" cola, shows that aberrant

<sup>43</sup> The same opening occurs at the beginning of the Second Strophe, but this time the aeolic aspect is developed in the ensuing lines.

<sup>44</sup> Some cola contain analytical units or "metra" of recurring movement; dactylic — υ υ, anapaestic υ υ —, iambic x — υ —, and trochaic — υ — x. Cola which have these components are said to proceed *κατὰ μέτρον* and are labelled as dimeters and so on, according to the number of metra in them. Not all cola are so organized. Aeolics, for example, do not proceed *κατὰ μέτρον*, because there is no recurrent pattern within a single colon.

rhythms can be the result of pressures operating on normal cola. We can see a major metrical innovation at work, rather than an occasional "license."

Some attention has been given to passages such as the example from the *Bacchae* in which the rhythm changed from a falling movement —υυ . . . to a rising one υυ— . . . . Dale restored<sup>45</sup> a piece of ancient metrical terminology, *epiploke*, to cover this phenomenon of a sequence of phrases in apparently antithetical meters. Her example is from Euripidean dactyls.

*Phoen.*

1489 αἰδομένα φέρομαι βάκχα νεκύων, —υυ—υυ— —υυ—  
1490 κράδεμνα δικούσα κόμας ἀπ' ἐμᾶς, —υυ—υυ—υυ—  
1491 στολίδος κροκόεσσαν ἀνείσα τρυφάν. υυ—υυ—υυ—υυ—

She remarked of this passage that, without the support of responsion, the choices between *epiploke* colometry, which emphasizes rhetorical pauses, and a traditional colometry of dactylic tetrameters, which is based on metra-counting, is largely a matter of taste. From a different point of view one could say that this astrophic example marks the beginning of a spectrum of phenomena in which metra-counting has increasingly less force.

A case of choriambic *epiploke* in responsion shows the tension between rhetorical phrasing and colometry.

*IA*

|     |                               |   |     |                                 |
|-----|-------------------------------|---|-----|---------------------------------|
| 171 | 'Αχαιῶν στρατιὰν ὥς ἐσιδοίμαν | - | 192 | κατεῖδον δὲ δῦ' Αἴαντε συνέδρω, |
| 172 | 'Αχαιῶν τε πλάτας ναυσιπόρους | - | 193 | τὸν Οἰλέως Τελαμῶνός τε γόνον,  |
| 173 | ἡμιθέων, οἷς ἐπὶ Τροίαν       | - | 194 | τὸν Σαλαμῖνος στέφανον. Πρω-    |
| 174 | ἐλάταις χλιόνανσιν            | - | 195 | τεσιλαὸν τ' ἐπὶ θάκοις          |
| 175 | τὸν ξανθὸν Μενέλαόν θ'        | - | 196 | πεσσῶν ἡδομένους μορ-           |
| 176 | ἀμέτεροι πόσις                | - | 197 | φαῖσι πολυπλόκοις               |

|         |                |
|---------|----------------|
| 171/192 | υ— —υυ— —υυ— — |
| 172/193 | υ— —υυ— —υυ— — |
| 173/194 | υυ— —υυ— —     |
| 174/195 | υυ— —υυ— —     |
| 175/196 | — — —υυ— —     |
| 176/197 | —υυ—υ—         |

The repetition of 'Αχαιῶν in 171 and 172 and their identical scansion suggest that both lines are pendant hendeca-

<sup>45</sup> Dale (supra n. 1) 40-41. Originally the term simply referred to the possibility of quarrying both iambic and trochaic cola from the series x—υ—x—υ—x . . . , dactylic and anapestic from υυ—υυ—υυ— . . . .

syllables, but the phrasing and the repetition of *τόν* in 193-94 imply that 172/93 are one syllable shorter than 171/92. Another conflict arises, this time between the stanzas. Line 193 is a choriambic decasyllable whose blunt end tips the rhythm into ionics, but in 195 sentence-end and word-overlap by *Πρω-* suggest uniform choriambic dimeter movement, i.e. —υυ——υυ—. The material seems to be so fluid that it almost defies analysis

There is another refinement possible in dactylic *epiploke*; the apparent anapestic segment can have the rhetorical balance and word-breaks which are associated with a dactylic tetrameter as in *Phoen.* 1575-76.

*Phoen.*

|      |                                    |                     |
|------|------------------------------------|---------------------|
| 1573 | μάτηρ, ὥστε λέοντας ἐναύλους,      | — — — — υυ — υυ — — |
| 1574 | μαρναμένους ἐπὶ τραύμασιν, αἵματος | — υυ — υυ — υυ — υυ |
| 1575 | ἤδη ψυχρὰν λοιβὰν φονίαν,          | — — — — — — υυ —    |
| 1576 | ἀν ἔλαχ' Αἰδάς, ὥπασε δ' Ἀρης      | — υυ — — — — υυ — — |

Lines 1573 and 1574 are ordinary tetrameters. Line 1575 seems like an anapestic dimeter but has the phrasing which often occurs in a dactylic tetrameter. The fourth colon completes the metrical ambiguity by having both the scansion and wording of a tetrameter. Euripides seems to be trying for an effect common in modern poetry, a dynamic tension between a line's ideal pattern (scansion) and the natural groupings of syllables and sense. But where English poetry, for example, has a relatively small number of simple meters to be used, Greek lyrics allow an enormous number of alternatives for each line.

## VI. METRICAL INNOVATIONS AND PERFORMANCE

A conflict between scansion and rhetorical phrasing in a cola-structured poetry presses the limits of the system. From our distant vantage point we can see an essential point. The sophistication and co-operation which Euripides could rely on in his audience were enormous. The metrical subtleties discussed here were not theoretical phenomena; they were meant to be heard by an audience and it must have been willing to give great concentration to a performance.

We are fortunate that accidents of textual transmission give us the evidence that proves Euripides' audience could in fact

hear the metrical nuances discussed here, i.e. Aristophanic comedy. For example, a sampling of the cola in Aeschylus' spoof of a Euripidean monody (*Ran.* 1309-64) show several metrical features mentioned above. The offsetting of the number of syllables by the number of *χρόνοι* in aeolic opening appears in 1327-28 where once again the *χρόνοι* produce an effect that edges the cola as far apart as the principle of quantity will permit.

*Ran.*

|      |                     |                  |              |
|------|---------------------|------------------|--------------|
| 1327 | ἀνὰ τὸ ἡδεκαμήχανον | ὕὑ υ — υ υ — υ — | glyconic     |
| 1328 | Κυρήνης μελοποιῶν;  | — — — υ υ — —    | pherecratean |

An exaggeration of the aeolic opening with long *ancipitia* and perhaps a parody of prefixing in aeolics appears several times. Two examples are:<sup>46</sup>

*Ran.*

|      |                                      |                        |
|------|--------------------------------------|------------------------|
| 1314 | εἰεἰεἰεἰεἰλίσσετε δακτύλοις φάλαγγες |                        |
|      | — — — — — χ — υ υ — υ — υ — —        | prefix plus phalacean? |

and

*Ran.*

|      |                       |                    |              |
|------|-----------------------|--------------------|--------------|
| 1349 | εἰεἰεἰλίσσουσα χερσὶν | — — — — —, — υ υ — | chor dim. B? |
|------|-----------------------|--------------------|--------------|

An example of "light" syllables in an anapestic paroemiac is in fact identical to a Euripidean example discussed earlier. Compare:

*Ran.*

|      |                       |                   |
|------|-----------------------|-------------------|
| 1355 | ἐβαλον ἐβαλον ἀτλάμων | ύ υ υ ύ υ υ — — — |
|------|-----------------------|-------------------|

and

*IT*

|     |                         |                   |
|-----|-------------------------|-------------------|
| 213 | ἔτεκεν ἔτρεφεν εὐκταίαν | ύ υ υ ύ υ υ — — — |
|-----|-------------------------|-------------------|

Also syllable-counting is turned loose and allowed to override quantity in a passage of decasyllabic cola.

<sup>46</sup> It is difficult to know precisely what is the metrical joke because the manuscripts differ on the repetitions of *el-*. Stanford thinks that the metrical parody may depend on one of Euripides' favorite musical devices, *ἐπέκτασις* or "prolongation" in which a singer prolongs a syllable over several notes. See W. B. Stanford, *Aristophanes: The Frogs*<sup>2</sup> (London 1963) 183. He also notes that Aristophanes can rarely resist milking a good joke—thus 1349.

*Ran.*

|      |                                |                 |
|------|--------------------------------|-----------------|
| 1361 | σὺ δ' ὦ Διός, διπύρους ἀνέχου- | υ—υ—υυ—υυ—      |
| 1362 | σα λαμπάδας ὀξυτάτας χερσῶν,   | υ—υυ—υυ—υ—      |
| 1363 | Ἐκάτα, παράφηνον εἰς Γλύκῃς,   | υυ—υυ—υ—υ—      |
| 1364 | ὅπως ἂν εἰσελθοῦσα φωράσω.     | υ—υ— — — υ— — — |

The gradual migration of the double shorts to the beginning of the cola (1361-63) is followed by a reassertion of the original iambic rhythm at the opening of 1364 and a heavy, clausular movement. Although the *χρόνοι* vary, the syllable-count is constant. This is the passage which overwhelms Dionysus; he orders Aeschylus to shut up.

These examples confirm some of the categories of metrical innovation proposed here, but, in addition, they are jokes. Since the dramatic context of a verbal *tour de force* implies a rapid delivery and a good comic writer such as Aristophanes writes jokes that will go over with his audience, we can know that the metrical extravagances were instantly perceived. The Athenians who attended dramatic performances (both tragic and comic) could not only hear subtle rhythmic patterns; they had a thorough mastery of them. Although we cannot directly experience an intimate alliance with Euripides and feel his metrical subtleties, we can observe evidence that the process once took place.

## VII. EPILOGUE

Paradoxically, this sophistication on the part of both audience and author led to a weakness in the system: Greek dramatic meters were too complex to sustain variation of *χρόνοι* within cola, the blurring of cola limits by *epiploke*, and metrical punning through prefixing or rhetorical phrasing for any length of time. Once changes in the fundamental assumptions of an elaborate system have been attempted, there is no retreat possible. Euripides was not only expanding the limits of his inherited metrics, he was doing it in such a way as to consume his heritage. What we see here are not only the sensitive innovations of a great artist, but also the seeds of destruction for a very fragile system. The colon which was fundamental to Greek metrics was being subjected to both internal and external attack.

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THE SPEECHES IN POLYBIUS:  
AN INSIGHT INTO THE NATURE OF HELLENISTIC  
ORATORY

Since there are no complete Greek orations and only a few fragments extant from the Hellenistic period, one must turn in large part to literary manifestations of oratory for conclusions concerning its content. Here the most valuable evidence are the speeches in Polybius. Polybius states at several points in the *Histories* that in the speeches he has attempted to report what was actually spoken on a given occasion (τὰ κατ'ἀλήθειαν λεχθέντα).<sup>1</sup> This point is so emphatically stressed that one must assume that there is some truth to his claim and that he was drawing on authentic accounts of the occasions on which the speeches were delivered.<sup>2</sup> There were many ways by which he could have found out what was said on a given occasion. Polybius himself was involved in the affairs of the Achaean League from 181 to 167, and after 167 he could have gotten information from members of the League who came to Rome. For the period previous to 181 he had the *Memoirs* of Aratus, and he had access to the archives of the League. Some speeches, as Polybius himself indicates (30.4.11), were published and consequently obtainable. The library of Perseus probably contained a collection of such speeches. Finally Polybius could have known from witnesses what happened in the meetings of the Senate from 167 to 150. Polybius was not himself especially interested in oratory, as Dionysius of Halicarnassus was, and thus did not seek to use the speeches as a creative expression of his own rhetorical ability. Nor does he use the speeches as a vehicle for his own thoughts as Thucydides

<sup>1</sup>Polyb. 2.56.10; 12.25a1; 36.1.7.

<sup>2</sup>See P. Pedech, *La méthode historique de Polybe* (Paris 1964) 259-76 for a full discussion of the sources of the speeches. Also see George Kennedy, *The Art of Rhetoric in the Roman World* (Princeton 1972) 32-37 concerning the authenticity of these speeches. Most of the speeches with which I will deal are either delivered to or by Achaeans or are given before the Roman Senate. Polybius had good sources for these speeches, and I think that it is safe to assume that they are authentic records of what was actually said.

may. Polybius clearly felt that speeches were important historical occurrences which had a great effect on the course of events. They also gave insight into the character and personality of those statesmen who made history and exposed the problems which these men faced. Therefore, it is probable that insofar as it was possible Polybius reported, doubtless in a condensed form, what arguments and other rhetorical devices were employed on a given occasion, drawing either on actual records or on literary or oral traditions which he considered to be trustworthy.<sup>3</sup> Before beginning the analysis of these speeches, however, in which I will deal with the speeches according to the parts of the model speech, proemium, narration, argumentation, and peroration, something more should be said about the nature of the speeches in general.

First, in my analysis I have restricted myself to formal speeches, excluding private conversations, informal exhortations, and advice given over a long period of time. Polybius probably had no accurate sources for such attempts at persuasion, and they really tell us very little about the nature of formal oratory anyway. I have also excluded speeches delivered by Romans or Carthaginians since these shed no light on the nature of Hellenistic oratory. Of the twenty-nine Greek speeches, four are given completely in direct discourse (5.104, 9.28-31, 9.32-39, 11.4-6), ten are begun in indirect discourse and then switch to direct discourse (21.10, 19-21, 22-23, 31; 22.8, 24.8, 9, 12, 13; 30.31), and the others (5.58, 83 [two speeches], 11.9, 15.28, 18.36, 37; 20.12, 21.14, 22; 23.17 [two speeches], 24.9, 28.7, 38.12) are summarized completely in indirect discourse. In those speeches where Polybius begins the speech in indirect discourse and then switches to direct discourse he seems to be summarizing certain sections of the speech, especially general observations and commonplaces, and reporting in greater detail the more particular comments which he considers to be most

<sup>3</sup>See H. Welzhoffer, "Die Reden bei Polybios," *Jahrbücher für Klassische Philologie* 50 (1880) 539-44; F. W. Walbank, *A Historical Commentary on Polybius* (Oxford 1957) I, 13-14, 261-62 and II, 397-99. See also T. Büttner-Wobst, "Der Hiatus bei Polybios," *Philologus* 16 (1903) 541-62 and R. Ullman, *La Technique des discours dans Salluste, Tite-Live, et Tacite* (Oslo 1927) 135-37.



interesting.<sup>4</sup> I do feel quite strongly that in these speeches Polybius is relating all of the argumentation, even that which he considered to be not so important.

Polybius himself (12.25a3) classifies speeches as being of three types: *δημηγορίαι*, or speeches in public assemblies, *παρακλήσεις*, or exhortations, usually of generals to their troops, and *πρεσβευτικοὶ λόγοι*, or ambassadors' speeches. The speeches in the *Histories* fall nicely into these categories.<sup>5</sup> Of the Greek speeches there are thirteen deliberative speeches, eleven ambassadors' speeches, and five exhortations to troops. It is interesting to note here the great importance of ambassadors' speeches. Most of these are ambassadors to Rome, and many of their speeches are delivered before the Senate. Greece had lost her independence; and her relationship to a larger power, either Rome or Macedon, was the most basic of her political realities. Therefore, it is only natural that ambassadors, the Greek cities' most accessible means of arguing her case before her masters, should assume an added importance during this period. It is interesting, moreover, to note that many of the deliberative speeches given in the public assemblies in Greece treat primarily the question of her relationship to Rome and quite often concern what instructions should be given to her ambassadors.<sup>6</sup>

These speeches are written in the same style which Polybius uses in the narrative sections of the work, which indicates that he is not quoting in the speeches but at the most recording what arguments, figures, and commonplaces were used on a given occasion. This is sufficient for our purposes here. The style is basically plain and straightforward, lacking in rhetorical flourish and schematization.<sup>7</sup> It is not an elegant style; and it was

<sup>4</sup>Cf. 21.10, 19-21, 31; 24.8, 30.31.

<sup>5</sup>See K. Ziegler, "Polybios," *RE*, 21<sup>2</sup>, 1524-27.

<sup>6</sup>One reason for the predominance of ambassadors' speeches in Polybius is probably because one of the books of excerpts which preserve the fragments of Polybius is called "On the Embassies." Nevertheless, Polybius is the first ancient author to speak of ambassador speeches as a distinct genre of oratory (12.25a3); and this would seem to indicate that he felt that these speeches had assumed great importance during the Hellenistic period.

<sup>7</sup>See E. Norden, *Die antike Kunstprosa* (Teubner 1958) I, 152-53 and *RE*, 21<sup>2</sup>, 1569-71.

not recommended by Dionysius (*De Comp. Verb.* 4), which proves that Polybius does not represent any sort of Atticist reaction against the Asianist style. The style which he uses is basically, I think, the *λέξις εἰρομένη*, the rambling, "continuous" style discussed by Aristotle in the *Rhetoric* (3.9), unadorned and often dull, the style of the pragmatic historian, not of the orator. The language is simple and correct, and the arrangement of the words is generally the normal order which one would expect, completely lacking in artificial schematization.

First I will give a separate analysis of the four speeches which are reported completely in direct discourse since these are the most extensive examples of oratory in Polybius.<sup>8</sup> I will then discuss in more general terms those speeches which are reported in indirect discourse or are begun in indirect discourse and completed directly.

The first speech reported directly is that of Agelaus of Naupactus who speaks before Philip V urging an end to the Social War (5.104). Agelaus opens the speech with a commonplace, that it would be best if the Greeks never made war on each other but united to defend themselves from the barbarians. If this is not possible in general, he argues, moving from the general to the particular, they should at least abandon their present quarrels and band together to preserve themselves and their cities in light of events in the west. For, he argues, whether Rome or Carthage is victorious in the Second Punic War, the victor will probably soon cast his eyes upon Greece, which, unless they cease their quarrels, will have been weakened by internal wars. Having appealed to the self-interest of the Greeks as a whole, Agelaus then appeals to the vanity of Philip in particular. If he protects Greece from the barbarian he will earn the loyalty and admiration of all the Greeks, thus making his own throne more stable. Moreover, he points out to Philip that in the west he will find a field of action where he can compete for

<sup>8</sup>These speeches are not necessarily more accurate than the other speeches which often give the gist of the argument even better. The speeches which are delivered entirely in direct discourse are usually thus reported because of some dramatic interest, for example, the paired speeches of Chlaeneas and Lyciscus before the Spartan assembly (9.28-39).

world dominion. Finally, in the epilogue, he appeals to all parties to act before it is too late.<sup>9</sup>

This speech is one of the most effective in Polybius. The speaker moves steadily from the general to the particular, from the group to the individual. It is also one of the most figurative. In the proemium Agelaus urges the Greeks to march arm in arm like men fording a river. He refers to Greece as the body with Philip at its head. In the most famous metaphor of the speech, he refers to the "clouds looming in the west" and finally urges the Greeks to abandon the "games" at which they play.

The second speech reported directly is that of Chlaeneas the Aetolian before the assembly at Sparta (9.28-31).<sup>10</sup> Chlaeneas opens his speech with the thesis which he wants to develop, namely, that the slavery of Greece owes its origins to the kings of Macedon. The narration, which is really argumentation, since it attempts to prove the general thesis set forth in the proemium, recounts the history of the relationship between Greece and the kings of Macedon, from Philip I to Philip V. He then passes to an attack on Philip V personally and a glowing encomium of his enemies the Aetolians. Chlaeneas then uses past experience to prove that Philip will never be able to defeat the Aetolians who are now allied with Rome and king Attalus.

Thus, Chlaeneas attempts to prove first that the Spartans should be naturally hostile to the Macedonians because of the way in which they have been treated in the past and naturally friendly to the Aetolians and secondly that it is expedient to join the stronger side, that of the Aetolians. He tries to show that an alliance with Aetolia is not only honorable but also expedient.

This speech, as will be seen later, follows the typical pattern of an ambassador's speech, first an attempt to prove that a

<sup>9</sup>This speech is similar to Thucydides' version of the speech delivered by Hermocrates of Syracuse at Gela in 424 (Thuc. 4.59-64); cf. G. de Sanctis, *Rivista di filologia e d'istruzione classica* (1934) 108-109. However, the parallelism between these two speeches probably arises from the similarity between the two situations rather than from Polybius' copying Thucydides; see Walbank, Vol. I, 629.

<sup>10</sup>The genuineness of this speech has been questioned. The material for it probably came from a literary source which was itself based on a genuine record. See Walbank, Vol. II, 163.

certain attitude is historically consistent and secondly an appeal to self-interest. A vehement attack on one's enemies is also characteristic of these speeches.

The speech of Lyciscus of Acarnania who replies to the speech of Chlaeneas (9.32-39) also follows this same general pattern. He opens the speech with an apology for seeming to defend Macedonian interests. He points out, however, that the interests of Macedonia and Acarnania have always been closely entwined. He then promises, in the "partitio," that he will prove that Sparta is obliged to ally with Macedon rather than Aetolia and that this is also the most advantageous policy: *δειξαι διότι καὶ πρέπον ὑμῖν ἐστὶ καὶ συμφέρον*. He begins the narration, which here again is really argumentation, by trying to refute Chlaeneas' charges against the kings of Macedon. After this defence of the Macedonians he then passes to an attack on the Aetolians, responding to Chlaeneas' attack on Philip. He employs a long series of rhetorical questions which are intended to arouse the Spartans' animosity against the Aetolians. He then argues that Aetolia is bringing the real enemy into Greece by calling in the Romans and urges the Spartans to join with the other Greeks against the barbarians just as their ancestors did against Xerxes. He concludes his speech with a final appeal to Sparta to take the honorable course, the only course in accord with her dignity (*καλὸν καὶ πρέπον*).

This speech is quite lively and probably reflects the tone of the original.<sup>11</sup> Exclamations and rhetorical questions, which are liberally used throughout the speech, make it one of the most emotional of the generally flat and rather colorless speeches in Polybius. It is interesting to note that in this speech Lyciscus takes basically the same approach that Chlaeneas had used. He concentrates on showing that the policy which he advocates is honorable and historically consistent; however, he also argues that this policy is most expedient.

The next speech which is reported entirely in direct discourse is that of Thrasycrates of Rhodes before the Aetolian assembly (11.4-6). He has come to Aetolia to beg the Aetolians to settle their war with Philip. He begins the speech by explaining his

<sup>11</sup>See Walbank, Vol. II, 172.

motives, sorrow at seeing the destruction which the war is bringing to Aetolia and Macedonia and concern for the safety of the rest of the Greeks. This is obviously an attempt to gain the audience's good-will, a normal function of the proemium. Then in a long, extended analogy he compares war to fire: once it has begun it is difficult to stop and often turns on the very man who lit it. If the Aetolians were engaged in an honorable war, he continues, they might be pardoned; however, the war which they are fighting, as he demonstrates in the argumentation, is shameful and dishonorable, for, although they claim to be fighting on behalf of Greek liberty, by calling in the Romans they are actually bringing on the enslavement of Greece. He echoes the warnings of Agelaus of Naupactus that Rome, having defeated the Carthaginians, will then turn her eyes upon Greece. He concludes by trying to impress upon the Aetolians that he has acted out of good faith and in the interest of all the Greeks.

This speech, like the ambassador speeches discussed above, is concerned with showing that a particular policy is, conversely, first dishonorable and secondly disadvantageous. The tone of the speech, however, is calmer and more subdued, probably because the speech is given by a third party rather than a representative of the two antagonists.

One can see in these speeches several general tendencies which appear in all the speeches in Polybius, especially concerning argumentation, which is really what these speeches serve to illustrate. There is first a tendency to concentrate on a single argument.<sup>12</sup> Agelaus of Naupactus appeals solely to self-interest or expediency (*τὸ συμφέρον*), which is probably the most popular argument used in the speeches of Polybius. Chlaeneas and Lyciscus attempt to show that their proposals are, primarily, honorable but add that they are also expedient. Thrasycrates of Rhodes uses this same approach. The speeches, moreover, are not generally very rich in figures but contain quite a few commonplaces.

Before discussing the types of argumentation used in the other

<sup>12</sup>For a general discussion of argumentation in Greek oratory see George Kennedy, *The Art of Persuasion in Greece* (Princeton 1963) 82-103 and Aristotle *Rhet.* 1.3.5.



speeches, I think that something should be said about the general structure of Polybius' speeches. Most of these speeches do not have a proemium, and there is nothing very striking about the proemia of those which do have a formal introduction. All quite clearly attempt to fulfill those functions which are usually ascribed to the proemium in the rhetorical handbooks, that is, to win the attention of the audience, to gain their good-will, or to prepare them to receive information (*iudicem attentum, benevolum, docilem parare*).<sup>13</sup> For example, when the Rhodians speak before the Senate (21.22), they open the speech by mentioning their former services to the Romans, obviously an attempt to gain the good-will of the Senate.

Only three of the speeches analyzed contain a formal narration, and in each of these speeches what appears to be a narration of facts is really a form of argumentation. The narrations in the speeches of Chlaeneas the Aetolian (9.28-31) and Lyciscus of Acarnania (9.32-39) have already been discussed. The other example of a narration is in the speech of Cassander of Aegina (22.8). Cassander relates how Aegina had fallen into the hands of the kings of Pergamum; however, here again the narration has another purpose other than simply to relate facts. What Cassander is trying to do in this section of the speech is to stir up pity for the Aeginetans. This is really an argument from emotion. The narration, however, it should be noted, is most characteristic of judicial oratory and is only occasionally necessary in a deliberative speech.

Of these speeches only four have formal perorations (5.104, 9.32, 11.6, 30.31). In each of these cases the peroration is simply a recapitulation of the arguments used in the speech. Only one, the speech of Agelaus of Naupactus (5.104), is at all emotional at the end.

That the speeches in Polybius do not usually have prooemia, narrations, or perorations does not by any means indicate that these parts of the model speech were not used in the Hellenistic period. Polybius states (36.1.7) that it is the duty of the historian to find out what was said on a given occasion and to report what was most important (*τούτων τὰ καιριώτατα καὶ*

<sup>13</sup>Ad Herennium 1.4.6.

*πραγματικώτατα*) to the reader.<sup>14</sup> A historian would most naturally be interested in argumentation and how the arguments used influenced the course of events. In this, the third section of the model speech, the orations in Polybius are rich.

In discussing the argumentation used in these speeches I shall treat them according to the three types of speeches, generals' speeches, ambassadors' speeches, and speeches before public assemblies, and then make some comments about argumentation in general. I shall treat exhortations to troops first.

There are five Greek generals' speeches in Polybius (5.83 [two speeches], 11.9, 15.28, 38.12). These speeches like those discussed above, tend to concentrate on a single argument. The most popular arguments are expediency (*τὸ συμφέρον*) and an appeal to honorable conduct (*τὸ καλόν*). In book 15 Moeragenes, urging the Macedonian troops in Alexandria to rise up against Agathocles, the minister of Ptolemy V, begs them to save himself, the king, and chiefly themselves (15.28), pointing out that unless they rose up then their destruction would be inevitable, an appeal to self-interest (*τὸ συμφέρον*).<sup>15</sup> The argument from honor (*τὸ καλόν*) is used in two of these speeches as the sole basis of argumentation. In both of these instances (11.9, 38.12) the argument is that men should act like men rather than like women. Honor and expediency are combined in the last two of these speeches. The speeches of Ptolemy IV and Antiochus III before the battle of Raphia (5.83) are excellent examples of dual emphasis in argumentation. The kings begin by reminding the soldiers of the glorious deeds of their ancestors, but lay the greatest stress on the rewards which await the victorious.

There are eleven Greek ambassadors' speeches (9.28-31,

<sup>14</sup>I would interpret this passage to mean first that Polybius has chosen not to report those parts of speeches such as the proemia and the perorations which were probably filled with commonplaces and had no real impact on the situation and secondly that he has suppressed entirely those speeches which he felt to be irrelevant or ineffectual. I think that the argumentation of those speeches which he relates is probably intact, as I have already noted.

<sup>15</sup>It is very improbable that Polybius had a copy of this rather impromptu speech by Moeragenes. He may have learned about its contents, however, through oral tradition or from a reliable literary source.

9.32-39, 11.4-6, 20.12, 21.14, 19-21, 22-23 [two speeches], 31; 24.9, 30.31). Six of these speeches concentrate on a single argument. Expediency is the sole basis of argumentation in three of these speeches. Philopoemen, speaking before the council at Sparta (20.12), makes it clear that he considers expediency to be more important than honor or justice. He says that he appreciates the crown and high honors which the Spartans have bestowed on him, but says that such honors should never be given to friends but only to enemies. This will mean that friends, being under no obligation, will be trusted by the Achaeans when they propose to help Sparta while enemies would have to support the proposal or keep silent, lest they appear to be ungrateful. Likewise, Callicrates, speaking before the Senate (24.9), argues that the Romans should show some definite sign of disapproval to discourage those Greeks who upheld the force of laws and covenants against the will of Rome. In effect, he advises the Senate to frighten the Greeks. Heracleides (21.14), bringing terms of peace from Antiochus to Scipio, offers his terms and then argues that it is to one's own benefit to be moderate in the face of success.

Three of these speeches concentrate on trying to show that what is proposed is just. Eumenes of Pergamum, speaking before the Senate (21.19-21) after the war with Antiochus III, relates in detail the good-will which the kings of Pergamum have always shown towards Rome and points out that it is only just that they now take thought for his welfare by remaining in possession of certain parts of Asia Minor and ceding others to himself. The envoys from Smyrna (21.22) also emphasize the good-will which they had shown in helping the Romans against Antiochus. Astymedes, the Rhodian envoy, pleading before the Senate after the Third Macedonian War (30.31), sums up the losses which Rhodes has already suffered and argues that the island has already been punished more severely for a single mistake than Macedonia which has always been the enemy of Rome. He also argues that the entire populace was not responsible and that the leaders of the folly have already been put to death.

The most popular approach in an ambassador's speech seems to have been to try to show that a certain course of action is not



only honorable or just but also expedient. The speeches of Chlaeneas and Lyciscus (9.28-31, 32-39) discussed earlier, use this approach. In addition to these two speeches, justice and expediency are appealed to in two others. In his speech before the Senate (21.31) Leon the Athenian points out that the Romans are justified in being angry with the Aetolians for provoking the war with Antiochus; however, he argues that they should vent their anger on the leaders rather than on the populace as a whole. This, he points out, will also be advantageous since compassion will make the Aetolians once again well disposed toward Rome. The speech of the Rhodians before the Senate (21.22-23) attempts to combine the arguments of expediency and honor with that of possibility. They argue that their proposal that Rome set free the cities of Asia Minor is not only more just but also more advantageous to everyone concerned than Eumenes' proposal that they be put under the hegemony of Pergamum. They argue that there are other means open to Rome by which they can reward the friendship of Eumenes, without acting unjustly towards other states. The Rhodians point out that most nations are impelled to action by the prospect of gaining more power. Rome, however, is already the most powerful nation in the world. What the Romans seek, therefore, is praise and glory among men. This they would win by freeing the cities in Asia Minor and thus augmenting their reputation in the Greek world.

There are thirteen Greek deliberative speeches (5.58, 5.104, 18.36, 37; 21.10, 22.8 23.17 [two speeches], 24.8 [two speeches], 24.12, 13; 28.7). The tendency to concentrate on a single argument is seen even better in these speeches, and by far the most popular argument is that of expediency. Agelaus of Naupactus appeals solely to this argument in the speech already discussed (5.104). When Alexander the Aetolian speaks before Flamininus at the peace conference at Tempe (18.36) he argues that the only way to insure peace for the Romans and liberty for the Greeks would be to depose Philip, regardless of whether the action was just or not. Phaeneas (18.37) argues the same point. The speech of Hyperbatus before the Achaean assembly (24.8) appeals to the argument that might makes right. He argues that neither laws nor covenants among nations nor anything else

should be considered more binding than the will of Rome. The Achaean *strategos* (23.17) urges the League to admit Sparta because, as he says, it will be advantageous in two ways: they would be including in the League those who had been loyal to it and confirming the decision of the rulers of Sparta who had already expelled those Spartans who opposed the interests of the League. It is interesting to note that he does not argue that the admission of Sparta would be just, by rewarding those who had been faithful, but stresses exclusively the advantage (*συμμέγον*) of the admission.<sup>16</sup>

Four of these speeches focus solely on the justice of what is proposed. Diophanes (23.17) argues that it would be unjust for the Achaeans to join in the persecution of those Spartan exiles who had been illegally driven from their homes. In a speech before the Achaean assembly (24.8) Lykortas urges the Achaeans not to heed the demands of Rome if these violated their oaths and laws and brought injury and disgrace on their friends. Polybius himself, speaking before the Achaeans (28.7), argues for the reinstatement of honors which had been bestowed on Eumenes and then revoked in violation of justice and right.

Most of the speeches in Polybius which focus the argumentation solely on justice or combine justice with other arguments are appeals to Romans.<sup>17</sup> The reason why is explained in a speech of Philopoemen before the Achaean assembly (24.13). Arguing that the Greeks should not heed unjust demands from Rome, Philopoemen points out that the Romans place a high value on the demands of justice and fidelity and that if an unjust demand is handed down the Greeks should simply point out to the Romans the injustice involved and stand by their rights. The Roman sense of justice was always keen. The Greeks doubtlessly realized this and played upon it.

All the other deliberative speeches examined combine the

<sup>16</sup>It is interesting to note that of the speakers in Polybius who appeal solely to naked self-interest all of them except one, Aemilius Paullus (29.1), are Greeks; and, moreover, the speech of the only Roman in the group is much less calculated since he is appealing solely to the public interest rather than to the interest of individuals or of particular groups.

<sup>17</sup>Cf. 21.19-21, 22-23, 31; 30.31.

arguments from expediency and honor. Apollonidas of Sicyon, speaking before the assembly of the Achaeans (22.8) concerning a sum of money which had been offered by Eumenes of Pergamum, argues first that it is disgraceful to allow the king to bribe the entire assembly. However, he points out, what is more important is that this sum would mean that the parliament would be, in effect, in the pay of Eumenes. Soon, he argues, other kings will begin to donate funds; and, since the interests of democracies and kings are naturally opposed, either the interests of the kings will predominate or the Achaeans will seem to be ungrateful. Eumenes, discussing the possibility of peace with Antiochus (21.10), points out to the Roman legate Lucius Aemilius that it would not be an honorable peace if it were made while Eumenes and the Romans were shut up within the walls of Pergamum. However, as in the speech of Apollonidas, the argument quickly reverts to one of expediency. Eumenes argues that while waiting for the approval of the Senate the Romans would exhaust their supplies during the winter and if the Senate didn't ratify the agreement they would have to begin the war anew. Meanwhile, they would have lost the opportunity of putting the war to a swift end. In a similar fashion, Apollonides, advising Antiochus III concerning the invasion of Coele-Syria (5.58), argues that it is foolish and disgraceful to covet Coele-Syria while allowing Ptolemy to occupy Seleucia, the capital seat of Antiochus' empire. Apart from the disgrace involved, he continues, it is of practical value to regain Seleucia since, if not, they will have to protect their own territory while invading that of Ptolemy. Aristaenus, speaking before the Achaeans (24.12), argues that since the Greeks are not strong enough to resist the Romans they should strive for the possible. He then points out that there are two aims in all policy, honor and interest, that those who are capable of it should aim at honor but that those who are powerless to do so should take refuge in the attainment of their interest. Consequently, he argues, unless it can be proved that they are capable of resisting the Romans they must readily obey all orders.

As can be seen from the evidence presented above the tendency in argumentation in the speeches in Polybius is to concentrate on a single argument. More than half of the speeches

Polybius himself, that is, the one concerning the honors which had been bestowed on Eumenes (28.7), is an excellent example of this difference. Concentrating on the justice of his argument, Polybius quotes the original decree of the Achaeans, discusses their intention, and how this intention had been perverted by a later inscription. Therefore, it is, I think, the influence of Demosthenes and not that of Thucydides which can be seen in these speeches.<sup>20</sup>

There are, moreover, quite a few passages in the speeches which seem to be modelled on similar passages from the Demosthenic corpus. Critolaus, arguing before the Achaean assembly (38.12) that they should fear especially those among themselves who favored the Romans or Spartans more than their own interests, sounds very similar to the same idea expressed by Demosthenes in the *Philippics* and in the speech *For the Megalopolitans*. Cassander of Aegina tries to stir up pity for the Aeginetans by relating how they have fallen into the hands of the kings of Pergamum and what misery has come upon them since they have been abandoned by the rest of the Greeks. This sounds very similar to a passage in the *On the False Embassy* (64-66) where Demosthenes uses the same type of emotional appeal concerning the Phocians. Lyciscus' appeal at Sparta (9.32-39) that all the Greeks should join together in a defensive war against the barbarian reminds one of the pan-Hellenism which appears in the *Third Philippic*. Lyciscus also calls upon

<sup>20</sup>There are several rhetorical declamations from the third century which have been found in papyri and which confirm Demosthenes' continued influence on Greek oratory during this period: see K. Jander, *Oratorum et Rhetorum Graecorum Fragmenta* (Bonn 1913) 21-22, 31-33 and K. Kunst, *Rhetorische Papyri* (Berlin 1923) 4-13. The style of these declamations is quite Demosthenic as is the argumentation; and one of them (Kunst, 4-13) deals with an episode from Demosthenes' life, the case against Leptines, which indicates that there was continuing interest in the great orator. Another declamation (Jander, 31-33), supposedly a speech of Leosthenes encouraging the Athenians to take up arms against Macedon, is so overwhelmingly influenced by Demosthenes that the argument reads like a compendium of Demosthenic commonplaces. Moreover, the most important orators who are known to us from the third century, Cleochares, Demochares, Cineas the Thessalian, Hegesias of Magnesia, were admirers of Demosthenes and attempted to imitate him in style, political policy, or both.

the Spartans to remember their ancestors and the traditions of their city in preserving Greek liberty against the aggressions of the barbarian. Demosthenes uses the same appeal on many occasions before the Athenians. The idea of *καὶρός*, so important in the speeches of Demosthenes, appears in one of the speeches analysed (15.28).

The perorations in these speeches are also quite similar to those in Demosthenes. Demosthenes preferred a quiet, calm ending to the speech, either a recapitulation or often a prayer. All of the perorations in Polybius are of this type.

One of the most striking aspects of Demosthenes' oratory is his use of vivid metaphor.<sup>21</sup> Striking metaphors are also found in the speeches in Polybius. Agelaus of Naupactus, in a metaphor which sounds very much like Demosthenes, calls Rome the "cloud looming in the west" (5.104).<sup>22</sup> The Rhodians, speaking before the Senate (21.22), compare the possessions of Rome to a sumptuous banquet. Leon, the son of Kichesias, compares states and peoples to the sea (21.31). The sea is naturally calm and at rest. However, when violent winds fall upon it, nothing is more appalling. Agitators, "blowing from Asia," acted on the Aetolians just as these winds act on the sea. Thrasycrates of Rhodes argues (11.4) that war is like fire in that once it has been started it cannot be controlled and sometimes even turns on the one who started it. Aristaenus compares the Achaean League to a man who holds out the sword and the olive branch at the same time (24.12).

The reason for Demosthenes' continued influence on mainland Greek oratory is, I think, quite obvious. The political situation of Greece vis-à-vis Rome or Macedon or Asia continued to be very similar to what her position had been in Demosthenes' time as regards Philip. His speeches, therefore, were models of the type of oratory which Greek politicians were still practicing. A very good example of the continued appropriateness of Demosthenic oratory is the speech of Lyciscus the Acarnanian before the Spartan assembly in 211/210 (Polyb.

<sup>21</sup>See G. Ronnet, *Etude sur le style de Démosthène* (Paris 1951) 147-76.

<sup>22</sup>Plutarch (*Per.* 8) says that Pericles also used this type of imagery in his speeches; however, it is most typical of Demosthenes.

9.32-39). Lyciscus warns the Greeks of the perils of association with Rome and plays a role very much like that of Demosthenes warning the Athenians against Philip of Macedon. The situation is very similar, and the arguments which Lyciscus uses are very Demosthenic. He warns the Spartans that all of Greece is threatened with enslavement by a foreign power and that all Greeks should consequently ally against the common enemy, very much like the pan-Hellenism of the *Third Philippic*. He also appeals to the Spartans, as Demosthenes had appealed to the Athenians, to remember their role as the defender of Greek liberty. Greece continued to be threatened by a larger power until the almost total loss of Greek freedom after the fall of Corinth in 146 when deliberative oratory seems to have almost vanished from the mainland.<sup>23</sup>

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<sup>23</sup>One is reminded of the thesis developed by Tacitus in the *Dialogus* that deliberative oratory declines when a country ceases to be involved actively in world politics.

## THE PURPOSE OF THE *TRINUMMUS*

For J. Arthur Hanson

The *Trinummus* is unique in the Plautine canon. For though Plautus wrote both good plays and bad, this is his only boring one—as the elder Wilamowitz himself once remarked. A glance at the *dramatis personae* explains much: the cast of eight features neither *fallax servus*, *durus pater*, *improba lena* nor *meretrix blanda*. In fact, excluding the abstract characters in the prologue, there are no women at all. Moreover, no one is either *libidinosus* or *gloriosus*, two quintessential comic eccentricities. Instead, the stage teems with senior citizens, no fewer than four dull *senes*, all lacking humours either Theophrastean or Jonsonian. What is more, these *patres familiae* seem indistinguishable in their benign conservatism; none is as liberal as Micio or as harsh as Demea in Terence's geriatrically-balanced *Adelphoe*. Even so, we discern the potential for comedy. Witness the many similarities between the *Trinummus* and the *Mostellaria*, not least of which, prominent use of the house metaphor.<sup>1</sup>

But the differences! As the very slave-names suggest, the ghost play scintillates through *τρανής* Tranio, whereas the *Trinummus* muddles with *στάσιμος* Stasimus. Indeed, the *Trinummus* stands as Plautus' *fabula stataria*.<sup>2</sup> While the

<sup>1</sup>Several of the metaphorical parallels will be cited in this essay. For a recent discussion of the imagery in the *Mostellaria*, see Eleanor Winsor Leach, 'De exemplo meo ipse aedificato: An Organizing Idea in the *Mostellaria*,' *Hermes* 97 (1969) 318-32.

<sup>2</sup>It is, of course, Terence who employs this term in reference to his *Heauton Timorumenos* (36). Moreover, there is a conspicuous echo of the *Trinummus* in the prologue to the *Adelphoe* (22-23):

de(h)inc ne expectetis argumentum fabulae,  
senes qui primi venient i partem aperient. . . .

Cf. *Trin.* 16-17:

sed de argumento ne expectetis fabulae:  
senes qui huc uenient, i rem uobis aperient.

Indeed, various other similarities between the two plays are oft remarked upon. See below, n. 31.

*Mostellaria* has an onstage *komos*, the *Trinummus* merely mentions yesterday's cakes and ale while praising tomorrow's virtue. The two *adulescentes* of the happier play enjoy comely companions like Philematium and Delphium, while the boys in the bland abjure such pleasures completely.<sup>3</sup>

But the contrast is most striking when one considers the cardinal feature shared by the *Trinummus* and *Mostellaria*: they both derive from comedies by Philemon. Our acquaintance with the Greek author is fragmentary and the differences between the two comedies shed little light on his own Muse.<sup>4</sup> But our acquaintance with Plautus is considerable and we may well ask why his adaptation of the *Θησαυρός* is so atypical of his work. Why despite the many Plautine verbal coinages does the *Trinummus* seem plodding and verbose? There is, in fact, but one moment worthy of the Latin master, the "title scene," in which a three-penny operator, a trickster hired for *tres nummi*, tries to bamboozle old Charmides.<sup>5</sup> This provides the only comic relief in what is otherwise a work less typical of Plautus

<sup>3</sup>Though it has been discounted by many critics, Leo's hypothesis on the Philemonian original still seems worth reviving here. Basing his conjecture on *Trinummus* 648, where Lysiteles tells Lesbonicus "*praeoptavisti amorem tuom uti virtuti praeponeres*," (as well as 651, 666 and elsewhere), Leo argues that in the Greek model, there had been a single *amor*, a girl for whom Lesbonicus had gone into debt (*Geschichte der röm. Lit.* I [Berlin 1913] 117, n. 1). This would seem likely Plautine material, and indeed it is the precise situation in the *Mostellaria*. And yet apparently Plautus *noluit*. The play is no richer for the absence of a lively *meretrix* and by George Meredith's standards, there can be no true comedy without the fair sex. If Leo is correct, Plautus has here atypically suppressed an inherently good comic situation. There are, however, arguments against Leo's view, as in Günther Jachmann, *Plautinisches und Attisches* (Berlin 1931) 242ff.

<sup>4</sup>And yet T. B. L. Webster, for example, dedicates an entire chapter to "Philemon and his Comedy," in *Studies in Later Greek Comedy*, 2nd ed. (Manchester 1970) 125ff. But his conclusions are based mostly on Plautus' plays and Apuleius' observations in *Florida* XVI. Also, the problem of using vastly differing plays as evidence for a *vēa* author's style is not unique with Philemon. What of the disparity between "Diphilus'" *Rudens* and *Casina*?

<sup>5</sup>*Trinummus* 843-997. The comic essence of this scene is *sartor resartus*, or as Charmides himself says (958) *enim uero ego nunc sycophantae huic sycophantari uolo*. This is the rubric Henri Bergson calls *monde renversé* in his classic essay, *Le rire* (Paris 1924) 72.



than Aeolus, replete with what he elsewhere mocks as *longos logos*.<sup>6</sup>

And yet the playwright wanted it so. The prologue emphasizes Plautus' creative responsibility, the same artistic "volition" which characterizes his rendition of Diphilus' *Κληρούμενοι*, *denuo latine* into the farcical *Casina*. Diphilus had presented a pretty young thing and an ardent suitor, but in Plautus we never see the lovers. Of the youth, the prologue states:

is, ne expectetis, hodie in hac comoedia  
in urbem non redibit; Plautus noluit.

(*Cas.* 64-65)

The *noluit* reveals the *ars poetica*: Plautus chose what *he* wanted to show, and cut what *he* wanted to cut. The same holds true for the *Trinummus*, although one might well question his choice of material.

The brief prologue is spoken by Luxuria personified, assisted by her daughter Inopia, who has but one line.<sup>7</sup> Alas, this style prefigures the dramaturgy to come, i.e. monostich evoking monologue. But here, no less than in the *Casina*, Plautus declares his independence:

primum mihi Plautus nomen Luxuriae indidit;  
tum hanc mihi gnatam esse uoluit Inopiam.

.....  
huic Graece nomen est Thensauro fabulae:

<sup>6</sup>*Men.* 779. Even the characters within the *Trinummus* are aware of their own long-windedness, as in Megaronides' remark (806) *at nimis longo sermone utimur*. This is unusual. Under normal circumstances, Plautus (and his characters) are acutely aware of audience reactions and remind us that they are trying not to bore. Cf. *Poen.* 1224: *in pauca confer: sitiunt qui sedent*, and the hasty forgiveness proffered at the close of the *Casina* (1006), *hanc ex longa longiorem ne faciamus fabulam*.

<sup>7</sup>Naturally the question of who invented the prologue has been the occasion of many a Greco-Roman tug-of-war. In his addenda to the revised *Plautinisches im Plautus*, Fraenkel, citing Wilamowitz and Jachmann, views the entire prologue as completely the work of Plautus (*Elementi Plautini in Plauto*, trans. Franco Munari [Firenze 1960] 434). Webster (above, n. 4, 140) understandably argues its presence in the Greek, although he concedes that Plautus may have invented the characters' names. See below 11ff.

Philemo scripsit, Plautus uortit barbare,  
nomen Trinummo fecit, nunc hoc uos rogat  
ut liceat possidere hanc nomen fabulam.

(8-9; 18-21)

In a dozen lines, the Latin author drops his own name twice; Terence never does so even once. We respect Plautus' *voluit* and understand his change of title, since he characteristically names his plays after their liveliest moments. But why did he accentuate the sermons on morality? Perhaps we may regard the *Trinummus* (and to some extent the *Captivi*)<sup>8</sup> as a glorification of contemporary ideals, a Plautine venture in Roman mythopoeisis. Let us follow the points which Plautus drives home.

As in many more successful comedies (e.g. the *Mostellaria*, Menander's *Samia*), the action begins with the hero's father off on a voyage. Before leaving, old Charmides appointed his friend, old Callicles, to take care of his household: a son, Lesbonicus, a daughter with no name, and a buried treasure. True to type, Lesbonicus took to prodigal roistering, and as the play begins, he has already run *res paterna* (13) into a sandal-string. In fact, he became so desperate that he was obliged to offer the family house for sale. To prevent the hidden hoard from falling into alien hands, Callicles purchased the house himself.

In the opening scene old Callicles is confronted by yet another *senex*. Megaronides, a protatic persona, has the impression that Callicles has abused his friend's trust. Ah, but it is part of the general moral decline, he philosophizes. Nowadays, *mores boni* have been weakened (28) and *mores mali* (30; 32) flourish everywhere. Megaronides feels bound by *fides* (27) to reprimand Callicles for betraying *fides et fiducia* (117). But Callicles then reveals that it was this very *fides et fiducia* (142) and *fidelitas* (164) that inspired both his financial rescue and his discreet silence. He recounts how the boy's father implored him *per amicitiam et per fidem* (153-54) never to disclose the presence of the aureate *aulula*. Thus, each of the first three characters has displayed a conspicuous concern with *fides*.

<sup>8</sup>And a general consensus of scholars dates the *Captivi* "ubi boni meliores fiant" (1034), at about the same time as the *Trinummus*.

Now the subplot. Enter young Lysiteles, an upstanding friend of declining young Lesbonicus. Lysiteles sings of his quandary: which life-style to choose—business or pleasure:

amorin med an rei opsequi potiu' par sit,  
 utra in parte plus sit uoluptati' uitae  
 ad aetatem agundam.

(230-32)

*Amor* is enticing, he reasons, but it brings ruin. The young man's words anticipate Lucretius:

nam qui amat quod amat quom extemplo sauiis sagittatis  
 percussus,  
 ilico res foras labitur, liquitur.

(242-44)<sup>9</sup>

Rather than flee duty, he will flee love: *apage te, Amor, tuas res tibi habeto*, the precise language of divorce.<sup>10</sup> He thus resolves to seek the polar opposite of love, i.e., marriage. He intends to wed the (nameless) sister of his impoverished friend.

The young man tries to convey his desire to his father Philto (*senex* IV), who must first lecture his son on *pietas* (281) and bemoan the current general decline in *mores* (283ff.). He urges the youth to follow *mores maiorum* (292) and lead his life *moribus antiquis* (295-96). Small wonder that some—including Fraenkel—have detected Ennian influences in this play.<sup>11</sup> The father's metaphor, *benefacta bene factis aliis pertegito, ne perpluant* (323) reminds us of Philolaches' "unroofing" in the *Mostellaria* (108ff.) as well as the words of a craven slave in that same play:

<sup>9</sup>Cf. the birds inspired by Venus, *perculsae cordstua vi* (1.13), and especially 4.1123-24:

labitur interea res et Babylonica fiunt,  
 languent officia atque aegrotat fama vacillans.

<sup>10</sup>Cf. P. E. Corbett, *The Roman Law of Marriage* (Oxford 1930) 224, who cites, in addition to Plautus, Cicero, Martial and the Digest. The cry *apage* is used at two other important junctures of the *Trinummus*: when Philto rejects the "haunted farm" (537), and when Charmides forswears maritime commerce (837).

<sup>11</sup>Fraenkel (above, n. 7) 188ff. D. C. Earl, "Political Terminology in Plautus," *Historia* 9 (April 1960) 239.

si huic imperabo, probe tectum habebo,  
malum quom impluit ceteris, ne impluat mi.

(870-71)

But the glass house of the *Trinummus* is so well polished that not even verbal stones are thrown.

After some persuasion, Philto grants his virtuous son permission to wed *sine dote*. In the long run, such magnanimity will bring *fama*, *amicitia* and *gratia* to the family name (379). It is more difficult to persuade Lesbonicus: he too has family pride. Still, he stubbornly insists upon selling his last remaining asset in the world—a little farm—to provide his sister with a dowry.

It remains for his comrade Lysiteles to convince him by insisting that such obduracy yields neither *gloria* nor *fama* (629). Lysiteles argues that the prodigal is now going to the opposite extreme, to avoid betraying the *fama* and *virtus* of his *maiores* (641ff.). But if you would truly repent, he says, "*in foro operam amicis da, ne in lecto amicae, ut solitus es*" (651). After all, the only Roman way leads straight to the forum.<sup>12</sup> And miraculously, the prodigal repents, recants, reforms, now painfully aware of how he has ruined *rem patriam et gloriam maiorum* (656).

With the young man's sudden reformation, the *Trinummus* achieves an odd consistency: everyone in the play has now pronounced upon *mos* except the slave Stasimus. The omission will soon be rectified, however, *δημοκρατικὸν γὰρ αὐτ' ἔδρων*, as Aristophanes' Euripides says (*Ran.* 952). In the meanwhile, moralizing briefly diminishes and dramaturgy perks. Old Charimides, the absent father, unexpectedly appears. Brimming with *pietas*, he blesses Neptune for returning him—and his riches—intact (820ff.). Father Theopropides in the *Mostellaria*

<sup>12</sup>Earl (above n. 11) 236 compares the language of line 651 to Polybius' description of Scipio Aemilianus (31.23), especially where Scipio defends himself against criticism of his "unRomanness": *δοκῶ γὰρ εἶναι πᾶσιν ἡσυχιὸς τις καὶ νωθρός, ὥς ἀκουῶ, καὶ πολὺν κεχωρισμένος τῆς Ῥωμαϊκῆς αἰρέσεως καὶ πράξεως ὅτι κρίσεις οὐχ αἰροῦμαι λέγειν*. That Plautus deliberately contrasts the festive activities in his plays with the forum and Roman responsibilities, is argued in my *Roman Laughter: The Comedy of Plautus* (Cambridge, Mass., 1968) 42ff.

thanks Neptune in similar fashion when he returns.<sup>13</sup> But Theopropides then suffers a *frustratio* "worthy of Philemon or Diphilus" (1149-51). By contrast what little deception is performed in the *Trinummus* is done *by* the oldster *to* the trickster. Plautus presents this incident as a kind of little play-within-a-play. For the *sycophanta*, who spouts much theatrical lingo in describing his assignment,<sup>14</sup> introduces himself with a kind of prologue:

Huic ego die nomen Trinummo facio: nam ego operam  
meam  
tribu' nummis hodie locaui ad artis nugatorias.  
(843-44)

The trickster has named the day, precisely as Plautus has named the play (cf. 9; 19-20). The problem is that the *sycophanta* has been hired to play an emissary of old Charmides (bearing dowry money), a difficult role since his first audience turns out to be Charmides *ipsissimus* (989). Unmasked, the con man retreats, wishing the old man a good beating at the hands of the *novi aediles* (990-97).<sup>15</sup> Old Charmides astutely concludes that something is up: *numquam edepol temere tinnit tintinnabulum* (1004). But what is truly up is another *mos maiorum* monologue, this time by the slave Stasimus.<sup>16</sup>

<sup>13</sup>*Mostellaria* 431ff. By contrast, consider how the slaves in each play greet their newly arrived masters: loyal Stasimus hails "the best man alive" (1069), Tranio wishes he would drop dead (*Most.* 442-43).

<sup>14</sup>Cf. 853ff. Also eavesdropping Stasimus plays the sophisticated drama critic 705ff. That Plautus should lavish so much theatrical terminology on the *sycophanta* once again reaffirms where his heart is in the *Trinummus*. By this line of reasoning, we can adjudge Pseudolus his favorite character of all, since he compares his plots and fictions to a playwright's creative process (*Pseud.* 401ff.).

<sup>15</sup>It was this remark that prompted Ritschl to propose 194 B.C. as the *terminus post quem* for the *Trinummus* (*Parerga zu Plautus und Terenz* [Leipzig 1845] 349). Aediles took office on March 15 and it seemed likely to Ritschl that the play would have been performed soon after, e.g. at the Megalesia (April 14). According to Livy 34.54.3, the first Megalensian *ludi scaenici* were in 194. A different explanation for this reference to the *novi aediles* is offered below, p. 261.

<sup>16</sup>Webster (above, n. 4) 139 sees no reason to believe that most of the moralizing element was not in the Philemon play as well. Fraenkel (above n. 7) 146ff. does not argue for total Plautine originality, but instead notes how

This jeremiad certainly comes unexpected and seems uncalled for. Nonetheless it comes, and at lines 1028ff. Stasimus begins a long lament:

utinam ueteres homin(um mor)es, ueteres parsimoniae  
potius (in) maiore honore hic essent quam mores mali!

Stasimus' repetition of *mores* outdoes even old Philto (cf. 280ff.), and old Charmides, who is eavesdropping, quips that Stasimus himself is acting *more maiorum* (1030), a familiar and feeble gag, since slaves were legally *nullo patre*.<sup>17</sup>

When the master hears the apparent bad news, he is terribly angered, and he confronts the man he trusted:

Charmides: o Callicles, o Callicles, o Callicles!  
qualine amico mea commendaui bona?  
Callicles: probro et fideli et fido et cum magna fide.  
(1094-96)

The central question of the play is here asked and answered, the question of friendship, of *fides*. The answer is positive, as Stasimus concludes:

hic meo ero amicus solus firmus restitit  
neque demutauit animum de firma fide,  
sed hic unus, ut ego suspicor, seruatur fidem.  
(1110-12)

This sentiment is repeated with even greater emphasis by father Charmides himself:

Neque fuit neque erit neque esse quemquam hominem in  
terra arbitror  
quod fides fidelitasque amicum erga aequiperet tuam;  
nam exaedificauisset me ex his aedibus, apud te foret.  
(1125-27)

The pun on *exaedificare* recalls its earlier usage in reference to

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abruptly and without motivation Stasimus' sermon begins. Though moral decline is a traditional motif in both Latin and Greek, this scene is characterized by "molti imbarbarimenti apportati da Plauto" (148).

<sup>17</sup>And yet the Romans must have taken delight in this joke, for Plautus repeats it on several occasions (e.g., *Miles* 327ff.; *Stichus* 280ff., as well as *Persa* 53ff. although it is a *parasitus* who here makes the boast). For the legal details, see W. W. Buckland, *The Roman Law of Slavery* (Cambridge 1908) 76-77.

the son's *ignavia* (132). Once more, the *Mostellaria* comes to mind. But unlike the haunted house-party play, the *Trinummus* has had a "utilitarian" purpose: to present the triumph of friendship and its nuclear quality, *fides*. And *fidelitas*, which appears but twice in the entire Plautine corpus, both times in the *Trinummus*.<sup>18</sup>

The words emphasized in this essay are the words Plautus emphasized in his play. One key term is *fides*. We know from Eduard Fraenkel's famous essay that with a single exception the word did not have its moral and religious connotations in early Latin (and until Cicero's time). The exception is not Ennius, but Titus Maccius Plautus. Here, according to Fraenkel, the term may indeed mean *Glauben, Vertrauen*.<sup>19</sup> But why this unlikely likelihood?

D. C. Earl's study of Plautus' political vocabulary is most helpful. He calls attention to the Roman reverberations of such terms as *virtus, gloria* and that oft-banded term in the *Trinummus, mores*. Using Tenney Frank's 1932 article as point of departure, Earl concludes that the language of the *Trinummus* is very much "in the tradition not only of Polybius, but also of Ennius and the Scipionic Elogia."<sup>20</sup> He argues that *mores* in Plautus could never have anything *but* a Roman connotation. And yet he does not mention that the word appears no fewer than twenty-one times in the *Trinummus*. This is almost triple the incidence in any other Plautine play, including the *Captivi*. There must be a specific reason.

Was Plautus politically *engagé*? This has been a frequent if unfruitful hypothesis. Tenney Frank read the *Trinummus* as a comment on the rivalry between Cato and Scipio, a possibility also admitted by Gagliardi.<sup>21</sup> C. H. Buck's entire chronology

<sup>18</sup>Regarding the specifically Roman connotations of *fidelitas*, see the comprehensive work by J. Hellegouarc'h, *Le vocabulaire latin des relations et des partis sous la république* (Paris 1963) 37-38.

<sup>19</sup>"Zur Geschichte des Wortes *fides*," *Rheinisches Museum* 71 (1916) 187ff., reprinted in *Kleine Beiträge I* (Rome 1964) 15ff. Gordon Williams senses the Roman concept of *fides* in Pseudolus' pointed remarks to Ballio (279ff.), "Some Problems in the Construction of Plautus' *Pseudolus*," *Hermes* 84, 428.

<sup>20</sup>Earl (above, n. 11) 235ff. The quotation is from 239.

<sup>21</sup>Tenney Frank, "Some Political Allusions in Plautus' *Trinummus*," *AJP* 53, 2 (1932) 152ff.; Donato Gagliardi, "Aspetti del teatro comico latino: la politica di Plauto," *Le Parole e le Idee V*, I-II (1963) 171.

presumes that the plays "provide a mirror of Roman public opinion in the politics of the day," and they are datable according to the waxing and waning of Scipio's career.<sup>22</sup> Many view Plautus as an advocate, arguing for Cato. And yet Plautus seems to have lived more as *cliens* than *patronus*. Which is to say he wrote to *be* supported. After all, the primary concern of the professional playwright is to be financially *engagé*. Horace's criticism of Plautus actually confirms this (*Epist.* 2.1, 175-76):

gestit enim nummum in loculos demittere, post hoc  
securus cadat an recto stet fabula talo.

Rather uncharitably, Horace neglects to mention that Plautus had no Maecenas; he *had* to work for a day's *nummi*.

And who paid the playwrights? The spectators gave their applause, but the cash came ultimately from the aediles. These men held the purse strings and usually supplemented the senatorial appropriation.<sup>23</sup> In fact, the practice whereby the aediles personally added to the largesse of the *ludi* began only in Plautus' day—according to Pliny (*HN* 21.4)—by an official almost theatrically named Crassus Dives. Is it not then logical that Plautus would be working to earn the favor of the very *novi aediles* to whom his favorite character refers? This would do much to explain the odd disproportion of *utile* to *dulce* in the *Trinummus*.

How would the officials find this play "useful?" We are, of course, seeking intent, not result. For one thing, old men hold the stage, and unlike most Plautine comedies (again e.g. the *Mostellaria*), they are *not* the butt of jokes.<sup>24</sup> Moreover, the sons are atypically respectful, dutiful and virtuous—if dull. *Fides*, queen of virtues, reigns in word and deed. For once on a Plautine stage, *mos maiorum* is praised, not damned.<sup>25</sup> We see

<sup>22</sup>C. H. Buck, Jr., *A Chronology of the Plays of Plautus* (Baltimore 1940) 106.

<sup>23</sup>On the funding of comedies, see Evelyn Holst Clift, *Latin Pseudepigrapha* (Baltimore 1945) 41-42. G. Duckworth also suggests the personal supplement by the aediles, *The Nature of Roman Comedy* (Princeton 1952) 74.

<sup>24</sup>And, of course, they were revered in everyday life. Cf. Cicero, *De Senectute* 61: "Habet senectus, honorata praesertim, tantam auctoritatem, ut ea pluris sit quam omnes adolescentiae voluptates."

<sup>25</sup>One example of Plautus' usual treatment of Roman institutions is *Menaechmi* 571ff.: "Vt hoc utimur maxime more moro, molesto . . ." in which Menaechmus damns the entire system of *clientela*.



*amicitia* in its best Roman sense, honorable dealing with friends, in praiseworthy paradigm.<sup>26</sup>

And these are Roman virtues which transcend Catonian or Scipionic factions, though they do reflect a current mood. For at the time the *Trinummus* was presented—roughly in the mid 190's<sup>27</sup>—conservative feeling, or at least propagandizing, was on the rise. The decade between Cato's consulship and censorship was a moralizing crescendo, culminating in what Livy calls *tristis et aspera in omnis ordines censura* (39.44.1). This year (184 B.C.) was, as Scullard observes, "the last real attempt of old-fashioned Romans to re-establish a more austere manner of life in the face of the social and moral decline . . ."<sup>28</sup> To Grimal, Cato and Valerius Flaccus represent no less than "le triomphe du *mos maiorum* et du conservatisme le plus étroitement réactionnaire."<sup>29</sup> And for more than a decade preceding 184, Roman voices decried the increasing *luxuria* pouring in from the East.<sup>30</sup>

But the mythical moments of the *Trinummus* briefly turn the tide. In art, if not in life, *mos maiorum* prevails, stronger than ever. In fact, here it is both past precedent and future perfect. But myth it was, as much a legend to the Roman mind as the *Saturnia regna*, an aureate past by which they could measure the present and find it wanting. Except in the *Trinummus*, which is quite simply a morality play. Consider the young men's

<sup>26</sup>On *amicitia* and its component features, see again Hellegouarc'h (above, n. 18) 41ff. On the role of *fides*, see 23ff.

<sup>27</sup>Buck (above, n. 22) 102 generally supports Ritschl's suggestion of 194 or just thereafter (see above, n. 15). There is concurrence in W. B. Sedgwick, "Plautine Chronology," *AJP* 70 (1949) 379, 382; K. H. E. Schutter, *Quibus annis comoediae Plautinae primum actae sint quaeritur* (Groningen 1952) 147-48. Tenney Frank's suggestion of 187 B.C. (above, n. 21, 152ff.) did not generate much support, but even if correct, it in no way alters our argument. In fact, it would lend it support.

<sup>28</sup>H. H. Scullard, *Roman Politics 220-150 B.C.* (Oxford 1951) 154.

<sup>29</sup>Pierre Grimal, *Le siècle des Scipions* (Paris 1953) 113.

<sup>30</sup>Cf. Scullard (above, n. 28) 112ff. At one point (18.35.1), Polybius indicates that 200 B.C. saw the beginnings of Roman moral decline, although he suggests that only after 167, the end of the Third Macedonian War (31.25.6). Cf. C. O. Brink and F. W. Walbank, "The Construction of the Sixth Book of Polybius," *CQ* 48 (1954) 106.

*redende Namen*: Lesbonicus, "passion triumphant,"<sup>31</sup> Lysiteles, λυσιτελής, *utilis*, perhaps. It is Plautus who chose these names, as is his wont.<sup>32</sup> And regardless of whether the prologue was in Philemon's original, it nonetheless confronts the Romans with their national nemesis. As Cicero remarks (*Pro Murena* 36.76), *odit populus Romanus privatam luxuriam*. And we recall who named the Latin prologue, *mihi Plautus nomen Luxuriae indidit* (8). How far are we from the spirit of such doctrinal dramas as *Everyman*?

I pray you all give your audience,  
And hear this matter with reverence,  
By figure, a morality play.

Is the *Trinummus* any less "by figure"? Indeed, if the Church could promote such entertainment, why not the State?<sup>33</sup> And if the *Trinummus* is indeed propaganda, it would hardly be the last time Rome would manipulate its myths. Who, after all, publicized Ascanius' transformation to Iulus, thus making him founder of the *gens Iulia*? But of course men like Virgil worked for more than *trium nummum caussa* (847). In fact, Servius relates how a short laudatory passage in *Aeneid* 6 reaped the poet a huge fee.<sup>34</sup> For Roman artists, myth was not only rich, it was lucrative.

But in this sense the Roman attitude was quite advanced. Only in our own day has the propaganda value of myths been acknowledged. As Georges Sorel wrote, "il faut juger les mythes comme des moyens d'agir sur le présent."<sup>35</sup> And this

<sup>31</sup>Following the suggestions of Alfred Ernout (ed., trans., *Plaute VII* [Paris 1961] 8): "Lesbonicus, 'le vainqueur à Lesbos,' ou le roi des amoureux." Ernout sees the *Trinummus* as a possible pièce à thèse, "où s'affrontent deux façons de concevoir la vie . . . de même que dans les *Adelphes* de Térence s'affrontent deux systèmes d'éducation" (8-9).

<sup>32</sup>Fraenkel (above, n. 7) 141. Cf. E. W. Handley, *Menander and Plautus: A Study in Comparison* (London 1968) 9.

<sup>33</sup>There is a striking similarity between young Lysiteles' grim picture of women despoiling their husbands (*Trin.* 237ff.) and Cato's speech on the very same topic, quoted (paraphrased?) by Livy 34.4.16ff.

<sup>34</sup>*Aen.* 6.868-86. Cf. Servius 6.861.

<sup>35</sup>Georges Sorel, *Réflexions sur la violence* (Paris 1946) 180.

may well be the way to judge the *Trinummus*, for *fides* and *mos maiorum* are great mythical attempts at moral re-armament. Consider the wise, if not too wise, definition of *le mythe* in the Littré: "ce qui n'a pas d'existence réelle. On dit qu'en politique la justice et la bonne foi sont des mythes."<sup>36</sup>

And consider the climactic moment of the play we have just examined:

Neque fuit neque erit neque esse quemquam hominem in  
terra arbitror  
quod fides fidelitasque amicum erga aequiperet tuam;  
(1125-26)

No further mention is ever made of the hidden treasure;<sup>37</sup> *mores* supersede materialism.<sup>38</sup> But then, that is why the *Trinummus* is myth and not comedy.

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<sup>36</sup>E. Littré, *Dictionnaire de la langue Française* (Paris 1882) Vol. III, 681. Illuminating is Harry Levin's essay, "Some Meanings of Myth," *Daedalus*, 88, 2 (Spring 1959) 223ff., rep. in *Myth and Mythmaking*, ed. H. A. Murray (New York 1960) 103ff.

<sup>37</sup>This would certainly not have been the case at the end of the *Aulularia*. And cf. the finale of Molière's adaptation: "je suis Don Thomas d'Alburcy, que le ciel garantit des ondes avec tout l'argent qu'il portait . . ." (*L'Avare* V.v); also:

*Anselme*: Allons vite faire part de notre joie à votre mère.

*Harpagon*: Et moi, voir ma chère cassette. (*Finis*)

The joy of the *Trinummus* is all too virtuous.

<sup>38</sup>Which may perhaps explain why it was far and away Cicero's favorite Plautine comedy (he cites it four times). Of this predilection Wilhelm Zillinger writes: "Das Stück ist im allgemeinen frei von der plautinischen derben Komik, es hat etwas Moralisierendes an sich, wie die ganze Schriftstellerei des Cicero, und ist ein feines Charakterstück," *Cicero und die altrömischen Dichter* (Würzburg 1911) 25.

## CYRUS AS A STOIC EXEMPLUM OF THE JUST MONARCH\*

*Cyrum quem maximis Graeci laudibus celebrant.*<sup>1</sup> Livy does not exaggerate the fame of Cyrus, who throughout antiquity was celebrated as the model of the just ruler. Aeschylus, Xenophon, Plato, Plutarch, Themistius, and Procopius, among others, all accorded high praise to the founder of the Persian Empire.<sup>21</sup> Hoïstad has shown that Antisthenes treated Cyrus as an ethical hero who, because of his virtues, became a true and just monarch. Especially in the form of the antithesis Cyrus-Alcibiades, Cyrus continued to serve as an important Cynic *exemplum*.<sup>3</sup> However, neither studies of the memory of Cyrus in antiquity nor of Stoic political thought discuss the reputation of Cyrus among Stoic writers; and from their silence it might be assumed that Cyrus had no role as a Stoic *exemplum*.

However, there is certain evidence which establishes that Stoics, at least from the time of the Middle Stoa did in fact honor the memory of the Persian king. In his *Second Oration on Kingship*, which is an exposition of Stoic doctrines of monarchy, Dio Chrysostom uses Cyrus as an example of the wise and just monarch, including him on a list with Deioces, Idanthyrus, and Leucon. These are all men who were endowed with Stoic royal virtues and whom, because of their virtues Zeus permitted

<sup>1</sup>Livy 9.17.6.

<sup>2</sup>Aeschylus *Pers.* 768ff.; Xenophon *Cyr.* esp. 1.2.1; Plato *Leg.* 694a; Plutarch *De Is.* 24 = *Moralia* 360B; Themistius *Or.* 6 p. 81; 8 p. 102, 114; 18 p. 225; Procopius *de Aed.* 1.1.12-17. Cf. Aristotle *Pol.* 5.8.5, 5.8.15; Diodorus 9.22; Cicero *ad. Q.* 1.2.7; Aurelius Victor *Caes.* 40.13. See Weisbach, "Kyros," *RE* Suppl. bd. IV, 1162-64. Somewhat less favorable are the accounts of Herodotus 1.75-92, 107-30, 188-91, 201-14; and Nicolaus of Damascus, *FGrH* II 361 fr. 66. For a comparison of this tradition with that represented by Xenophon see R. Hoïstad, *Cynic Hero and Cynic King* (Uppsala 1948) 82-87.

<sup>3</sup>Hoïstad 73-94.

\* This paper was written with the aid of grants from the Penrose Fund of the American Philosophical Society and from Indiana University. I would like to thank Professor G. Downey for his comments on this paper.

to live out a long life.<sup>4</sup> The Stoic character of this list is made even clearer by the mention of Idanthysus and Leucon, whom Chrysippus is known to have singled out as examples of good kings with whom the wise man would wish to associate.<sup>5</sup>

Evidence of Stoic admiration for Cyrus is not limited to writers of the imperial period. Cicero preserves a summary of the opinion of Cyrus held by Panaetius, *gravissimus Stoicorum*:

*Quis est enim, cui non perspicua sint illa, quae pluribus verbis a Panaetio commemorantur, neminem neque ducem bello, nec principem domi magnas res et salutare sine hominum studiis gerere potuisse? Commemoratur ab eo Themistocles, Pericles, Cyrus, Agesilaus, Alexander, quos negat sine adiumentis hominum tantas res efficere potuisse. Utitur in re non dubia testibus non necessariis.*<sup>6</sup>

Cicero presents only the barest summary of Panaetius' lengthy discussion of famous statesmen and their lieutenants. However, in his digression on Alexander and his generals, Polybius is obviously drawing on the same material in Panaetius; and this passage in Polybius indicates clearly how favorably Panaetius judged Alexander and, by extension, Cyrus, Agesilaus, Themistocles, and Pericles.<sup>7</sup> Further evidence of Panaetius' admiration for Cyrus is offered by his pupil Africanus, who constantly had the *Cyropaedia* in hand and

<sup>4</sup>Dio Chrys. *de Regno* 2.65-78. For Dio as a Stoic, see the collection of material in H. von Arnim, *Dion von Prusa* (Berlin 1898) II, 371-77; and M. Pohlenz, *Die Stoa* (Göttingen 1964) I, 364-66. For Dio's political thought, see most recently F. Dvornik, *Early Christian and Byzantine Political Philosophy: Origins and Background* (Washington 1966) 537-42. For the specifically Stoic character of *de Regno* 2, see also Hoistad 89. In addition to such common Stoic themes as *Philanthropia* and God the common protector and father of man, the analogy of the ruler with a bull and his herd seems to have been a common Stoic *exemplum*. See Marcus Aurelius 11.18.

<sup>5</sup>Chrysippus *ap. Plut. Stoic repug.* 20.3 = *Moralia* 1043c = H. von Arnim, *SVF* III 691.

<sup>6</sup>Panaetius *ap. Cic. Off.* 2.5.16 = M. van Straaten, *Panaetii Rhodii Fragmenta* (Leiden 1962) fr. 117.

<sup>7</sup>Polybius 8.12. For a detailed refutation of the view that the Middle Stoa was hostile to the memory of Alexander, see my article, "The Stoic View of the Career and Character of Alexander the Great," *Philologus* 118 (1974) 113-30.

quoted from it;<sup>8</sup> and Cicero no doubt correctly represents Panaetius' opinion when he has Africanus describe Cyrus as *iustissimus sapientissimusque rex* and an example of monarchy at its best.<sup>9</sup>

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<sup>8</sup>Cicero *Tusc.* 2.26.62: The quotation attributed to Africanus is from *Cyr.* 1.6.25. Cf. *ad. Q.* 1.1.8.

<sup>9</sup>Cicero *Rep.* 1.27-28. Panaetius, along with Polybius, was the main source for the *de Republica*, as Cicero clearly indicates, 1.21.34. See Pohlenz II 102. A. Schmekel's arguments on this point, *Die Philosophie der Mittleren Stoa* (Berlin 1892) 55, 64, have been generally accepted; but see the literature in H. Strasburger, "Poseidonius on Problems of the Roman Empire," *Journal of Roman Studies* 55 (1965) 45 n.50.

## THE COUNT OF DAYS AT ATHENS

Students of the Athenian calendar are by now well acquainted with a much debated scholion on Hesiod, alleged to have the authority of the grammarian and philosopher Proklos, which describes the days of the month in Boeotia and affirms that some months have thirty days and some twenty-nine, when the day before the thirtieth is omitted by the Athenians (*sic*). To avoid misunderstanding which may arise because of my free interpretation of the text I give the original Greek:<sup>1</sup> ἄρχεται οὖν ὁ 'ΗΣΙΟΔΟΣ ἐκ τῆς τριακάδος, καθ' ἣν ἡ ἀληθὴς ἐστὶ σύνοδος, ὅτε μὲν οὖσαν τριακάδα ἄνευ ἐξαιρέσεως, ὅτε δὲ καθ' , ὅτε καὶ ὑπεξαίρεται ἡ πρὸ αὐτῆς ὑπὸ 'Αθηναίων.

I am not concerned here with the time of conjunction or even with the name of the last day of the month, which the Athenians called ἔνη καὶ νέα. My concern is to emphasize the fact that Hesiod was describing a Boeotian calendar and that what the Athenians did or did not do in the naming of their days can have had no conceivable effect upon it. The scholion as it stands is corrupt, and no legitimate sense can be made of it without correction. I have commented on this elsewhere, and divesting the scholion of the intrusive ὑπὸ 'Αθηναίων I have shown what the original may have been as Proklos wrote it. I now refer the reader to that earlier discussion,<sup>2</sup> and suggest that he pay attention to the argument. Some have failed to do so. There is no necessity to repeat the argument and the documentation here. The evidence is conclusive against the commonly accepted text of the scholion which includes ὑπὸ 'Αθηναίων.

The scholion, misinterpreted, has been the principal excuse for the modern assumption that the Athenians omitted in a hollow month (29 days) the day before the last (30th). There has been, recently, an opportunity for Alan Samuel to review the evidence for the omitted day in his account of the Athenian

<sup>1</sup> For the scholion (on line 765 of the *Works and Days*) see the edition of A. Pertusi (Milan 1955).

<sup>2</sup> 'Αρχ' Ἐφ. (1968) 80-91. Cf. *Hesperia* 33 (1964) 1.

calendar published in Müller's *Handbuch* (I.7).<sup>3</sup> He has failed to do so. Instead of the up-to-date resumé which one had every reason to anticipate with satisfaction there are three pages of trivia, a renewed acquiescence in accepting the corrupt scholion of Proklos, and a disregard of Plutarch, of Pollux, of the scholia on Aristophanes, and (most damaging of all) of those inscriptions of classical Athens in which the correct count of days can be deduced. This is an amazing record of lack of attention to the evidence.

Samuel gives on p. 60 a paradigm showing the count of days in the Athenian month in which the backward count was used in the last decade of the month with *φθίνοντος*. He says "in this scheme when a day was to be left out of the month to make a hollow (29 day) month, it was the *δευτέρα φθίνοντος* (29) which was simply omitted, and that day became *ἐνη καὶ νέα*, as if to count 28, 30. Proclus describes this method of omission of the day before the thirtieth as that used by the Athenians." If one reads the scholion attentively he will realize that this is not at all what Proklos said; he states explicitly that he was giving the Boeotian count of days. The final two words *ὑπὸ Ἀθηναίων* do not belong and are to be deleted. The scholia on the *Clouds* of Aristophanes give the correct count of days for a hollow month, beginning with *ἐνάτη φθίνοντος* (=21st) and continuing with backward count to the end of the month with no omission of *δευτέρα φθίνοντος*. These scholia, from both the Venetus and the Ravennas manuscripts, are conveniently printed in my *Athenian Year* (1961) 43.<sup>4</sup> I have also cited the evidence of Pollux, an ancient author in his own right and not merely a scholiast, who gives both counts in the Athenian calendar, for full and hollow months. The account of Pollux for the month of 29 days (the hollow month) reads in part as follows, in the Editio princeps (Aldus 1502) and in the Florentine edition (Junta 1520)

<sup>3</sup> Alan E. Samuel, *Greek and Roman Chronology* (Munich 1972) 59-61.

<sup>4</sup> The texts are precise and accurate, in the idiom of their time. Pritchett's attempt at denigration in *BCH* 85 (1961) 24-26, is a failure. In the various Aristophanic scholia he makes no distinction between the good and the bad, and he repeats the error about Proklos, who, he says, makes "a clear and explicit statement about the Athenian calendar." Pritchett, like so many others, has confused Athens with Boeotia.



and the Basel edition (Gryaneus 1536):<sup>5</sup>—καὶ μέχρι τῆς εἰκοσάδος. τὸ δὲ ἀπὸ τούτου α. ἐπὶ εἰκάδι · ἡ δ' αὐτὴ · καὶ θ. φθίνοντος · θ' γὰρ λοιπὰ, ἀπὸ τῆς κα. καὶ ὁμοίως ἄχρι τῆς τριακάδος ἦν οἱ Ἀτικοὶ καλοῦσιν ἔνην καὶ νέαν. If there were nine days from the 21st to ἔνη καὶ νέα (so-called) then δευτέρα φθίνοντος was not omitted. Other manuscripts of Pollux give the full count for a month of thirty days:<sup>6</sup> πρώτη ἐπ' εἰκάδι · ἡ δ' αὐτὴ καὶ δεκάτη φθίνοντος · καὶ δευτέρα ἐπ' εἰκάδι · ἡ δ' αὐτὴ καὶ ἑννάτη φθίνοντος · ὁμοίως ἄχρι τῆς τριακάδος. Obviously Pollux knew and understood the Athenian count in both the full and the hollow months, and the omitted day was that with which the backward count began.

Just as with the scholia on Aristophanes, these true texts have been obscured and warped by modern scholars who have wished to eliminate the differences between the counts in full and hollow months. Until we come to very modern times and the researches by Pritchett and his followers, these scholars have been ignorant of epigraphy.<sup>7</sup> Now at last there is brilliant confirmation, epigraphically patent, for the validity of the untampered texts that the omitted day in a hollow month was *that day with which the backward count began*. The evidence is in the month Metageitnion of 407/6 B.C. The two equations of the text of *IG* I<sup>2</sup>, 304B which give us this knowledge deserve to be repeated:<sup>8</sup>

Metageitnion 20 = Prytany II 13  
(δεκάτη προτέρα)

Metageitnion 24 = Prytany II 17  
(ἕκτη φθίνοντος)

The dates by prytany show that only four days had elapsed

<sup>5</sup> See the account in 'Αρχ. 'Εφ. (1968) 88-89.

<sup>6</sup> See 'Αρχ. 'Εφ. (1968) 90.

<sup>7</sup> Henry Dodwell, for example, and his predecessor Manuel Moschopoulos had no help from the inscriptions to control their interpretation of Proklos. See Dodwell, *De Veteribus Graecorum Romanorumque Cyclis* (Oxford 1701) 169-70, Dissertatio III, Section xxiv, and comment by Meritt in *Hesperia* 33, (1964) 3, and 'Αρχ. 'Εφ. (1968) 85.

<sup>8</sup> The Greek text is given by B. D. Meritt, *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society* 115 (1971) 116.

between Prytany II. 13, called also Metageitnion *δεκάτη προτέρα*, and Prytany II. 17, called also Metageitnion *ἑκτη φθίνοντος*. At this time (407/6) the 21st day of the month was always called *δεκάτη ὑστέρα* (See Diagram B on p. 277, below).<sup>9</sup> This was the equivalent of Prytany II. 14. Since Prytany II. 17 was *ἑκτη φθίνοντος*, it follows that Prytany II. 16 was *ἑβδόμη φθίνοντος* and that Prytany II. 15 was *ὀγδόη φθίνοντος*. There was, therefore, no *ἐνάτη φθίνοντος* and the month Metageitnion must have been hollow.

Pritchett, with his readings of *IG I*<sup>2</sup>, 304B, knew this, admitting that "a day was positively omitted from the festival calendar between the 20th and the 24th." But instead of following the clear evidence of the scholia on Aristophanes and of the text of Pollux (which he nowhere cites) he prefers to assume an irregularity. This will have been, he thinks, a day omitted "in compensation for a day intercalated in the previous month." This introduces another irregularity, for which he can give no documentation. By compounding one irregularity with another, Pritchett thinks to save his theory of an omitted *δευτέρα φθίνοντος*.<sup>10</sup> To assume two errors, or irregularities, where there is no need to assume any is bad method. Pritchett again compounds this by another error, in that he takes the equation Prytany II. 1 = Metageitnion 8 of *IG I*<sup>2</sup>, 304B to belong to 407/6 rather than 406/5<sup>11</sup> and then gives to Prytany I thirty-six days with a hypothetical date Hekatombaion 1 = Prytany I. 1. If Prytany I had 36 days, as Pritchett claims, then Hekatombaion had 29 days, not the 31 that he claims for it. This is all so confused that one despairs of following his argument further. Simply stated: there was no intercalated day in Hekatombaion and there was nothing to justify an assumed irregular omission by way of compensation in Metageitnion.

Pritchett and Samuel not only ignore the literary evidence that *δευτέρα φθίνοντος* was not the omitted day. They continue

<sup>9</sup> This was never the omitted day in a hollow month. See B. D. Meritt, *The Athenian Year*, p. 46, note 6.

<sup>10</sup> He refers in *BCH* 88 (1964) 473 to his *Ancient Athenian Calendars on Stone* (1963) 324ff., and to *Historia* 13 (1964) 29-33.

<sup>11</sup> *BCH* 88 (1964) 371, and for the correction see B. D. Meritt, *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society* 115 (1971) 117-22.

to ignore the increasingly impressive epigraphical records, including texts from 303/2 B.C.<sup>12</sup> and 271/70 B.C.<sup>13</sup> They continue also to misinterpret or to ignore (Samuel) *IG* I<sup>2</sup>, 304B (see above) and a much debated text of 333/32 B.C. (*IG* II<sup>2</sup>, 339).

Samuel refers briefly to *IG* II<sup>2</sup>, 339. His note 1 on p. 60 reads as follows: "Scholia to Hesiod, *Op.* 765-768, mooted by Meritt (1961) Chap. 3, particularly p. 47f. Pritchett's answer appears in *BCH* 85, 1961 p. 24f., summarized in Pritchett (1963) p. 324f. For the citation of *IG* II<sup>2</sup>, 339 to refute Proclus, Meritt (1961) p. 48-50, see the (not cited by Meritt) Neugebauer-Pritchett restoration p. 46, in accord with the Proclus position, and the comments in Pritchett (1963) p. 276-277. The issue of the omitted day remains contested; cf. now Meritt, *Arch. Ephem.* 1968 pp. 77ff."<sup>14</sup>

It is astonishing to read that I do not cite the Pritchett-Neugebauer restoration of *IG* II<sup>2</sup>, 339, "in accord with the Proclus position." My citation of their restoration is on p. 50 of *The Athenian Year*. I refer in footnote 17 to their restoration of the inscription and say "if one writes the date by prytany as [ἐκτῆι κα]ὶ δε[κάτῃ]" (which is what Pritchett and Neugebauer have done) "an irregularity must be assumed in an otherwise blamelessly stoichedon text." I then proceed to show that their restoration of date by prytany is impossible whether the date by month was written ἐκτ[ῆι μετ' εἰκάδας], as Pritchett and Neugebauer have it, or as ἐκτ[ῆι φθίνοντος]. Samuel's study of this crux was evidently quite superficial, and he apparently relied on Pritchett's ambiguous and misleading assertion that I nowhere told the reader what text he had introduced into

<sup>12</sup> *IG* II<sup>2</sup>, 493-97 and *Hesperia* 21 (1952) 367-68; cf. 'Αρχ. 'Εφ. (1968) 78-80.

<sup>13</sup> B. D. Meritt, *The Athenian Year* (1961) 192-95; cf. 'Αρχ. 'Εφ. (1968) 77-78.

<sup>14</sup> For the reader who has not all the references at his ready disposal, an elaboration of the brief citations will be useful:

B. D. Meritt, *The Athenian Year* (Berkeley 1961) Sather Classical Lectures 32.  
W. K. Pritchett and B. L. van der Waerden, "Thucydidean Time-Reckoning and Euctemon's Seasonal Calendar," *Bulletin de Correspondance Hellénique* 85 (1961) 17-52.

W. K. Pritchett, *Ancient Athenian Calendars on Stone* (Berkeley 1963) 267-402. University of California Publications in Classical Archaeology, IV, 4.

W. K. Pritchett and O. Neugebauer, *The Calendars of Athens* (Cambridge, Mass., 1947).

B. D. Meritt, "Calendar Studies," 'Αρχαιολογική 'Εφ. (1968) 77-115.

his table.<sup>15</sup> Surely I had done enough when I referred to the page which carried his table and then devoted several pages to showing that [ἐκτη κα]ῖ δε[κάτη] could not be right.

There is more to be said about IG II<sup>2</sup>, 339. Pritchett does not like the photograph of it in *The Athenian Year*. He says:<sup>16</sup> "the light comes from above and to the right; the result is that the bottom line, with the exception of the iota, is almost obliterated." This is quite untrue. The light comes from the right, not from above, and every single letter, so far as preserved, including those in the last line, is shown with remarkable clarity. Having now (in 1972) again examined the stone in Athens and the published photograph in *The Athenian Year* (fig. 1, facing p. 49) I can claim part of a fourth letter not seen by Pritchett; this is the upper part of the vertical stroke of kappa, following the well-preserved epsilon. The restoration of the date within the prytany is [πέμπτῃ κα]ῖ δεχ[άτῃ τῆς πρωτανείας]. Strokes of all four letters preserve traces of surface patina. In his first publication Pritchett says of the delta:<sup>17</sup> "The cross-bar is clearly discernible on the squeeze in such a position that it is overlapped by the oblique hastas." This too is false. The oblique strokes end at the end of the cross-bar, and in spite of his assertion to the contrary the three strokes of the letter make a perfect isosceles triangle, just as in the case of the deltas preserved in line 3.<sup>18</sup> Pritchett continues his comment to say that "epigraphically, the letter may be read more probably as a delta, but possibly as an alpha," thus envisaging a possibility which does not exist. The letter is a perfect delta, with each stroke measuring 5 or 6 millimeters, depending on how the measurement is taken. I would have been equally precise about this in my criticism of Pritchett in 1961 except that I was reluctant to rely too heavily on a squeeze or photograph without having, in verification, consulted the stone itself. This I have now done, and the photograph, especially at the lower left angle where there is no damage to the stone, shows the perfect angle with no protrusion of either stroke beyond the apex. I regret that

<sup>15</sup> W. K. Pritchett, *Ancient Athenian Calendars on Stone* (1963) 276.

<sup>16</sup> Loc. cit.

<sup>17</sup> *Calendars of Athens* (1947) 47.

<sup>18</sup> This can be seen in my photograph in *The Athenian Year*, fig. 1 facing p. 49.

so much ink has been wasted in trying to make a case for a wrong letter and in necessarily combatting the false suggestion of alpha. It is enough to say that the letter is a perfectly formed delta and that it cannot be mistaken by a trained epigraphist, when he has seen the stone, for anything else. Pritchett publishes a photograph of a latex squeeze showing what he calls "the apparent delta" in the bottom line.<sup>19</sup> The squeeze shows all that I claim for the stone itself but is no clearer than my photograph. It has the disadvantage of showing only parts of lines 6 and 7 and hence gives no control over the similarity of the delta to the deltas in line 3. It has also the disadvantage of having been published upside down.

But all this, with Pritchett, was a kind of red herring. He did not really believe in his suggested (*Calendars of Athens*, 48)  $\xi\kappa\tau[\eta\iota \ \epsilon\pi\iota \ \delta\acute{\epsilon}\kappa\alpha \cdot \ \epsilon\kappa\kappa\lambda\eta\sigma\acute{\iota}\alpha \ \kappa\upsilon\rho] \ \acute{\iota}\alpha \ \acute{\epsilon}[\nu\text{---}]$ . He preferred  $\xi\kappa\tau[\eta\iota \ \mu\epsilon\tau' \ \epsilon\acute{\iota}\kappa\acute{\alpha}\delta\alpha\varsigma, \ \nu'\xi\kappa\tau\eta\iota \ \kappa\alpha] \ \acute{\iota} \ \delta\epsilon[\kappa\acute{\alpha}\tau\eta\iota \ \tau\eta\varsigma \ \pi\rho\upsilon\tau\alpha\nu\epsilon\acute{\iota}\alpha\varsigma]$ , as he had written the equation on p. 46. He has this to say of the uninscribed space:<sup>20</sup> "In assuming an uninscribed letter-space, I refer the reader to table 14 (p. 374), where Meritt has assumed the same irregularity in seven inscriptions he studied in *The Athenian Year*; so there can be nothing unusual about this assumption."

It will be well for the reader to pause when he consults table 14, and to weigh the evidence. The examples which Pritchett cites (six in number in the table, and not seven) are in no way comparable to the inscribed space assumed in *IG II*<sup>2</sup>, 339. This is, of all places, the one place when a blank space cannot be assumed. In the exacting study of Attic inscriptions there are various considerations which from time to time have led epigraphists to claim uninscribed spaces in the texts on which they were working. Some are justifiable and can be documented; some are not. One uninscribed space is by no means always the same as another. Pritchett cites examples chosen from my book which have a wide range of motivation, but no inscription which he cites posits the abnormality of a blank space between the date by month and the date by prytany in the opening lines of a

<sup>19</sup> *Ancient Athenian Calendars on Stone* (1963) plate 21a.

<sup>20</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 276.

decree. He has given no documentation, from my book or otherwise, to show by example that the assumption of a blank space in this position is possible. There are many subtleties in the field of Attic epigraphy, some of which one learns by long experience and observation. One of these is that the Athenians thought of the two day dates as a unit: date by month and date by prytany, with no pause for punctuation between. We sometimes obscure this fact by inserting a comma in our published texts, but it is (if one does not know the idiom) misleading, a heritage probably from older publications in which commas were liberally used. The punctuation of a blank space, at this point, is not permissible. Pritchett says<sup>21</sup> that "the *vacat* occurs between phrases, and for this there are epigraphical parallels." But these two phrases are so closely knit that they practically coalesce into one. There is no known parallel for the assumption which he has made.<sup>22</sup>

Pritchett thinks, alternatively, that the blank space "could be assigned to the last letter-space of the line; for there are parallels for this too in preserved prescripts." But there would be no excuse for this here, where the stoichedon text runs smoothly forward. There might be some excuse for this solution if the lines were divided syllabically, but the division of [Μεταγε|ιτιω̄]νος in lines 5-6<sup>23</sup> shows this too not to have been the case. I came back to the study of this text in 1968<sup>24</sup> to show how Pritchett, by restoring [ἐβδόμη|κα]ι δε[κάτη] could have avoided his epigraphical solecism with the assumption (less reprehensible) of a calendrical rather than an epigraphical anomaly. Samuel must have known of this for he refers to the article in which the assumption was suggested, but he chose to champion the worse and not the less bad of the two alternatives. An irregularity, even had he chosen differently, would remain, unexplained and unmotivated, which—being it—

<sup>21</sup> Loc. cit.

<sup>22</sup> There was a time when I had assumed such a blank space in the text of *Hesperia* 5 (1936) 418-19 (No. 14), not cited by Pritchett. This anomaly has been eliminated. See the text in *Hesperia* 38 (1969) 111, and the comment there on pp. 112-13 for the close adherence of the civil calendar to the pattern of the Metonic norm through five consecutive nineteen-year cycles.

<sup>23</sup> See the text in *The Athenian Year* (1961) 48.

<sup>24</sup> 'Αρχ. 'Εφ. (1968) 82.

self a mere assumption—can hardly be used to support a theory that at Athens the omitted day in a hollow month was *δευτέρα φθίνοντος*.

It is indeed regrettable that false doctrine should be included in a handbook, or for that matter in any general work of reference.<sup>25</sup> For those who wish to consult paradigms I publish here a correct tabulation of the names of days in the Athenian civil month. These are to replace those given by Samuel in Müller's *Handbuch*.

THE DAYS OF THE MONTH AT ATHENS<sup>26</sup>

|                      |  |
|----------------------|--|
| 1. νουμηνία          | 11. ἑνδεκάτη                                   |
| 2. δευτέρα ἱσταμένου | 12. δωδεκάτη                                   |
| 3. τρίτη ἱσταμένου   | 13. τρίτη ἐπὶ δέκα                             |
| 4. τετράς ἱσταμένου  | 14. τετράς ἐπὶ δέκα                            |
| 5. πέμπτη ἱσταμένου  | 15. πέμπτη ἐπὶ δέκα                            |
| 6. ἕκτη ἱσταμένου    | 16. ἕκτη ἐπὶ δέκα                              |
| 7. ἑβδόμη ἱσταμένου  | 17. ἑβδόμη ἐπὶ δέκα                            |
| 8. ὀγδόη ἱσταμένου   | 18. ὀγδόη ἐπὶ δέκα                             |
| 9. ἐνάτη ἱσταμένου   | 19. ἐνάτη ἐπὶ δέκα                             |
| 10. δεκάτη ἱσταμένου | 20. εἰκάς, εἰκοστή, εἰκάδες,<br>δεκάτη προτέρα |

Diagram A: From the Time of Solon down to 432 B.C.<sup>27</sup>

| In a Full Month       | In a Hollow Month     |
|-----------------------|-----------------------|
| 21. δεκάτη φθίνοντος  | 21. ἐνάτη φθίνοντος   |
| 22. ἐνάτη φθίνοντος   | 22. ὀγδόη φθίνοντος   |
| 23. ὀγδόη φθίνοντος   | 23. ἑβδόμη φθίνοντος  |
| 24. ἑβδόμη φθίνοντος  | 24. ἕκτη φθίνοντος    |
| 25. ἕκτη φθίνοντος    | 25. πέμπτη φθίνοντος  |
| 26. πέμπτη φθίνοντος  | 26. τετράς φθίνοντος  |
| 27. τετράς φθίνοντος  | 27. τρίτη φθίνοντος   |
| 28. τρίτη φθίνοντος   | 28. δευτέρα φθίνοντος |
| 29. δευτέρα φθίνοντος | 29. ἔνη καὶ νέα       |
| 30. ἔνη καὶ νέα       |                       |

<sup>25</sup> The false count in the last decade of a hollow month is given in Herbert Weir Smyth, *Greek Grammar*, revised by Gordon M. Messing (Cambridge, Mass., 1956) 722. In his introduction (p. v) Messing credits Sterling Dow with this "valuable revision" of paragraph 350d of the original edition of 1920.

<sup>26</sup> These dates for the first 20 days, except the 20th, are valid at all periods. For the 20th see the comment following the paradigms.

<sup>27</sup> This is the calendar described by the grammarians and the scholiasts; e.g.

Diagram B: Valid from 432 B.C. (Meton) to  
Late 4th Century.<sup>28</sup>

| In a Full Month       | In a Hollow Month     |
|-----------------------|-----------------------|
| 21. δεκάτη ὑστέρα     | 21. δεκάτη ὑστέρα     |
| 22. ἐνάτη φθίνοντος   | 22. ὀγδὴ φθίνοντος    |
| 23. ὀγδὴ φθίνοντος    | 23. ἑβδόμη φθίνοντος  |
| 24. ἑβδόμη φθίνοντος  | 24. ἕκτη φθίνοντος    |
| 25. ἕκτη φθίνοντος    | 25. πέμπτη φθίνοντος  |
| 26. πέμπτη φθίνοντος  | 26. τετράς φθίνοντος  |
| 27. τετράς φθίνοντος  | 27. τρίτη φθίνοντος   |
| 28. τρίτη φθίνοντος   | 28. δευτέρα φθίνοντος |
| 29. δευτέρα φθίνοντος | 29. ἔνη καὶ νέα       |
| 30. ἔνη καὶ νέα       |                       |

Diagram C: Valid from Late 4th Century Onward<sup>29</sup>

| In a Full Month          | In a Hollow Month        |
|--------------------------|--------------------------|
| 21. δεκάτη ὑστέρα        | 21. δεκάτη ὑστέρα        |
| 22. ἐνάτη μετ' εἰκάδας   | 22. ὀγδὴ μετ' εἰκάδας    |
| 23. ὀγδὴ μετ' εἰκάδας    | 23. ἑβδόμη μετ' εἰκάδας  |
| 24. ἑβδόμη μετ' εἰκάδας  | 24. ἕκτη μετ' εἰκάδας    |
| 25. ἕκτη μετ' εἰκάδας    | 25. πέμπτη μετ' εἰκάδας  |
| 26. πέμπτη μετ' εἰκάδας  | 26. τετράς μετ' εἰκάδας  |
| 27. τετράς μετ' εἰκάδας  | 27. τρίτη μετ' εἰκάδας   |
| 28. τρίτη μετ' εἰκάδας   | 28. δευτέρα μετ' εἰκάδας |
| 29. δευτέρα μετ' εἰκάδας | 29. ἔνη καὶ νέα          |
| 30. ἔνη καὶ νέα          |                          |

Proklos' comment on Hesiod's *Works and Days*, lines 817-18 (ed. Pertusi, Milan 1955, 254-55) for a full month and the Aristophanic scholia of the Ravennas and Venetus manuscripts for a hollow month (Meritt, *The Athenian Year* [1961] 43). The comment of Proklos distinguishes between Hesiod's forward count in Boeotia and the backward count at Athens. *Οὐ γὰρ ἐν Ἀθῆναις ἀνὰ πάλιν ἀριθμοῦντας τὰς φθινούσας—δεκάτην, ἐνάτην, ὀγδὴν καὶ ἐξῆς*. The one clear deduction that can be made from this scholion is that Hesiod did not count the last decade backward as the Athenians did (*οὐ κατὰ Ἀθῆναιους*). Samuel (69-70) assumes that the count in Boeotia was like that at Athens but admits that "there is no evidence to support or refute that assumption." His uncertainty may reflect the ambiguity of the evidence for classical times, but Proklos, both here and in the scholion on line 765, was thinking of Hesiod's day. Cf. *Hesperia* 33 (1964) 1 and *Αρχ. Έφ.* (1968) 107.

<sup>28</sup> This is the calendar valid at the time of IG I<sup>2</sup>, 304B, where the count of days in Prytany II shows that the month Metageitnion was hollow.

<sup>29</sup> Between 334/33, approximately, and the end of the century there was some overlapping of the definitions from Diagrams B and C.



The use of *εἰκάς* for the 20th must be as early as Solon<sup>30</sup> and it occurs epigraphically in 485/84.<sup>31</sup> It continued in informal epigraphical usage,<sup>32</sup> though replaced by *δεκάτη προτέρα* in official documents as early as 407/6 as epigraphically attested.<sup>33</sup> *Εἰκάς* or *εἰκάδες* was used by authors and grammarians at all epochs.<sup>34</sup> The appearance of *εἰκοστή* in an official document of 407/6, the same that also has *δεκάτη προτέρα*, is unique. The use of *δεκάτη προτέρα* for the 20th implies *δεκάτη ὑστέρα* for the 21st; its first preserved appearance is in a sacrificial calendar from Erchia soon after mid fourth century.<sup>35</sup>

Solon's calendar had *δεκάτη φθίνοντος* for the 21st in a full month and *ἐνάτη φθίνοντος* for the 21st in a hollow month. This has been described by the grammarians and the scholiasts. In official epigraphical Greek, at least from 407/6, *δεκάτη ὑστέρα* was always used for the 21st in both full and hollow months. In hollow months it was never the omitted day. The omitted day was that with which backward count began (see above). Backward count was employed from the 22nd to the end of the month, first with the modifier *φθίνοντος*,<sup>36</sup> and then with the modifier *μετ' εἰκάδας*.<sup>37</sup> The names of the days as known best from the decrees of the mid fourth century were probably fixed by Meton at the time of his reforms in 432 B.C. They had international currency among astronomers.<sup>38</sup>

Samuel gives (61) paradigms showing backward and forward count with *μετ' εἰκάδας*. The former is in error for the hollow month and the latter is an out-of-date conception that should not have been perpetuated. The consensus of all serious students of

<sup>30</sup> *Αρχ. Έφ.* (1968) 107.

<sup>31</sup> *IG* I<sup>2</sup>, 4, lines 20-21.

<sup>32</sup> *Hesperia* 30 (1961) 229-30, Nos. 28 and 29.

<sup>33</sup> *IG* I<sup>2</sup>, 304B, as read in *BCH* 88 (1964) 463.

<sup>34</sup> Cf. *Αρχ. Έφ.* (1968) 106, 107.

<sup>35</sup> *BCH* 87 (1963) 604-10; *SEG* 21 (1965) No. 541.

<sup>36</sup> Last appearance, though not in the preamble of a decree, in *IG* II<sup>2</sup>, 1492, of 306/5.

<sup>37</sup> First recorded appearance in *IG* II<sup>2</sup>, 335, of 334/33.

<sup>38</sup> *Αρχ. Έφ.* (1968) 107. These dates were perpetuated by astronomers even after the change in Athens from *φθίνοντος* to *μετ' εἰκάδας*. See, for example, Ptolemy, *Almagest*, VII (ed. Heiberg, p. 29) for a month date with *φθίνοντος* in 283 B.C. The text is quoted in Meritt, *The Athenian Year* (1961) 21.

the calendar is now that forward count with μετ' εικάδας was never used.

Samuel also discusses (61-63) the length of the prytanies in the Prytany Calendar and argues that Aristotle's rule for four prytanies of 36 days followed by six prytanies of 35 days must be accepted *au pied de la lettre*. He thinks that "this clear statement of Aristotle has never been successfully refuted." It is now refuted categorically by the readings of IG I<sup>2</sup>. 304B which show conclusively that the last two prytanies of 407/6 each had 36 (not 35) days.<sup>39</sup>

We have come a long way in the last quarter century in our knowledge of the Athenian calendar. My own views have changed as the evidence from inscriptions has become more clear. We owe to Pritchett the stabilization of the prytany calendar (though in the case of Aristotle he carried this to extremes) and the demonstration that the festival calendar cannot be used as a norm if it disagrees with the prytany calendar. The arguments to which this present article may serve as a kind of appendix have been set forth by me over the years. It would have been of profit to Samuel if he had made a less superficial study before writing his resumé for Müller's *Handbuch*.

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<sup>39</sup> Cf. 'Αρχ. 'Εφ. (1968) p. 87, note 1.

THE PROTECTED FUND IN THE  
ATHENIAN COINAGE DECREE  
(*ATL D 14*, par 7f)

David Lewis has radically reinterpreted an unsatisfactory passage in the standard texts of the measure imposing Athenian currency on the Empire. He assembles all the fifth and early fourth-century evidence for 'entrenchment-clauses' in Attic decrees, whether they protect funds or policy. Most relevant to *D 14*, par. 7f are a clause from the second Kallias Decree, the ban imposed in 431 B.C. on diversion of the 1,000 talents 'inner reserve' of Athens, and the protected fund specified in a decree concerning the Sicilian expedition of 415/413 B.C.<sup>1</sup> Against this background Lewis demonstrates convincingly that the capital penalty of *D 14* par. 7f was imposed not for any use of non-Athenian silver, but in defence of a particular reserve fund. What this could have been he does not attempt to resolve, terming it 'obscure.'<sup>2</sup>

This is a real breakthrough. But I do not think that we have to remain content to be agnostic. Something more surely can be unearthed. I would start—rather as Lewis did—by studying closely the text of the Aphytis fragment, allowing only minimal supplement:

stoich. 42

[-----δ δὲ ἂν περιγ]ίννηται ἀργυρίο  
[.....22.....ἀποδό]σθαι ἢ τοῖς στρατ  
[ηγοῖς ἢ.....19.....· ἐπε]ιδὲν δὲ ἀποδοθῇι,  
[.....29.....]αι καὶ τῶι 'Ηφαίσ  
[τωι.....11.....· καὶ ἐάν τις εἴπηι ἢ] ἐπιψηφίσῃι περ  
[ι.....27.....]τι χρῆσθαι ἢ δανε  
[ι.....28.....] τοὺς ἔνδεκα· οἱ δ  
[ε ἔνδεκα θανάτῳι ζημιωσάντων· ἐάν] δὲ ἀμφισβητῇι, ἐσ  
[αγαγόντων ἐς τὸ δικάστέριον. ---]

<sup>1</sup> See Φόρος: *Tribute to Benjamin Dean Meritt* (1974) 81-89.

<sup>2</sup> *Op. cit.* 83-85 and 89.

For lines 19-21 we may safely adopt Lewis's proposal: *περ* [ἰ τούτων .....15 .....ἐς ἄλλο] *τι* χρῆσθαι ἢ δανε [ἰζεσθαι, ἀπαγωγὴν αὐτοῦ εἶναι πρὸς]. Contravening the ban on attempts to divert the fund would automatically involve prompt arrest and execution, unless the culprit appealed to the people.<sup>3</sup> But what was the fund? It seems logical to expect to find *some* clue in the immediately preceding passage. Several scholars have favoured restoring [τῇι 'Αθηναί]αι καὶ τῶι 'Ηφαίσ [τῶι] in line 18f. and this can hardly be wrong. Though debt repayment is probably *not* in question, these two deities presumably were to profit in some way from the earmarked funds. What had these *χρήματα ἐξαίρετα* to do with them?<sup>4</sup>

Another mysterious passage from an Attic decree may help. In *IG* I<sup>2</sup>, 84.6ff. the broken text seems to run as follows:

stoich. 61

[.....16.....τ]ῆς μουσικῆς καθάπε[ρ.....28.....]  
 [.....11.....]τῶ ἢε[φα]ίστο καὶ τῆς 'Αθηναίας [.....26.....]  
 [.....9.....]'Αθηναίῳ[ις] νόθεν χρὲ ἔχσαιρες ἀργ[ύριον.....19.....]  
 [.....7..ἢ]εργοποιὸς[ς]δὲ ἡοίτινες ἡεργοπέσοσ[ι τὲν θυσίαν δέκα ἀνδρας δι]  
 [ἀ]κλε[ροδοῖ] ἐκ τῶν δ[ικα]στῶν ἡένα ἐκ τῆς φυλῆς ἐκ τῶν[----]

<sup>3</sup> See *op. cit.* pp. 83ff. with n. 15. Lewis's argument for replacing the supplement [ἀπαναλλίσκεν] with [δανείζεσθαι] in line 13f. of the second Kallias Decree (*ATL* 2, D 2) seems unanswerable. "The Athenians", he observes, "are not to use Athena's money, not even with a promise to repay." The restoration in D 14 follows inevitably.

<sup>4</sup> See *ATL* 1, p. 579, T 69 and 2, D 14; D. M. Robinson, *AJP* 56 (1935) 151-53; Dinsmoor, *Hesperia*, Suppl. 5 (1941) 152f. For earmarked funds note *ἐξυλῶνται* in *Thuc.* 2.24.1 (431 B.C.) and the tantalising *ἐ[ὰν δέ τις εἴπει] ἔπιποι[ε] [ἐπίσει] ----]ς ἔχσαιρε[---]* in *IG* I<sup>2</sup>, 98/99 frg. g. The best edition is Dover's in *Hist. Comm. on Thucydides*, iv (1970) 224-27 and Meiggs and Lewis *GHI*, 236-40, no. 78. Lewis noted (*op. cit.*, 83 n. 13) that Ronald Stroud planned to 'publish a reconsideration of lines 18-19, based on a new reading from the stone'. Study of a clear new photograph—kindly sent me by Stroud—confirms that ]ΑΙΚΑΙΤΩΙΗΦΑΙΣ should indeed be read. But surely [ΘΙΑΘΗΝ]ΑΙ remains possible. For this spelling of Athena's name see *IG* I<sup>2</sup> 415, 424, 579, 615, 696, 711; *IG* II<sup>2</sup> 111.67 and 80 (363/2), 1388.1 (398/7), 1412.13 (after 385/4), 4326 and 4329 (both mid fourth-century). It occurs intermittently from c. 500 to 350 B.C.

All editors readily print ἐχσαιρῆ(ν) in line 18.<sup>5</sup> Once more the mutilated context proves baffling. Yet it surely dealt with a fund reserved for the cult of Athena and Hephaistos. Could this be the same as the fund protected by the death penalty in D 14, par. 7f? If the two passages do concern the same transaction, as appears plausible, we might conjecture that because of financial stringency money earmarked for these gods needed temporarily unusually rigorous sanctions. The fund is unlikely to have been retained as a reserve fiercely protected over a generation, like the far more important 'inner reserve' of the Athenian state. Now the Hephaisteia Decree is archon-dated 421/420 B.C. What then becomes of the orthodox c. 445 B.C. dating of the Coinage Decree, based on the assumption that the three-barred Attic sigmas in the Kos copy are inconceivable after that date?

It must quite simply be abandoned and the underlying assumption drastically modified.<sup>6</sup> This can be shown by close study of another Attic decree to be unavoidable anyway. The Sigeion Decree also has three-barred sigmas, and in its preamble appears the mutilated name of an archon. For the moment I propose leaving that name unsupplemented. The opening of the decree needs recasting. Meritt began with ἐπαινέσαι μὲν Σιγειεῦσιν, but this reflects fourth-century usage and is therefore probably out of place.<sup>7</sup> I prefer to restore lines 4-9 thus:

stoich. 23

-----ε]

πεσάτε, 'Αν[----ἔρχε----

[ο] χίδεις ε[ι]π[ε] · ἐπαινέσαι τοῖς]

[Σι]γειεῦ[σ]ιν [ὁς] ὁσιν ἀνδράσι]

[ν] ἀγ[αθοῖς] ἐς [τὸν] δέμον τὸν 'Αθ]

[εναίον----

<sup>5</sup> So *IG* I, Suppl. p. 64f., no. 35b; *IG* I<sup>2</sup>, 84; F. Sokolowski, *Lois sacrées des cités grecques* (1969) 26-28, no. 13.

<sup>6</sup> For a recent confident reassertion of this epigraphic dogma see Michael Walbank in *Φόρος...* (1974) 161-69.

<sup>7</sup> See *Hesperia* 5 (1936) 360-62. For ἐπαινέσαι μὲν in the fourth century see *IG* II<sup>2</sup>, 2.9ff.; 7.4f.; 26.7; 28.4; 31.5; 62.5; 76.7f; 86.6f.; 107.37f.; The nearest fifth-century parallel seems to be [τὸ] | μὲν δέμοι τοῖ Σαμίον ἐπαινέσαι in *IG* I<sup>2</sup>, 101.1f. (412/411 B.C.).

Though plural ethnics generally do not have the article, there are good fifth-century parallels.<sup>8</sup> One comes in the opening of the second Neapolis Decree of ? 408/407 B.C.: ἐπαινέσαι τοῖς Νεοπολίταις τοῖς ἀπὸ [Θραίκες ἡος ὁσιν ἀνδράσιν ἀγαθοῖς] | ἔς τε τὴν στρατίαν καὶ τὴν πόλιν τὴν Ἀθηναίων καὶ ἡότ[ι---].<sup>9</sup> The decree for the Halikarnassians in 410/409 B.C. opens very similarly: [---ἐπ]αινέσαι τοῖς Ἀλ[ικαρνασσεύσι ὡς οὔσι] ν ἀνδράσιν ἀγα[θ]οῖς ἔς τε τὴν στρατίαν ν καὶ τὴν πόλιν | τὴν Ἀθηναίων, καὶ περὶ ὧν λέγουσι---.<sup>10</sup> On close inspection these parallels turn out to be extraordinarily suggestive. In all three clauses ἐπαινέσαι takes the dative with participle, the ethnic usually has the article and the preposition εἰς is preferred to the alternative περὶ.<sup>11</sup>

What does this imply? The orthodox view of the lettering style—three-barred sigma and tailed, rounded rho—has imposed Antidotos (451/450 B.C.) as the archon of the Sigeion Decree.<sup>12</sup> I find it hard to believe that a decree of c. 450 B.C. should open in terms identical with the fashion of forty years later. Nor is this all. There is also the disturbing evidence of the purpose clause in lines 9-14: ---ὅπο[ς] ἂν ---μὲ ἀδ[ελφοί] ἰκόνται μεδὲ ὑφ' ἐνὸς τῶν ἐν τ[ῇ] ἐπιείρῳ. I know of only one certain parallel, in the decree honouring Evagoras of Salamis c. 410 B.C.: [---ἐπιμέλεσθαι δὲ αὐτῷ τὴν τε βο]λὴν τὴν αἰε[μένην] | [ἰ]βoλεῦσαν καὶ

<sup>8</sup> See Meisterhans, *Gramm. Att. Inscr.* 3, 225, 14.

<sup>9</sup> SEG XII, 37.48f. (IG I<sup>2</sup> 108+) = Meiggs and Lewis, no. 89. For the date see *ibid.* p. 274.

<sup>10</sup> IG I<sup>2</sup>, 110a. 5-8. I have altered the IG περὶ in line 7, so as to conform better to the superior Neapolis pattern.

<sup>11</sup> For ἐπαινέσαι with dative and participle see IG I<sup>2</sup>, 72.3-7 (c. 420 B.C.), 119.5f (408/407 B.C.), 105.31-33 (407/406 B.C.?), *Hesperia* 39 (1970) 111, lines 6-8 (IG II<sup>2</sup>, 174+: 405/404 B.C.), IG II<sup>2</sup>, 1.35-37 (405/404 B.C.) and 60.4-6: with accusative and participle see IG I<sup>2</sup>, 110.6f and SEG X, 98.2-5 (Wilhelm's drastic revision of IG I<sup>2</sup>, 154): with dative or accusative and ἐπειδή/ἵθι see IG I<sup>2</sup>, 35.4-6, ATL 2, D 21.14f, SEG X, 84.24f (IG I<sup>2</sup>, 70+), IG I<sup>2</sup>, 82.8ff, 160.4-6 (?), IG II<sup>2</sup>, 27.5-9 (420's B.C.), IG I<sup>2</sup>, 101.1f and 103.5-9, SEG XII, 37.6-11 (IG I<sup>2</sup>, 108), IG I<sup>2</sup>, 118.6-13 and II<sup>2</sup> 1.43, 58, 64f and 71. For ἀνὴρ ἀγαθός etc. with περὶ see IG I<sup>2</sup>, 59.7ff, 160.5f, IG II<sup>2</sup>, 27.7f, SEG X, 84.25f, IG I<sup>2</sup> 110.6f, 118.6-9 and II<sup>2</sup> 1.43, 58 and 65.

<sup>12</sup> For the orthodox dating of SEG X, 13 (IG I<sup>2</sup> 32+) see Meritt, *Hesperia* 5 (1936) 360-62, no. 3; Meiggs and Andrewes, Hill, *Sources for Greek History*<sup>2</sup>, p. 291, B 28.

τὸς προτάσεις καὶ τὸς στ]ρατεγὸς ἡόπ | [ὅς ἂν μὲ ἀδικῆται μεδ' οἱ παῖδες αὐτῷ μεδὲ] ἡνφ' ἐνός.<sup>13</sup> The fourth-century order is ἐπιμέλεισθαι ὅπως μὴδὲ ὕφ' ἐνός ἀδικῆται.<sup>14</sup>

In view of these stylistic considerations I am still sorely tempted to conflate the archon An— and —on of the Sigeion and Egesta Decrees, especially as similar evidence for the latter points to the 420's or later. The resulting Antiphon (418/417 B.C.) satisfies all requirements and makes c. 425/424 B.C. appear almost a moderate dating for the Athenian Coinage Decree.<sup>15</sup>

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## APPENDIX

### THE ORDER OF THE TRIBUTE DISTRICTS

Recently Eberhard Erxleben (*ArchP* 21 [1971] 145-62) argued strongly in favour of putting the Coinage Decree in 425/424 B.C. or one of the following years. He laid great stress on the order of the four tribute-districts in D 14, 9, which is the same as that established for the Reassessment Schedule of 425/424 B.C. (*ATL* 2, A9)—namely Islands, Ionia, Hellespont, Thrace. On p. 149 he fairly countered Meritt's claim that in that schedule—as opposed to D 14—there were really *six* districts, not just four. In *BSA* 65 (1970) 141f. I deployed similar arguments. The order of the four districts is the same then in A 9 and D 14 and, with Erxleben, I continue to find this significant.

Erxleben missed one important point. The order of districts in the Kleinias Decree (*ATL* 2, D7) may not be the same as in A 9 and D 14. It has simply been so restored and in *Historia* 10 (1961) 150ff. and *CQ*, N.S. 16 (1966) 187 and 189 I accepted this,

<sup>13</sup> *IG* I<sup>2</sup>, 113.13f. For the bibliography see *SEG* X, 127.

<sup>14</sup> See *IG* II<sup>2</sup>, 86.16f.; 184.4-7; 252.12.16 (?); 287.9-12; 292.1-4 (?); 426.5-7; 505.56-58 (?); *SEG* XXI, 340.9-13 (?).

<sup>15</sup> For Egesta Treaty see the new evidence discussed in my forthcoming paper for *Historia* 24 (1975), and the most important epigraphic study of the stone by Dr. Terry Wick, which will be published in *JHS* 95 (1975).

making it one of my main arguments for D 7 also. Erxleben did not know of my recantation in *Acta of the Vth Epigr. Congr.*, 1967 (1971) 29-31. The order of Ionia, Islands, Hellespont, Thrace is equally open. Indeed idiomatically it is preferable and more consistent. The envoys were sent out in two groups—'to ? Ionia and the Islands' and 'to Hellespont and Thrace'. What for us is *reversed* geographical order (the further point mentioned first) was normal fifth-century Attic usage, as can be observed from Thucydides. See 2.7.3 and 93.1; 3.29.1 and 102.1; 6.62.1 and 8.88 (and Steup/Klassen's good notes ad loc.). The principle behind the orders in D 7 and D 14 differed. In D 7 it was probably geographical, as fifth-century Athenians understood it, and in D 14 the order was quite indifferent, the districts being listed one by one (a herald to each). Klearchos, I believe, 'happened' to adopt the order fixed in the 425/424 B.C. reassessment for the very good reason that it was the current one.



## REVIEWS

ANDRÉ WARTELLE. *Histoire du Texte d'Eschyle dans l'Antiquité*. Paris, Les Belles Lettres, 1971. Pp. 397. 30.00F. (*Collection d'études anciennes*)

This book claims to be a "history of the text" in the broad sense given to that term by the late Alphonse Dain and his school: an investigation not merely of the textual transmission of a given author's works, but also of their genesis, dissemination, and literary cultural influence. In general, no one can doubt the theoretical importance of such studies, for the literary critic as well as for the cultural historian. But the first condition of success is surely that the surviving evidence should be adequate to the writing of a reasonably continuous and objective history. That condition was met, for example, in Comparetti's *Virgil in the Middle Ages*. But can it possibly be met in an enquiry into Aeschylus' text in antiquity?

Most of the raw literary data for such an enquiry are already available in three places: F. Schoell, *De Aeschyli Vita et Poesi Testimonia Veterum*, in Ritschl's 1875 edition of the *Septem* (the only near-comprehensive collection of its kind, but never mentioned by Wartelle); the testimonia to the text in Wilamowitz' edition of Aeschylus; and Mette's collection of the Fragments. All of this scrappy material, even if printed *in extenso*, would occupy perhaps eighty pages. A vast proportion of it is either repetitive or nonsignificant. Nowhere in it can this reviewer discern the evidence for a history (in any intelligible sense of that word) of the fate of Aeschylus' works at any period in antiquity. Nor has Wartelle apparently undertaken any original research in order to amplify or refine those data. In the crucial matter of ancient citations from the extant texts he simply relies on Wilamowitz (see especially pp. 78 and 247). Yet Wilamowitz himself (*Praef.* to his edition, p. xxxiii) did little more than take over the testimonia collected by Hermann; and anyone who compares the testimonia in Johansen's recent edition of the *Supplices* with those given in Wilamowitz will at once see how many items can plausibly be added by research in the ancient lexicographers. Another immensely important source for such an investigation as this, one would suppose, would be the Medicean scholia on Aeschylus. Wartelle does not even mention the only accurate published transcript of the scholia (Wecklein-Vitelli, 1885-93), but relies throughout on the notoriously misleading edition by Dindorf, and makes no use whatever of the work that has been done on the analysis of the scholia in the last hundred years. He contributes, indeed, lengthy speculations on the Didymean authorship of some of them (ch. 11). But his results here are so vague that they would be

unusable even if they were grounded on solid research into the material; which they are not. Finally, he has simply left untouched a rich non-literary source for the *Nachleben* of Aeschylus in Magna Graecia and Sicily: the vase-paintings of that area (p. 192, with n. 2, might suggest that he has never heard of them).

Even in his dealings with the already established data, Wartelle's touch is none too sure. On pp. 34-35, 37, and 362 he expressly attributes to Aeschylus two plays called *Aitnaiai*, of which one is entitled *Etnéennes Légitimes* in the Medicean Catalogue, the other *Etnéennes Illégitimes*. Before fathering on our poet an *Aetnaean Female Bastards*, he might have troubled to observe that the epithets in the Catalogue, *gnesioi* and *nothoi*, regularly mean "authentic" and "spurious" respectively in ancient scholarly writings. On p. 95 he confuses the *Glaukos Potnieus* with the *Glaukos Pontios*. In n. 4 to p. 217 he seems to have forgotten the existence of the papyrus hypothesis to a play of the *Supplices*-tetralogy. In n. 1 to p. 286 he holds up to our admiration a conjecture on Fr. 304a which is plainly impossible on metrical grounds alone (it involves no less than two speaker changes within a single trimeter, whereas there is no certain example of *antilabe* at all in the extant work of Aeschylus), not to speak of its stylistic anomalies.

In sum, it seems fair to say that Wartelle's treatment of his announced subject produces no new results that can be accepted with any confidence. He has compiled voluminously from the secondary sources, and he offers an abundance of speculation; but these will not compensate for the absence of firsthand observation or critical acumen.

The book, however, goes well beyond its announced subject; for Wartelle discusses at length not merely those ancient authors who mention Aeschylus but also those who could well have mentioned him but do not, at least in their surviving works. Such, for example, are Aristoxenus, Callistratus, the entire Pergamene school (173-76), Virgil, and Suetonius. Thus the work, taken as a whole, practically constitutes a survey of literature and scholarship from the early fifth century B.C. to the age of Justinian, with Aeschylus serving as the connecting, but by no means always visible, thread to the narrative. From this point of view many readers may find it useful and interesting. It assembles a great quantity of information, with abundant quotations and references. It also offers a sweeping perspective of the rise and fall of Graeco-Roman literary culture such as can be found in few other single-volume works. Here again, however, one is bound to note defects similar to those that have been described above. To review them in detail would take far too long, but perhaps the methodology of the early part of chapter 12 will serve as a fair example. Here Wartelle examines the delicate and ill-documented question of the influence of Greek tragedy on the Roman dramatists, and arrives at statistics more precise than have ever been seen before (summarized on p. 206, n. 8). It

is quite easy: in Wartelle's eyes the fact that a play-title of Accius coincides with a play-title of Aeschylus—even though the same title is known to have been used by one or more of the other Greek tragedians—may count as evidence that Accius “imitated” Aeschylus in the play concerned (203-206).

The book will therefore need to be used with caution. It may prove moderately valuable as an extensive compilation of facts and opinions more or less relating to Aeschylus' influence in antiquity; but a truly critical account of the subject remains to be written.

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ANNE LEBECK. *The Oresteia: A Study in Language and Structure*. Washington, Center for Hellenic Studies; distributed by Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1971. Pp. x + 222. \$8.50 (*Publication of the Center for Hellenic Studies*)

This is an exciting and powerful book. Much good work has been done on the *Oresteia* in recent decades, but Professor Lebeck has advanced our understanding measurably. She builds, of course, on the work of others, perhaps most particularly Daube, Fraenkel, Groeneboom, Hiltbrunner, Kranz, Lesky, and Reinhardt, but again and again she reveals additional meaning and force in a word, or a stasimon. She can be criticized for parts of her method and in places for stretching the evidence, and the density of her style makes the book hard to read; but it will be read with high profit.

Several programmatic statements mark not only the “Introduction” but also succeeding chapters. A sampling from them will indicate Lebeck's points of departure. For Lebeck (as for many), images in the *Oresteia* are not isolated but form systems. These are connected not by verbatim repetition but by “. . . associative or reminiscent repetition. Such repetition may evoke several different passages, yet correspond exactly to none [my emphasis]. Each recurrence adds a new element to those with which it is associated. Often this expansion will be a blend of two images previously separate, preserving features reminiscent of both” (1). Again, fundamental for Lebeck, “Prolepsis and gradual development of recurrent imagery, along with the corollary, movement from enigmatic utterance to clear statement, from riddle to solution, dominate the structure of the *Oresteia*” (2; cf. the similar statement, 131). And again, on Aeschylean ambiguity, “. . . when argument arises over meaning, the statement that claims to be exclusively right is categorically wrong. The philologist should not restrict himself to a single interpretation of such passages but should give free rein to all possibilities and associations, ultimately selecting as many as form

part of a larger pattern [my emphasis] . . ." (3; cf. 121-22). Such interpretative credos are impressive, but they involve risk. Associative repetition may connect certain passages for Lebeck but not for another reader. Interpretation which gives free rein and then selects may give too free a rein and then select injudiciously.

The book is in four parts. The first analyzes the lyrics of *Agamemnon*, in particular detail the parodos; the second examines in the context of the whole trilogy the relation between groups of images and between (5) "image complex and dominant ideas" (the chapters of this part are "Action and Suffering," "The Carpet Scene: *λὰς πατεῖν*," and "The Endless Flow of Blood"); the last two parts treat the structure, imagery, and themes of *Choephoroi* and *Eumenides*. An index follows, but no bibliography.

One of Lebeck's immediate attractions is her eagerness, in a book of broad horizons, to dwell upon philological cruces. Thus, in her long and sweeping explication of the *Agamemnon* parodos, she includes a defence of ms. *ἀνάσσω* at v. 77 (followed only by Paley and Headlam) against Hermann's *ἀνάσσει* (accepted by Fraenkel, Murray, Denniston/Page, and others).<sup>1</sup> Her defence is plausible (18), "Fraenkel's demand for a word characterizing immaturity is not justified; *ἀνάσσω* is neither unsuitable nor out of place but in harmony with a passage which plays paradoxically on strength and weakness." At vv. 104-5, *κύριός εἰμι θροεῖν ὄδιον κράτος αἰσιον ἀνδρῶν ἐκτελέων*, the puzzling reference of *κράτος* (omen? Atreidae? expedition?) is solved by Lebeck in a manner reflecting her principles. *κράτος* should not be construed narrowly: ". . . it is a compressed allusion to subject, predicate, and object, to the bird which sends the leaders and their expedition as well as the expedition and its leaders alone" (12).

Later, while discussing one of the main sets of images, "The Endless Flow of Blood" (80-91), Lebeck devotes three pages to another passage in the parodos, the robes of Iphigenia (vv. 231ff.), especially the difficult phrase (v. 233), *πέπλοισι περιπετῇ παντὶ θυμῷ*. She takes the robe to be Iphigenia's, not Agamemnon's (*contra* Lloyd-Jones, *CR* 66 [1952] 132ff.), and suggests that both 233 and 239, *κρόκου βαφὰς δ' ἐς πέδον χέουσα*, "are different ways of describing the same phenomenon, the robe of Iphigenia flowing down" (82). Then, with considerable boldness, she argues that the whole series of terse phrases in 232-34 is not part of Agamemnon's command but an anticipatory description by the chorus of Iphigenia ". . . as she will look once held above the altar, not as she looks at the moment when the attendants seize her" (83). Thus *παντὶ θυμῷ* does not mean "resolutely," as part of the command, but "[pleading] with all her heart." And to the question Lebeck asks of

<sup>1</sup> Including Page's new OCT, which appeared of course too late for Lebeck to take into account.



herself, "Can one assume that Aeschylus has inserted within the command given by Agamemnon a description of Iphigenia as she looks after that command is executed?" (84), she answers affirmatively, since the thoughts of the chorus are not coherent but move from one moment of the sacrifice to another, ". . . without regard for temporal sequence" (84). There are several other close analyses of words and phrases, e.g. of the notorious *τοκεῦσι* at *Ch.* 385, but the above instances are illustrative both of Lebeck's seriousness as a philologist and of her approach to the language, hence the meaning, of Aeschylus. It is the precise opposite of the view (quoted by Lebeck, p. 82) expressed by Page (Denniston/Page, p. 90), approving Lloyd-Jones' interpretation of *πέπλοισι περιπετῇ* (see above), "This interpretation has great advantages: the thought and the language are now both of a normal type. . . ." For Lebeck, Aeschylean language, especially in lyrics, is usually not normal, not direct, not clear, until perhaps the final scene(s) of a play or trilogy.

I have lingered over Lebeck's work with the text to emphasize that this is not a book which proceeds to massive conclusions about Aeschylus by ignoring his actual words. Some of Lebeck's own conclusions may now be mentioned. She stresses constantly the ambiguous nature of Dike until the end of the trilogy, beginning with the vulture simile (opening the anapests) and eagle omen (opening the lyrics) of the *Agamemnon* parados, "Agamemnon, likened in the simile to a vulture whose nest is robbed of young, is represented in the omen by an eagle destroying the young of another."<sup>2</sup> . . . Together the simile and omen show that it is difficult to know where justice ends and wrong begins: the Dike puzzle of the *Oresteia*" (13). Dike operates in large part through the principle *παθεῖν τὸν ἑξῆς* (*Ag.* 1564), and the gnome is expressed in *Agamemnon* mainly at the level of imagery of sacrifice, hunt, and marriage ritual (Lebeck's treatment of the last, in the section "The *Telos* of Marriage and the *Telos* of Death," 68-73, is brilliant). The gnome, and its principle, is also central to *Choephoroi* and *Eumenides*. In *Choephoroi*, ". . . the chorus overcome Electra's doubt and hesitation [in the first episode] by teaching her the lesson of Dike. In the *kommos* they perform this same task with Orestes" (102). But

<sup>2</sup> Against Fraenkel, Hiltbrunner, and Hammond, Lebeck believes the theme of Thyestes' banquet and the inherited curse enters the play not in the Cassandra scene but right here in the parados. The feast of the eagle ". . . includes not only the destruction of Troy and the sacrifice of Iphigenia but the banquet served Thyestes as well" (34). Similarly, *θυοίαν ἐτέραν* (v. 151) evokes past, present, and future "sacrifice." The theme becomes explicit in the second stasimon, and thus the titles with which the chorus immediately afterwards (vv. 783-84) address the king are particularly ominous: "They embrace the interlocking causes of his guilt: that which he incurred voluntarily [*Τροίας πολίπορθ'*] and that to which he has fallen heir [*Ἀτρέως γένεθλον*]" (50). This is really excellent.

Dike creates a vicious circle: "Lament for a murdered man automatically involves prayer that his murder be avenged; but on the lips of Electra and Orestes the traditional piety . . . of this prayer is sacrilege" (103). In *Eumenides* the gnome, like the Erinyes, ". . . undergoes a final metamorphosis: from doing ill and suffering harm to doing good and faring well" (59-60). Justice resides in Zeus<sup>3</sup> and eventually is revealed to men: "In the court of law with all its faults, all its inadequacies, divine justice finds expression" (138).

In her analysis of *Choephoroi*, Lebeck concentrates on the kommos, toward which everything earlier in the play points. Of all the interpretations of the kommos, she is in most extensive agreement with Lesky's, opposing those of Wilamowitz and Schädewaldt: "The kommos does depict Orestes' inner struggle, does trace his ascent from despair to new resolve. Prior to the kommos Apollo's command was in the foreground; the lyric deals with Orestes' decision to follow that command, choosing of his own will the task imposed upon him by necessity" (94). And Orestes' choice involves the basic dilemma of the play, since ". . . vengeance is matricide, vengeance is just" (110). Lebeck follows particularly well the use, and avoidance, of words for "mother." The gradual isolation in the kommos of Clytemnestra as the real object of the coming vengeance is suggested by the chorus' use of indefinite plurals (e.g. *τοκεῦσι*, 385; *τεχομένων*, 419) until 422, *ἐκ μητρός*. Orestes himself shuns *μήτηρ* until his final moment of torment at 899.

*Eumenides* resolves not only the themes but also the imagery of the trilogy. Some images become action or object; e.g. hunting becomes the Furies' pursuit, the coiling snake becomes the Furies' masks. Other images are rid of their ominous ambivalence: e.g. Clytemnestra's and Orestes' guileful persuasion becomes Athena's gentle persuasion, unnatural images of fertility in *Agamemnon* become normal at the end of *Eumenides*. There is also paradox and parody in the play, especially in the trial, where much of the argumentation sinks to quibbles and mudslinging. In fact, "The trial is a caricature of Athenian legal procedure . . ." (137), thus reinforcing the Aeschylean demand for ultimate trust in Zeus.

My hope is that the above has conveyed something of the wealth of

<sup>3</sup> This is a theme that arises much earlier, in the Hymn to Zeus, on which Lebeck has fine things to say. While agreeing with Page and Lloyd-Jones that the concepts in the Hymn may themselves not be profound, she insists that Aeschylus treats them profoundly. "The language of Calchas' prophecy merges portent and thing portended, turning the moment into a mirror where present, past, and future stand reflected. Following such oracular perception come words of hymnlike simplicity" (21), with the major statement of the prophecy and Hymn being: ". . . conflict among the gods [Artemis and Apollo] and resolution through the will of Zeus" (22). The interpretation is compelling, but Lebeck lapses in not discussing, or even mentioning, R. Dawe's suggested transposition of the Hymn (*Eranos* 64 [1966] 1-21).

insight displayed by Lebeck. There are, of course, faults. Most damaging, because the result will be a loss of some readers, is the complexity of Lebeck's style. Her writing tends to begin proleptically, take on additional significance as a thought is developed, and reach clarity only at the end. A second or third reading of a sentence, paragraph, or whole section almost always unravels the difficulties, but this is a pity since few have time to read a book thoroughly even once.

A few particular points. Lebeck neglects entirely the Watchman's prologue scene in *Agamemnon*, even while conceding that it contains the initial appearance of several themes that continue through the trilogy. Her reason is that the prologue is overwhelmed by the parodos, but this is unsatisfactory. Not all of her many examples of verbal reminiscence are valid. When arguing for a meaning of *πνεόντων* = "blown high" at *Ag.* 375, i.e. a wind metaphor, she invokes the use of wind metaphor in the parodos and says, "... *πνέω* has just [my emphasis] appeared in the parodos . . ." (p. 179, n. 6). But "just" refers to passages 175 lines earlier. Again, the verbal echoes which she sees between *Ag.* 1138-42 and 1080-87 are minimal. Several other instances could be added. Lebeck believes that a high degree of understanding is achieved, especially by the chorus, at the end of *Agamemnon*: "Finally all that was once obscure is seen with frightening clarity" (29). But in order to maintain this view, she is forced to ignore the Aegisthus scene, whose petty meanness is actually the unsettling mood with which the play ends. In *Eumenides*, she is not very successful in her attempted resolution of the issue of paternal or maternal priority. Again in *Eumenides*, when she treats the passage (vv. 778-891) in which the Furies lament their loss and Athena responds to each lament with a request to refrain, she comments, "And this request both repeats words which they themselves have used and introduces new metaphors [my emphasis] to express the same ideas" (89). True enough, but in effect Lebeck has had to admit, a bit quietly, that new patterns of imagery do appear in *Eumenides*, even though her basic thesis argues that the play essentially clarifies and resolves imagery begun in *Agamemnon*. Finally, Lebeck concludes her interpretation of *Choephoroi* with the kommos, and justifies her decision: "The first half of the play lends itself to close analysis; the rest is action" (130). This is a doubly unfortunate statement, since it is wholly counter to Lebeck's unified approach to the trilogy and also denies what is apparent elsewhere, that she has indeed made good use of the last half of the play. None of the above, however, can affect the admiration that must attend the book.

While this review was being written, the news came of Professor Lebeck's sudden death on July 1, 1973. The proven strength and the great potential of her scholarship will be missed sorely.

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KENNETH JAMES DOVER. *Aristophanic Comedy*. Berkeley, University of California Press, 1972. Pp. xv + 253. \$10.95.

Chapter 1 outlines the Greek textual tradition, the main Aristophanic MSS, and certain elementary text problems *exempli gratia*.

Chapter 2, on theatrical conditions, does not really answer the important question of whether women attended; indeed, on p. 17 Dover seems to feel that they did and on p. 39 to imply that they did not. The evidence is not clearly presented. In fact, Dover leaves us in doubt as to what kind of audience he thinks Aristophanes was writing for. On his frontispiece he shows a modern Greek peasant carrying a goat, with the caption, "Contemplation of this Greek countryman, and particularly of the expression on his face, may help us to imagine the people who constituted the greater part of Aristophanes' audience." Does he then feel that the audience was more rustic than urban? He does not say. No account of the musicians and the choral dances is given.

In chapter 3 Dover presents his view of what Aristophanic comedy meant psychologically, and identifies its main motive as "self-assertion," which falls into several types: self-assertion against (and hence mockery of) the gods, politicians, and intellectuals. There are several methods: self-assertion through sexual obscenity (and Dover is quite willing to use the English words so long tabooed), through scatological obscenity, and through physical aggression. Dover's discussions of these types are lively and astute, and yet, it seems to me, there is something lacking. Surely there is a deeper motivation here than "a means by which man strikes back" (33), "a vicarious revenge on the social and political order" (125). Once Dover suggests that the Aristophanic hero may be a consistent type from one play to the next, but takes the matter no further. Most Aristophanic heroes are essentially trickster figures (as Whitman demonstrated so well without using the term). Aristophanes' affinities in this respect are with Ben Jonson: in Ben Jonson, however, trickster's success is short-lived—the whore who became a countess will soon be a whore again—but in Aristophanes it is consistently validated by what appear to be ritual celebrations at the ends of the plays: the fool, though a fool true enough, is nevertheless the dreamer of the divine dream.

In chapters 4 and 5 Dover deals with the metres, the structure, and the various comic devices of the plays. Metre is treated with a brevity which seems designed for the Greekless reader. The discussions of structure seem regrettably disjointed and might not be understood at one reading by a reader not previously familiar with the subject. Only brief notice is taken of change or development in the Old Comedy form, and the transition to Middle Comedy is presented as if it involved no more than the disengagement of the chorus from the action. Above all, no special attention is given to the ends of the plays and hence there is



no comment on the nature of the hero's triumph. Dover seems, on p. 39, to reject Cornford's theory of the ritual origin of Old Comedy, but leaves the matter there. He does not ask why ten of the eleven plays end with themes familiar from Dionysiac cult: rejuvenation, resurrection, and sexual union. On the contrary, his determinedly secular view of Aristophanic comedy leads him to lengthy consideration of the number of actors needed and to a rather preoccupying concern with the number of doors in the skene, a problem which receives as much space as any subject in the book (21-24, 83-84, 94, 106-8, 124-25, 134-36, 197-98).

The discussion of comic devices is a highlight of the book. Aristophanes' fondness for what Dover calls "rupture of dramatic illusion" (56) and "discontinuity of characterization" (59) are amusingly presented and enlivened by a very apt comparison with the Marx brothers. Dover explains, with the Greekless reader always in mind, such delightful Aristophanic obscenities such as the pun on *khoiros* in *Acharnians* and the puns on bird names in *Birds*. For the Greekless reader, no better introduction to Aristophanes' humour is likely to appear.

Chapters 6 through 16 deal with the individual plays, offering synopses followed by discussions of what Dover sees as the important matters that each play brings in its wake. In connection with *Acharnians*, for example, we find an essay entitled "Peace and War," on Aristophanes' pacifism. Dover, who is not a sentimental critic, writes: "It cannot be too strongly emphasized that Dikaiopolis does not concern himself even with the interests of his own city, let alone those of the Greek world . . . He wants his own comfort and pleasure, and escapes . . . from his obligations as a citizen. . . . *Acharnians* is not a pill of political advice thickly sugared with humor, but a fantasy of total selfishness" (87-88). In discussing *Clouds*, Dover explores Aristophanes' attack on Socrates and concludes that it was probably serious. "There is no suggestion that anything which Socrates has to offer is of any value to society or of any interest to a decent citizen" (112). "If *Clouds* made life hard for Socrates, did Aristophanes care? . . . I doubt whether he would have hesitated to buy success at the price of Socrates' security . . . It seems that the play is not good-natured fun which Socrates' friends could enjoy as much as anyone else" (119). Other topics include slavery, women, the sophists, and the law courts. Dover is perhaps at his best when presenting the changing political milieu which surrounds the plays and in his discussions of both sexual humor and sexual mores ("Was the 'jockey' position," he asks, "in which the total bodily contact is small, particularly favored during the heat of the day?" [288]).

Chapters 17 and 18 offer brief glimpses of earlier and later Greek comic playwrights, a rather token discussion of comic origins, a look at Byzantine attitudes toward Aristophanes, and a glance at the problems

of translation. A select bibliography, index of passages, and compact general index conclude the work.

The book's one great weakness—that it deals only superficially with what some would regard as the deeper questions of the subject matter—seems to reflect Dover's evident dislike of the subjective kind of thinking that such questions all too often evoke; and if Dover's aim was to be clear, lively, and down to earth, he has succeeded well.

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BRUCE M. METZGER. *A Textual Commentary of the Greek New Testament*. London, United Bible Societies, 1971. XXXI + 775 pp. \$1.60.

The textual criticism of the New Testament occupies a most important place within theological research, for the text of the New Testament is the source of all its statements and the focal point for all its reflections. But because this text was always of central importance for the life and thought of the Christian church, it underwent even in the time when it was copied by hand a prodigiously sudden and widespread dissemination, which early made it liable to all possible sorts of dangers of corruption, from mistakes and unfortunate attempts by copyists at stylistic improvement to dogmatically conditioned alterations and corrections. It is therefore an extremely difficult task to follow backward the paths of the various lines of the tradition of the text, which developed in various places, in order to come as nearly as possible to the starting point.

B. Metzger, who is one of our leading critics of the text of the New Testament, has given us in this book an uncommonly helpful commentary to all important textual problems which are to be found in the new Greek edition of the United Bible Societies (UBS). For students who wish to work their way into the problems of textual criticisms, and also for the experienced scholar, Metzger's book is an indispensable companion.

In his introduction the author sketches "The History of the Transmission of the New Testament Text," and clarifies the manner in which the variants arose, and describes the development of the chief types of the New Testament text in various areas of the early Church. A chapter deals with "Criteria Used in Choosing among Conflicting Readings in New Testament Witnesses," which is a brief summary of what the author has developed in his book, *The Text of the New Testament*. Finally, there is a compilation of the most important textual witnesses "according to the predominant type of text exhibited by each witness."

Then in the main section Metzger discusses all variants that are noted in the UBS edition. One regrets only that the entire undertaking was not based on the Nestle edition, since in the UBS one too often misses interesting variants. But one is grateful at the same time that the author also discusses a great number of variants not to be found in the UBS. In the case of each passage Metzger succeeds in setting forth in an extraordinarily concise manner, and in a few lines, the main reasons which led the editorial committee of the UBS to their text-critical decisions. The wealth of learned detailed work which Metzger has brought together and made available makes this work a classic tool for all future text-critical work on the New Testament.

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C. J. GIANAKARIS. *Plutarch*. New York, Twayne Publishers, Inc., 1970.  
Pp. 177. \$4.95 (*Twayne's World Authors Series*)

The announced intention of this series is "to present a critical analytical study of the works of the writer; to include biographical and historical material that may be necessary for understanding, appreciation, and critical appraisal of the writer; and to present all material in clear, concise English—but not to vitiate the scholarly content of the work by doing so."

This volume fails to redeem a single promise made in the statement. The book is so lacking in critical acumen that I cannot imagine what level of reader was the author's intended target. Its analyses are shallow and naïve and, for the most part, ignore truly representative works of Plutarch. As for the biographical and historical background, unless the reader already knows something about the life of Plutarch and the times in which he lived, he will find it difficult to follow G.'s confused and obscure discussions, particularly since the writing is deplorable.

G. has violated almost every rule of English composition. His sentences are vague and confused; his choice of vocabulary is pretentious and sometimes silly; his thought patterns are involved, obscure and often contradictory. In an earlier version of this review I discussed many passages which exemplify these faults, but the editors have asked me to curtail my contempt. Consequently I offer only a few examples of G.'s style without comment (the italics are mine). If anyone is interested in a fuller list, I have one on file.

P. 19: His facts *often are claimed* to be inaccurate, especially those concerning historical events, which *they* deem to be colored by personal bias.

P. 21: By the time of Plutarch's birth, Pericles and the mighty

attainments of a flourishing Hellenic peoples had largely receded into blurring memories.

P. 23: Apparent also in Plutarch's essays was his remarkable knowledge of Greek Literature and earlier Latin books.

P. 30: Nor . . . does Plutarch comment on the major contemporary Latin authors, such as Persius, Lucan, Valerius Flaccus, the younger Pliny, Martial and Quintilian. *Horace is the lone exception.*

P. 31: To sum up, Plutarch's humanism was a unique combination of his intellect, accepting as part of its obligation toward self-cultivation and betterment the revealing of the "good life" to one's fellow men.

P. 38: Indeed, as literary historians and critics emphasize, most writing from earlier centuries had beneath it at least didactic foundations, from Horace on.

P. 40: Simply to say that his (Plutarch's) "sources were monumental" as does Bernadotte Perrin in her Introduction . . .

Enough! G. has apparently not even read the introductions to the Loeb volumes whose translations he regularly cites. Even if he did not know Perrin's sex from any other source, he could and should have read the tribute to him(!) in the Introduction to Vol. 10 of the *Lives*.

G.'s notion of suitable sources are very strange. He cites as his authority for Plutarch's numerous quotations Hibbert's *A Life of Plutarchus* which was published in 1828. Apparently he is unaware of all the recent work done on this subject. G. considers R. H. Barrow's *Plutarch and His Times* the *non plus ultra*; Hadas' popularizations are critical studies, and Lesky's *A History of Greek Literature* (in its English translation, of course) is a very valuable source because of his "painstaking treatment of all the important Greek authors." That the weakest part of Lesky's book is precisely in this period of Greek literature has completely escaped G.

In short, this is a bad book. G. seems to know little about Plutarchan scholarship, and what little he knows he cannot communicate. Plutarch is too important an author, his body of writings too large, too influential for anyone other than an experienced Greek scholar to attempt an analysis even for a general audience.

Since I began with a quotation from G.'s book, perhaps one from A. E. Housman can be used for a conclusion:

A scholar who means to build himself a monument must spend much of his life in acquiring knowledge which for its own sake is not worth having and in reading books which do not in themselves deserve to be read.

Those who are building monuments can ignore this book. It does not deserve to be read. Nor should the teacher assign it to his students. There are much better books available, (even Barrow's work is far superior), e.g. those of C. P. Jones and D. A. Russell, and they are really written in English.

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GIUSTO MONACO. *Plauto: Curculio*. Palermo, Editore Palumbo, 1969. Pp. 252. (*Hermes Collana di testi antichi*, 5)

This edition of the *Curculio* is the third in eleven years (after Paratore [Florence 1958] and Collart [Paris 1962]) and follows upon Monaco's own previous publication of a book of background material, commentary, and notes (*Teatro di Plauto: Il Curculio* [Palermo 1963]). His new volume includes an abbreviated introduction dealing with the Plautine corpus, the MS tradition, and the respective dates of the Greek original and Plautus' play. One half of the book is given to a narrative commentary (*analisi scenica*) and a series of interpretative notes. Pages 249-52 present an analysis of metrical variations.

Much of the material is transferred, with some revisions, from the earlier publication, and many of Monaco's textual preferences might be anticipated from his commentary. He follows Paratore's edition rather consistently and where he departs from it is often in agreement with Collart (vss. 12-13, 124, 142, 268, 398, 424, 487, 519, 542). In two instances (vss. 352 and 680) he follows Goetz-Schoell in adopting the readings of the *codices*. In the problematical last 100 lines where the major MSS are often at variance on speech attributions he gives vs. 622 to Therapontigonus, 665 (*verum hercle dico*) to Curculio, 688 to Therapontigonus, *actutum* of 727 to Cappadox. In accordance with the practice of most recent editors (excepting Collart), he omits Curculio's role from the final scene, giving vss. 712 and 714 to Therapontigonus. Some textual problems have already been discussed by reviewers of the previous volume (see especially Duckworth, *Gnomon* [1964] 424-26; Paratore *R.Ph.* [1966] 74-77). The adoption of classical spellings here is an unfortunate innovation. The translation is more economical, and to my mind more spirited than Paratore's but Monaco intends it primarily as a guide to his interpretation.

As in the earlier volume, Monaco includes references to most major studies of Plautus and articles on this play (see Duckworth, *op. cit.*). New citations here are J. P. Cèbes' study of Roman caricature and parody (Paris 1966) and Pierre Grimal's article "Échos plautiniens d'histoire hellénistique," (in *Mélanges Piganiol* [Paris 1966]) which argues for a new dating of the Greek original to the mid-third century B.C. (see pp. 10-11 and p. 242, n. 408: The siege of Sicyon at vs. 394 would allude to Aratus' recapture of the town in 251, and the conquests of Therapontigonus, humorously catalogued at vss. 442ff., would parody the conquests of Ptolemy III in 246-45). There is, however, no notice of J. A. Hanson's paper, "The Glorious Military," (in *Roman Drama* [London 1964]) whose observations on the variations in the *miles gloriosus* figure are important. Monaco has utilized reviews of his earlier volume (e.g. pp. 144-44; n. 472), but in mentioning the previously omitted discussion of the *paraclausithyron* in Copley's *Exclusus Amator* (p. 144, n. 26), he has not thought through the arguments or worked them into his own interpretation.

The commentary brings out Monaco's strongest points: his ability to work with Fraenkel's suggestions on composition and originality, and to visualize dramatic action on stage. A careful discussion of act 5 gives tone and gesture to the swift, sometimes cryptic exchanges of the dialogue. But at one point Monaco's picture of a dramatic situation virtually defeats his argument. He gives a lively account of Paratore's case for reading *licet te antestare?* (vs. 621) as Phaedromus' challenge to the soldier to go to court as his own witness, a challenge intended to demonstrate the weakness of the soldier's case. (*Te* must thus be construed as the subject of the infinitive.) The dramatic possibilities of this interpretation are more attractive than those of Monaco's more conventional belief that the remark is an aside to Curculio, designating him as witness. The first act is also clearly visualized, and one may note the valuable suggestion (pp. 125-26) that the lover's *pompa* mentioned by Palinurus (vs. 2) is not literally an entourage brought onto the stage, but a term in the slave's ironic mockery of his master's amorous folly. *Tute tibi puer es, lautus luces cereum* (vs. 9) shows that Phaedromus is not heavily attended. (As Fraenkel suggests, there is a single slave to bear Leaene's jug of Wine.) This point would enforce Copley's discussion, since the joke foreshadows further variations upon the *paraclausithyron* theme.

The *Curculio* has drawn much attention for its Roman allusions and bravura speeches (the *paraclausithyron*; the Leaena scene; Curculio's entrance, 280-98; the description of the Forum, 462-86), which, as Monaco points out, contribute more to theatrical showmanship than to the development of plot or theme. But scholars have frequently discussed these matters at length. Monaco writes ten good pages (164-75) on the humor of the *servus currens*, but misses less spectacular opportunities for comparison with other plays (e.g. the ironically moral tone in which Palinurus teases his master might be compared with the more sober, but equally comical moralizing of the *Ludus*—or *Lydus*—in *Bacchides*, 109-69; 368-499). He is only mildly interested in Collart's suggestion (op. cit., p. 4) that the characterizations reveal some Plautine parody of Plautus.

I noticed two misprints in the text of the play: vs. 111: for *hac* read *hanc*; vs. 470: for *ita* read *ito*.

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F. W. LENZ ET G. C. GALINSKY, eds. *Albii Tibulli aliorumque Carminum Libri tres*. Third Edition. Leiden, Brill, 1971. Pp. 193. Fl. 68.00.

This is actually the fifth in the series of F. W. Lenz' editions of the *Corpus Tibullianum*. The first two were published (1927; 1937) by Teubner, the following three (1959; 1964; 1971) by Brill. It is impossible, of course, to compare them in every detail, though it seems to me that this new edition is also the most useful, mainly thanks to Carl Galinsky's revisions. At the same time it does not completely replace the 1927 edition with its valuable discussions of some passages by Eduard Fraenkel which, nobody knows why, have vanished from the subsequent ones (cf. H. D. Jocelyn, *Gnomon* 38 [1966] 40). None of them gives what might be called a history of the text (in fact, the prefaces are disappointing), and altogether little has been gained over the last thirty years or so. The critical apparatus has become enormously inflated with trivia from the trash-can of the Middle Ages, but this can hardly be called progress.

The list of MSS features prominently the *Hamburgensis* 139, saec. XV, a very inferior witness. The consensus of A V G recorded by previous editors is replaced by that of A. V. B(erianus), but why this 15th century codex should be more significant than the *Guelphertanus* (which was almost certainly overrated by Baehrens but still should be fully reported) remains a mystery. 'Ven.' serves as abbreviation both for the *Excerpta Marciana* Z. L. 497, saec. XI and the *Editio Veneta* of 1475. It should be said that the *Cuiacianus*, saec. XV, is now in the British Museum (Egerton 3027).

A more serious piece of misinformation is found on p. 42 where only one 'Editio princeps' of 1471 is listed. In reality there were *four* 'Editiones principes' published almost at the same time, as far as we know, and carefully distinguished by Huschke (1819) and Dissen (1853), although even in the late 18th century very few copies were known to be in existence: (a) *Editio maior*; (b) *Editio minor*; (c) *Editio Bartoliniana*; (d) *Editio Pinelliana* (the last two named after former owners). Thus knowledge laboriously acquired and established by former generations of scholars is quickly swept under the table and forgotten.

The sources, parallels and testimonies quoted between text and apparatus are welcome, but they are far from complete. A systematic search of the *Thesaurus* which Lenz clearly never made yields many more, some of them essential for the text. Cross-references found in the apparatus are often cryptic, to say the least; the note on 1.4.27 *eris errabis*, for example, refers to 1.7.61, but this reference seems to be left over from the 1937 edition; in the meantime the text has been changed to *agricola (a) magna*.

A few remarks on the text:

1.1.48 *igne* A V G plerr.: *imbre* Flor., G<sup>2</sup> is followed by a long and virtually useless list of editors which back this or that variant, but only

a feeble effort at a critical discussion is made; no reference to Soph., Fr. 579 N.<sup>2</sup> and to Germanicus, Fr. 4.70.— 51 *pereat pereatque* was suggested by Statius (1567) before Baehrens (1878).— 6.11 *cur* (for *ut*) is already found in the Editio Veneta of 1475.— 72 *per rapiarque* (Lenz dub.) was already suggested by Nic. Heinsius.— 7.12 *Carnuti* is Scaliger's emendation, not Dissen's.— 28 the apparatus does not indicate that *Memphiten* is found in G (post corr.).— on 8.26 the remarks of Jocelyn, loc. cit., should be considered.— 9.48 *at* (for *et*) is quoted by Lachmann from the cod. Askewianus ('nescio quis' Lenz).— 10.18 the critical note is misleading; the variant readings are: *veteris* (-es) *sedis* (-es) or *veteres aedes*.— 55 Scaliger later conjectured *obtusam*.

2.1.58 *curtas . . . opes* (Waardenburg) must be right; cf. Heinsius on Ovid, *Amores* 2.2.39 *sic curta* (*alta* vulgo, em. Heinsius) *peculia crescent*; Bentley on Horace, *Epist.* 1.7.58.— 2.21 Galinsky's *huc venias* (cf. Ovid, *Tristia* 5.1.14) is very attractive and probably right.— On the possible lacuna after 5.66 see J. P. Postgate, *JP* 26 (1898) 189f.— 82 Cornelissen's *satur* for ms. *sacer* is almost certainly right (cf. 2.2.21ff.) and should at least be mentioned in the apparatus.— 6.53 *vives* (Withof) is a necessary change; Némethy aptly compares 1.6.53.

3.7.2 *valeant ω: nequeant F* is probably an old crux, but even though F is a superior witness, I cannot believe that *ut* should be taken in a concessive sense; I understand *terret* as *verbum metuendi*: 'virtutis tuae erga metuo ut vires meae subsistere nequeant.' The construction would then be analogous to *terrere ne* (e.g. Hor. *Carm.* 1.2.4).— 129 *cuncta* (Itali) surely necessary.— 12.19 *grata ut* (Eberz, Baehrens) very attractive.— 19.12 *CIL* X, 378 (= *CLE* 1786 B.), quoted as a *testimonium*, is probably not an ancient inscription.

There are more passages where the reading adopted by the new edition seems unsatisfactory, but this is not my main criticism. An apparatus of such dimensions should really offer more useful information; in other words, the reader who wants to make up his mind should receive more help from the editor. The display of irrelevant facts is depressing.

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TIMOTHY DAVID BARNES. *Tertullian. A Historical and Literary Study.* Oxford and New York, Clarendon Press, 1971. Pp. xi + 320. \$20.50.

As the title implies, this study has three major centers of interest. First, Barnes has tried to describe the religious, and political context within which Tertullian wrote. We do indeed find here a well-drawn picture of the Christian community in pagan Carthage during the late second and early third centuries. Second, we have in the book one of the most rigorous attempts yet made to extract and test all the evidence that can be used to write a biography of Tertullian. Third, the various writings of Tertullian are passed in review, as far as possible within the historical and biographical framework established.

On the whole, the picture of the Christian community in ancient Carthage is a fairly familiar one. We see African Christianity at the turn of the century rapidly expanding from its non-apostolic and probably Greek origins, and embracing all social classes. But in Carthage, as in Africa, there was not only a Christianity firmly entrenched against paganism, but also an orthodoxy opposing a vigorous Montanism and a growth of gnostic heresies. Carthage itself is vividly portrayed as the intellectual center of the African provinces. To the question of persecutions Barnes devotes an entire chapter. He argues that the Emperor had little to do with them. The frequency and intensity of persecution depended on the provincial governors and the mob. It is a mistake "to attempt to distinguish, for the Roman Empire as a whole, periods of persecution and periods of peace, corresponding to the reigns of different Emperors", a mistake on which "all attempts at a narrative of the persecutions, beginning with Eusebius" have rested (149). This is not new: nearly forty years ago, Hans Lietzmann made precisely the same point (*A History of the Early Church* II, trans. B. L. Woolf [Cleveland 1953] 160).

Barnes renounces quite rightly any attempt to write a full biography of Tertullian, but he does try to outline what he can. He demolishes the notions that Tertullian's father was a centurion, that he himself was a jurisconsult, or became a priest. He also shows that there is no good evidence for the traditional view that Tertullian was converted in middle age, or lived to be very old. The now widely held opinion that the bishop alluded to in the *De Pudicitia* was not Callistus but a Carthaginian ecclesiastic leaves that treatise without a firm date, which in turn allows the possibility that it was written well before A.D. 220. Given this possibility, Barnes is able to replace the traditional view of Tertullian with what he confesses to be a largely conjectural one, that Tertullian was born about 170, converted as a young man, wrote all his extant treatises over a relatively short period (from 196 to 212) moving rapidly from Catholicism into Montanism, and died possibly in middle age, perhaps a martyr whom the Church preferred to forget.

Chapter 5, on the chronology of Tertullian's writings, is perhaps the

best part of the book. Barnes provides first a list of treatises in which historical references suggest a date; where treatises contain allusions to other treatises, a sequence of earlier and later writings can be established; only then does Barnes use doctrine and style to complete the picture.

Barnes' conjectures, it must be said, are sometimes a little too facile. For example, he argues (pp. 53, 54) that since the reference to "Lupanaris" in *Idol.* 15.11 is easily comprehensible and appropriate, but without motivation in *Apol.* 35.4, we must assume that the *Apology* is later than the treatise *On Idolatry*. But one can argue that the brothel-image has a better motivation in the *Apologeticum* than in the *De Idolatria*, for in the former Tertullian tries to relate quite explicitly idolatry to sexual immorality, while in the latter, where immorality is not immediately a question, the image seems forced, therefore might be borrowed. Similarly, Barnes places the *De Cultu Feminarum* II before the *Apologeticum* because of its rambling argument: it was the fires of persecution that forged the consummate artist of the *Apology*. In fact, the argument of *Cult. Fem.* II is as tight as that of the *Apology*, and progresses through the same kind of precise symmetries.

The book is weak as a literary study. The final chapter describes cursorily the influence of Tertullian's rhetorical education, and of the Second Sophistic, upon his writings. Barnes points to Tertullian's use of the rhetorical parts of a speech, the *exemplum*, the standard topics of rhetoric, the tricks of sophistical argument, sarcasm and satire. Apart from the final chapter, the "literary study" seems to consist of the ubiquitous and often digressive summaries of the contents of Tertullian's writings. We have long known that the Second Sophistic contributed at least in a superficial way to the form and content of Tertullian's writings. What we must still discover are the patterns in the often puzzling convolutions of Tertullian's thought and the rationale for those patterns. Tertullian's writings are in some measure artistic compositions with a theological orientation and they can hardly be rendered fully intelligible until we have looked deeply into the nature of their art and its relation to the theological ideas Tertullian wished to express. And some recent investigations—for example that of T. P. O'Malley on the pattern of Tertullian's imagery (*Tertullian and the Bible* [Utrecht 1967] 64-116)—indicate that literary analysis can go further to illuminate the inner movement of Tertullian's thought.

In spite of these criticisms, this study is valuable, and readers will find it a rich source of information. Its crisp and at points dramatic style makes it a pleasure to read.

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STEFAN WEINSTOCK. *Divus Julius*. Oxford Clarendon Press, 1971. Pp. xx + 469. 31 plates. \$30.75; £9.

This extraordinary book, sumptuously produced and copiously illustrated, apparently reached its final form in March 1971, not long before the author's death (on 5 June). The fact that it was published posthumously (cf. the [London] *Times* obituary, 8 June 1971) is not revealed anywhere in the volume, though it might have served to excuse some errors and inconsistencies, notably in numismatic chronology where Weinstock has frequently given differing dates for the same coins in disparate references. In the main the text seems to have been completed in the summer of 1968. This no doubt explains why the annotation *non vidi* appears against H. Gesche, *Die Vergottung Caesars*, 1968, in the brief "Select Bibliography," while in the "Addenda and Corrigenda" it is said that Miss Gesche's monograph "could not be taken into account, as this would have involved more substantial changes than were possible at so late a stage." It would seem, however, that *non vidi* should have been changed to *praetermissi*.

Weinstock had originally planned a work on what he somewhat loosely calls "the religion of the age of Augustus." He changed the plan when, as he puts it, he "realized the identity of the reformer" he wished to write about—not Augustus but Caesar. He defines the two principal themes of the book as being "Caesar's religious reforms and his honours" and concludes by describing Caesar as "an imaginative and daring religious reformer, who created and planned new cults, accepted extraordinary honours, and died when he was about to become a divine ruler." It is a large part of Weinstock's conception that Caesar's "religious honours" were "a serious attempt at further reform." The usage in such a context of the terms "reform" and "reformer" seems a little grotesque. It would indeed be wrong to make a sharp distinction between Caesar's new cults and Caesar's honours. The cults of Venus Genetrix, Victoria Caesaris, Fortuna Caesaris, Clementia Caesaris (as well as others hypothesized by Weinstock—Salus Caesaris and Genius Caesaris) clearly bore a direct relationship to the honouring of Caesar. Essentially what Weinstock has done is to provide an immensely detailed study of the *cultus* of Caesar as man and as divinity.

The framework is broadly chronological, from before Caesar's birth to beyond his death, but not truly biographical. Weinstock's method is comparative—to examine each honour or religious manifestation against the background of supposed or actual precedents and parallels, ranging from the regal period, through the Republic and the Hellenistic kingdoms, as far as the early Empire. The result is a richness and complexity of detail which tend to make the book a storehouse of reference material above all else, easier to plunder than to read. The discussion of particular points and problems is often interesting, sometimes bewildering, not infrequently repetitive. The

pages in which Weinstock examines the remarkable proceedings in the months before Caesar's murder (chapters 13 "Kingship and Divinity," 14 "Iuppiter Iulius," 15 "The Investiture") stand out as the climax of the work. They present with considerable vigour and intensity an argument for an incipient ruler cult that derives some cogency from the suggestive power of cumulative and mutually corroborative detail. The difficulty is always that Weinstock tends to build, throughout the book, from one frail hypothesis to another.

As a specimen of his somewhat tortuous mode of argument let us observe a passage (13f.) in which Weinstock deals with the story that Atia, Caesar's niece, declared her son Octavius to be the offspring of Apollo. The tale is cited by Suetonius from a certain Asclepiades of Mendes, and a briefer but closely similar version appears in Dio, where it is made the special reason for Caesar's choosing Octavius as his successor. (The detailed references can be found in Weinstock.) The story, according to Weinstock, is authenticated by an epigram preserved from the Augustan poet Domitius Marsus: (*Domiti Marsi de Atia, matre Augusti*): *ante omnes alias felix tamen hoc ego dicor sive hominem peperit femina sive deum*. Weinstock asserts that this must have been written between 41 and 31 in support of Octavian's political and religious claims, but immediately qualifies—"or much earlier, even during Caesar's lifetime." He continues: "Not that Atia ever made such a statement; it must have been Caesar who inspired the story of Octavian's divine descent at the time when he decided to make him his heir." The expression "must have been" is grievously overworked by Weinstock. It seems otiose to point out that Domitius Marsus does not mention Apollo; that there is no basis for dating his epigram; and that there is less reason to believe Caesar started the story about Atia than that Atia started it. Equally curious is the subsequent argument. The supposed probability that Apollo was "brought to the fore again" by Caesar is "supported by the god's sudden popularity after the Ides of March," which turns out, of course, to be popularity with Brutus and the other conspirators! (In referring here to Octavian's predilection for Apollo Weinstock might perhaps have noted as relevant the old temple of Apollo at Velitrae: Livy 32.1.10).

On Caesar's youthful years Weinstock is weak in a characteristic way (29f.). He begins with the assertion that Caesar's ancestors did not hold any priestly offices. This overlooks the meagre information on priests of the early and middle Republic. The evidence about Caesar's own designation as Flamen Dialis is notoriously problematic. Weinstock introduces new confusion. He believes that Caesar was designated to the flaminiate in 87 or January 86 as successor of L. Cornelius Merula (†87). This may well be close to the truth. But he adds "at the age of thirteen." This is contrary to Suetonius *DJ* 1.1, which makes Caesar fifteen or (at most) sixteen at the time. Weinstock claims that the Flamen Dialis had "great political authority," which is strange, and that he was precluded from following a political career, which is false

(cf. not only Merula, consul 87, but also C. Valerius Flaccus, praetor 183—it was a military career that was barred). Finally, Weinstock presumes that Caesar did not reach “the age required for the administration of his priestly office” until after Sulla’s victory, therefore (apparently) not till 13 July 81, which according to Weinstock would be Caesar’s nineteenth birthday. He cites no evidence that the Flamen Dialis could not officiate until he was nineteen, and of course there is none.

Let us turn now to the matter of the white horses (68ff.). After Thapsus the Senate decreed that in his triumph Caesar should ride in a chariot drawn by white horses. Weinstock as usual looks for the precedents. According to Vergil, Aeneas on reaching Italy saw four white horses grazing. Latinus rode in a chariot drawn by four horses (colour not specified, but possibly white, for Turnus rode *bigis* . . . *in albis*). Aeneas and Latinus were both identified with Iuppiter. Weinstock infers that Iuppiter Latiaris was represented in a chariot with white horses in the pediment of his temple on the Alban Mount. A reasonable conjecture, perhaps, though spun out of very little. Romulus, according to Propertius, triumphed with four white horses. There is something odd here since, as Weinstock notes, the triumph was supposedly introduced long after Romulus. Again, after Algidus, 431, A. Postumius triumphed with white horses, according to Ovid. But Livy does not have the white horses. Perhaps “the case of Postumius was created to serve as precedent for Camillus” (but if so, Livy ought not to have missed the point). Camillus after conquering Veii entered Rome in a triumphal chariot drawn by four white horses. According to Livy this was resented as not only *parum civile* but *parum humanum*; it put the dictator on equality with Iuppiter and Sol. Weinstock, however, argues that Camillus’ act “could not have been resented” because it was correct for the triumphator to represent Iuppiter in other ways. (But why, in that case, were the white horses not normal for a triumphator?) On the other hand, Weinstock goes on, Camillus may have been an innovator changing the character of the *triumphus*—from triumphator representing the king to triumphator representing Iuppiter. Whereupon Weinstock kicks over the whole construction, by declaring that “such behaviour would have been much too early for the historical Camillus.” The question then becomes whether the legend of Camillus was created before or after 46. Weinstock prefers the latter hypothesis. He seems unaware that it would set up an intolerable problem about Livy’s sources. Equally unsatisfactory is his treatment of Plutarch who states that what Camillus did was never done before or after. Weinstock declares that either Plutarch is mistaken or he is following a pre-Caesarian source; but Plutarch seems to be speaking for himself in *Cam.* 7.1. (*ἵερὸν γὰρ ἡγοῦνται* . . . *κτλ*). Weinstock cannot allow Plutarch’s comment to be right, because it conflicts with his assumption that Caesar did use the white horses as the Senate had decreed.

The way is now clear for Weinstock’s reconstruction of the triumph

of 46. He assumes what no source states, that Caesar actually rode with the white horses—"which was a claim to superhuman status." What the sources do say he is prepared to reject or recast. The breakdown of Caesar's chariot (Suetonius, Dio) is "apocryphal"; there was a breakdown on some other "ordinary journey" (Pliny 28.21 is quoted, but completely fails to support the point). Caesar's climbing the temple steps on his knees (Dio) must also be apocryphal. When Claudius did the same in "A.D. 41" (sc. 44), his precedent must have been "the fictitious precedent of Caesar." It might have been better to suggest that the Claudius story was apocryphal too!

Perhaps enough has been said to indicate that for all its enormous erudition Weinstock's book is not a safe and reliable guide. It will be used as a reference work, but much time and effort will need to be spent in checking the proliferation of its errors.<sup>1</sup> It sometimes seems that to engage in the study of Roman religion is to risk never being able to think clearly again.

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<sup>1</sup>Here are some further examples, of the sort that can be indicated briefly: 17 n. 5, on L. Iulius Caesar (cos. 90) and "his son, L. Iulius Caesar the moneyer of c. 94 (see the preceding note), . . . quaestor of Asia in 87 . . ." The preceding note refers to the father, coining about 105. L. Caesar (cos. 64) was quaestor in 77, and is not recorded as a moneyer.

22. Caesar "at Gades in 67 B.C." Rather, 68.

28. A Roman "could not hold a priesthood if another of his family was a member of the same priestly college . . ." For "family" read *gens* (a distinction too often blurred).

30. When coopted as pontifex in 73, "Caesar himself was absent as a legate in the war against the pirates in Greece." It is quite improbable that the C. Iulius of SIG 748 is to be identified as Caesar.

32. Sex. Iulius Caesar, the Flamen Quirinalis, was certainly not Caesar's "great-nephew." Probably a son of L. Caesar (cos. 64) and cousin to Caesar (third, once removed).

37. Pompey's first triumph is to be dated one year or two years before "12 March 79."

53. In the inscription on Caesar's statue on the Capitol (of 46) "'hemitheus' is impossible because it is first found at Rome in late antiquity, in Servius . . ." This dissembles the fact that Servius actually purports to reproduce the wording of the inscription—"Caesari emitheo" (Serv. Auct. Ecl. 9.46).

60. It should be questioned whether Caesar was really granted a triumph in 60 (what he gave up was the right to *claim* a triumph); and it is certainly hazardous for W. to state that "supplications too had been held at Rome," for which there is no evidence. (The "implied" evidence W. finds in Cic. Pis. 59, *supplicationes totiens iam decretae*, is illusory.)

93. Vibius Pansa's coinage is dated "soon after Caesar's arrival from Gaul in 49." The correct date, 48, is given at plate 6.17. The claim that "the first theme" (Roma) "is the earliest" should therefore have been revised as well.

109. Scipio Nasica Corculum, described by W. as "the 'perfect citizen'," is presumably confused with his father, *vir optimus in civitate* (Liv. 29.14.6ff).

136. "coins of . . . C. Cassius Longinus (*cos.* 96) c. 125 B.C." This identification will not do; twenty-nine years from monetalis to consul is excessive. The moneyer should be C. Cassius Longinus, *cos.* 124, and the date of the coins about 127.
158. W. probably misinterprets Dio 44.5.2. He thinks that in 44 the name of one of the 35 tribes was changed (to *tribus Iulia* or, e.g., *tribus Fabia Iulia*). What is more probably meant is that each time the first tribe to vote was selected by lot it was to be called, honorifically, *tribus Iulia*.
161. W. adopts an interpretation of the Tabula Hebana which would make the *destinatio* centuries an integral part of the Comitia Centuriata. This is almost certainly wrong.
181. The theory that Dion. Hal. 2.18-23 derives from a "contemporary pamphlet" was demolished by W.'s Oxford colleague J. P. V. D. Balsdon in *JRS* 61 (1971) 18ff. (from a Presidential Address of 6 January 1970).
289. Q. Mucius Scaevola, "pro-consul of 97, in the province of Asia" (cf. 315, "c. 98 B.C.") Rather, 94.
306. W. has neglected the possibility that the Pontifex Maximus who picked Antony as Flamen Iulialis could have been Lepidus, after the Ides of March.
307. Dio 44.6.4, ὥσπερ τινὰ Διάλιον, need not be interpreted so narrowly as W. proposes. (The Flamen Iulialis was to receive the privileges of the Flamen Dialis—"without the restrictions".) "Like a sort of Dialis" merely identifies Antony's priesthood as a flamine.
309. W.'s supposition that the Flamen was associated with "Iuppiter Iulius" is controverted by Cic. *Phil.* 2.110, *flamen . . . Divo Iulio*.
327. W. misconstrues Liv. 28.9.15, *etiamsi pedes incedat*, as a contradiction of 28.9.10, *ut . . . equo . . . inveheretur*, and so erroneously concludes that C. Claudius Nero in 207 probably entered in ovation on foot, not on horseback.
334. W. perpetuates the absurd notion that the Claudius Drusus (Rusus?) of Suetonius *Tib.* 2.2, who *Italiam per clientelas occupare temptavit*, was Ap. Claudius Caecus, censor 312, acting in 312.
399. W. misconstrues Valerius Maximus 9.9.1, *caput Helvi perinde atque Corneli* as "the heads of Helvius and Cornelius Cinna."
- 401, cf. 308. The Flamen Iulialis Sex. Appuleius is correctly identified as Augustus' brother-in-law, but wrongly indexed (420) as "*cos.* 29."
411. W. observes that his view of Caesar as the founder of the empire is unusual. "It is discernible in the pages of Mommsen's *StR*, presupposed rather than fully argued." He was apparently unfamiliar with T. Rice Holmes' *The Roman Republic and the Founder of the Empire* (Oxford 1923).

C. W. CHILTON. Diogenes of Oenoanda. The Fragments; A Translation and Commentary. London, New York, Published for the University of Hull by Oxford University Press, 1971. Pp. xlviii + 141. £3.00. \$11.00 cloth. (*University of Hull Publications*)

The book under review is mainly a translation of and commentary to the Greek text of Chilton's Teubner edition *Diogenis Oenoandensis Fragmenta* (1967). This Greek text consists of the scanty remains of what was c. A.D. 200 (and till perhaps 350 or even later) an enormous

inscription (extending over 40 m. and three or four columns high) on the wall(s) of a stoa at the Greco-Roman town of Oenoanda in Lycia, intended to celebrate and propagate Epicurean doctrines, and owing its existence to a certain Diogenes, perhaps to be identified with the local magnate Φλαυιανὸς Διογένης. The inscription contains texts not only by Diogenes<sup>1</sup> but also by Epicurus and others.

After a short *Preface* (xi-xii) there follows a lengthy *Introduction* (xv-xlviii), then the *Translation* of the fragments (3-22), the first rendering of the text of Diogenes into English. Next comes the *Commentary* (25-123), followed by an *Appendix* (124-33) which refers to four new fragments published by M. F. Smith in *AJA* 84, no. 1, 1970. This is the first commentary of the inscription in English. The book ends with two indices: an *Index of Passages Quoted or Referred to* (135-38) and a *General Index* (139-41). Eight photographs are also included together with a map of Lycia-Cabalis and two drawings depicting the arrangement of fragments suggested by J. William and A. Grilli respectively.

The amplitude of the *Introduction* is not warranted by the scope of the book itself. Such chapters as *Lycia and the Cabalis* and *The Lycian League* are almost irrelevant, and could be entirely omitted or reduced to only a paragraph with adequate bibliography contained in footnotes. Even the chapter entitled *The Epicurean School in Imperial Times* could be drastically cut, since it offers little which has not been known since at least the days of Usener (see the *Praefatio* to Usener's *Epicurea* [1881], especially pp. lxxi-lxxvi). The chapters entitled *The Arrangement of the Inscription* and *The Total Length of the Inscription and its Location* should have been written more clearly if Chilton intended them to be intelligible to others besides those already familiar with the inscription (who do not require this chapter in the first place).

The *Translation* is generally accurate, but this reviewer would have preferred that Chilton had not attempted to beautify and render more logical the Greek of Diogenes, but rather had kept closer to the Greek text: translating, for example, τὸ ῥητορεύειν (fr. 41.6) not "the life of

<sup>1</sup>Concerning the portions of the inscription which have been attributed to Diogenes himself, Chilton writes (p. xlvii): "If at times his style [= Diogenes'] is rather garrulous and repetitive this is confined to introductory passages . . . Elsewhere the argumentation is reasonably concise, and expressed in good, clear Greek . . ." I venture to suggest here that this difference in style owes its existence either to Diogenes' use of epitomes of his own works (such epitomes would necessarily have been written in a more succinct style than the original text) or to his appropriation of texts (whether epitomized or in original form) written by others who employed a terser style than he himself. In either case Diogenes added *ex suo* the introductory passages. The assumption of epitomes suits the purpose of an Epicurean χρηστομάθεια such as this inscription, and is explicitly supported by fr. 23 (Διογένης [Οἶνο] ἀνδρῶς [περὶ τῶν] παθῶν καὶ [πράξεων] ἐπιτομή). A stylistic analysis of the text may well throw more light on its sources.



the speaker" but "public speaking"; ὡς φασίν τινες (fr. 10, col. iii, line 6) not "as some do" but "as some say"; προπηλακιστὰς (fr. 28, col. ii, line 10) not "captious" but "insulting" or "contumelious." I would also have wished that Chilton (and Grilli before him) had not changed William's numbering of the fragments, because in general such changes create confusion in research, and in the case of the text of Diogenes seem to be motivated by *pruritus novandi* rather than by any valid reasons.

In the *Commentary*, which is mainly epigraphical and philosophical, Chilton shows learning and as a rule good judgment. His main contribution is a systematic evaluation of the scholarship which has been produced in connection with the inscription of Diogenes. The commentary could have been richer in *similia*; a sole example: Maximus Tyrius could furnish Chilton with many illuminating parallels but is quoted only once. Chilton's own supplements are of doubtful merit (for example, [ῥα]κεῖδος in fr. 10, col. v, lines 6-7, and παροῦσ]αν in fr. 24, col. iii, line 9 [= p. 69]); but he chooses mostly among those proposed by others (G. Cousin, H. Usener, Th. Gomperz, R. Heberdey-E. Kalinka, J. William, S. Sudhous, A. Grilli, R. Philippson), evaluating them plausibly. I only hope that someone will produce an album of photographs of the actual fragments to enable us to judge how confidently we may say with Chilton that, for example, "The restoration proposed by HK [= Heberdey-Kalinka] is rather long, that of Grilli is somewhat short . . ." (p. 27). Until then much must be accepted on faith. It is my feeling also that Chilton would have rendered his commentary more useful if he had paid more attention to the language of Diogenes (grammar, syntax, rhetoric, etc.). For example, a note on the construction of εἰδέναι ὅτι μή εἰσιν (fr. 11, col. ii, line 12) or of δηλός] . . . ἐστίν . . . ἀπ[ο]δεδωκέναι (fr. 38, col. iii, lines 5-10) would have been most welcome. One might also expect at least a paragraph of linguistic comment on such forms as ἀναγκαῖα in fr. 1, col. i, line 6; συγγράμ[μ]ατος fr. 2, col. ii, line 1; ἀκατάληπτα fr. 4 col. i, line 7; κόζμων fr. 16, col. i, line 5; ἐγλελεγμένων fr. 24, col. ii, line 12; ἐγβαίνειν fr. 30, line 7; βηχικὰ fr. 59, line 8. The commentary contains a few non sequiturs: on p. 105, for example, Chilton writes: "καρδιακὸν πάθος is 'stomach trouble' rather than [italics mine] 'heart disease,' as is clear [italics mine] from Alexander's commentary on Aristotle, *De Anima* (98.23 ed. Bruns) ἡ γὰρ λεγομένη καρδικὴ νόσος, ἣν νόσον σώζεται τινα νοσήσαντα, οὐ καρδίας ἀλλὰ στομάχου πάθος ἐστίν, and Cicero *De divin.* 1.38.81. . . ." Granting that καρδιά occasionally means "cardiac orifice of the stomach" (see LSJ s.v. καρδία II), or even στόμαχος (cf., for example, *Gal.* (=MGF) 14.735 καρδίαν οἱ παλαιοὶ τὸν στόμαχον ἐκάλουν), and granting that καρδιακός may occasionally mean "pertaining to the cardiac orifice of the stomach," or even "στομαχικός," καρδία in general still means "heart," and therefore one would require a good

deal of argumentation from Chilton in order to be convinced by him that a Greek of c. A.D. 200 writing *καρδιακὸν πάθος* meant not "heart disease" but rather "stomach disease" (*καρδιακός* and *cardiacus* according to LSJ and ThLL may both refer either to heart or to stomach). Chilton should have examined all extant instances of *καρδιακός* in Greek and *cardiacus* in Latin, and drawn a conclusion from statistics about its prevailing meaning (especially *apud medicos*). He has done nothing of the sort. Indeed the very example from Alexander which he cites runs counter to his interpretation. Had he read his quotation from Alexander in the Greek context he would have concluded (in agreement with the editors of LSJ s.v. *καρδιακός* V) that *καρδιακός* here means not "belonging to the stomach" but "belonging to the heart!" The meaning of Alexander is: *even slight heart damage entails death. The so-called "heart disease" which some survive, does not contradict this observation, for this "heart disease" in name is but a stomach disease in reality.* Here and there one comes across tame scholarship which could have been omitted (for example, p. 35, "The most probable conclusion is that Diogenes obtained permission to carve his message on the wall . . ."; or p. 97, "My own impression is that these maxims, though fully worthy of the Master [= Epicurus] himself, were probably not written by him but by a very competent Ionian disciple . . ."). This reviewer also feels that Chilton sometimes sheds his good judgment in attempting to defend intellectual deficiencies on the part of Diogenes (for example, on pp. 40-43, on p. 51, and on pp. 92-93). Chilton here strives to present a more favorable picture of Diogenes' intellect than the historical Diogenes deserves. William, who wrote sixty years before Chilton, more accurately grasped the historical Diogenes when he saw in the inscription the manifestation of a mere *ingeniolum* which was capable of an occasional blunder, even to the extent of writing *Ἐμπεδοκλῆς . . . ὁ Ἀκράγων* (= Empedocles . . . the son of Akragas, declining *Ἀκράγας* like *νεανίας* and taking it to be the name of Empedocles' father! instead of *Ἐμπεδοκλῆς . . . ὁ Ἀκραγαντίνος* (cf. his Teubner edition [1907] p. xxx). Chilton's note (p. 44): "No one has satisfactorily explained the odd phrase *ὁ Ἀκράγων . . .*", is another instance of his desire to endow Diogenes with a probably unmerited *ingenium*.

There are also some mistakes in the printing of Greek words. We should read: p. xxv, line 8 (subsequently the line is given by a number following the page number) *παράδεδοκότες*; p. 28.19 *ἔστιν*; p. 31.2 *πολιτεύσεσθαι* (sc. *τὸν σοφόν*); p. 31.9 *νεανίας* (or rather *νέους*); p. 31.25 *γραφή*; p. 32.28 *παιάν*; p. 34.30 *τόθ'*; p. 36.23 and 30 *λύπαι*; p. 38.18 *ἦπερ*; p. 39.10 *μετέωρα*; p. 46.3 *ἀλλὰ*; p. 46.30 *ἀσώματα*; p. 46.33 *καὶ τὸ κενόν*; p. 51.15 *ἐξηλωκότων*; p. 52.22 *ἔμπυρος*; p. 55.26 *θεοὺς*; p. 59.27-28 *ἄπειροί εἰσιν*; p. 61.40 *φασ[χ]όντων*; p. 62.20 *κενόν*; p. 64.35 *γῆν*; p. 68.16 *χρηματιεῖσθαι τε*; p. 69.36 *τῇ* (or better *τῇ*); p. 70.39 *Ἀντωνίνω*; p. 71.3 *Ἰππίας*; p. 73.18 *διὰ*; p. 75.31 *φω[νὴν]*; p. 76.19

ἀφεῖλε; p. 76.32 ζῆν; p. 79.28 προᾶξις; p. 91.22 μῖξιν; p. 92.23 γάλα; p. 93.16 ἄλογον; p. 95.27 add μικρὸν after σπινθήρα, and τοσοῦτον after ἐξεφύσησεν; p. 98.12 κυθρίδιον; p. 101.33 γνώμην; p. 102.16 βα[ρε]ϊαν; p. 102.19 κρεῖττον; p. 111.39 ᾧ; p. 112.22 ἐνδεδείχθε; p. 116.17 ἀμαύρωσις; p. 118.29 λ[εκτέος]; p. 122.36 Ἰλιὰς; p. 125.38 διανοίας; p. 133.8 σοβαρός; p. 135, col. I, line 32, ἰδεῶν; p. 137, col. I, line 18 Ἐπικούρου. I found only very few inaccurate references, of which the more significant are on p. 101.36, where we must read Plutarch, *Tranq. an.* 470b, and on p. 95.28, where we must read Polybius xviii.22.2 (the pertinent text of Polyb. being ἐκ τούτου τοῦ σπινθήρος ὁ πρὸς τοὺς Αἰτωλοὺς ἐξεκαύθη πόλεμος). The *Alphabetical List of Abbreviations* on p. 24 should have been placed not after the translation of the fragments but before the *Introduction*, since such abbreviations are also used there. Chilton also should have taken care to add that the *Selected Additions to the Bibliography* (p. xlviii) are additions to the bibliography of his Teubner edition, pp. xvi-xvii (= *Conspectus Studiorum*). The *General Index* is not as full as it ought to be. There is also no index to the points of grammar, syntax, rhetoric, and textual criticism raised in the *Commentary*.

All these adverse criticisms, however, do not substantially affect a book which in the opinion of this reviewer is for the most part a product of sound scholarship and hard work, significantly advancing our knowledge of *Diogenes Oenoandensis*.

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LIVIA BIVONA. *Iscrizioni latine lapidarie del Museo di Palermo*. Palermo, S. F. Flaccovio, 1970. Pp. xvi + 320; 182 plates. L.12.000. (*ΣΙΚΕΛΙΚΑ*; *Serie storica* 5)

Of the 382 inscriptions in this volume, only 79 are Sicilian, including 31 from Palermo, while 286 are from Rome and another 6 may also be. One was acquired in Naples (originally from Misenum?). The provenance of 10, mostly small fragments, is unknown. Very few are unpublished, and none of any consequence. Thus all of those from Rome are in *CIL* VI, De Rossi, *ICVR*, or Diehl, *ILC* with four exceptions: Nos. 82 and 85 (in which the only text is the *chrism*) and Nos. 350 and 379 which are listed in *CIL* X as 1088\*, 423 and 1089\*, 171, the latter as *falsa* as well as *aliena*. The other *inediti* are fragments, mostly consisting only of a few letters: Nos. 79, 89-95.

But it would be wrong to conclude that this handsome, well produced volume and the editor's conscientious labors serve little purpose. For

one thing, the 182 plates are of the highest quality. They include every inscription and constitute a kind of lapidary gallery, with texts ranging from the third century B.C. to the Late Empire, in fact to the copyists and forgers of the eighteenth century. As one would expect, the plates are often very instructive and even essential in attempting to grasp the character and problems of individual texts. They illustrate, too, such palaeographical matters as marked differences in lettering in formal, official inscriptions of the same type set up side by side within a few months at most (Nos. 12, 13). The introduction provides an account of the various collections that were brought together and deposited in the National Museum in the last century. The oldest of these included dedications to emperors set up by the *res publica Panhormitanorum* in the forum, and quite appropriately, displayed before the Palazzo Pretorio in the sixteenth century, the largest group of such texts from Sicily. Dr. Bivona discusses various points of interest more fully than the editors of the *CIL* or other corpora. In particular, she interests herself in personal names, regularly citing Schulze, *Eigennamen*, Perin, *Onomasticon*, and Kajanto, *Cognomina*. She has been able to make a number of small corrections in readings, matters of provenance, and the like. Anyone with more than a passing interest in an inscription in the Museum should check this work to see what additions it may contain as well as to examine the plates.

Further, the volume should be helpful in the preparation of a badly needed new collection of all Sicilian inscriptions. The extraordinary poverty of Sicily in inscriptions is presumably owing in large part to conditions in antiquity, but certainly also to destruction, neglect, and various circumstances in more recent periods. One may recall, e.g., that the only known Sicilian mile-stone was saved by mere chance in 1954 after its discoverers had already broken it up. A volume of *Inscriptiones Italiae* which G. Manganaro is preparing will contain both the Greek and the Latin inscriptions of the island. Collected and placed in their context, including the growing archaeological materials, they should make possible a much more substantial study of Roman Sicily than any now existing. One may hope that Bivona's volume and example will help sustain interest in epigraphy elsewhere in Sicily and stimulate the search for new materials. It is disappointing that since Mommsen's edition of *CIL* X, 2 in 1883 only six inscriptions have been added to the Museum's collection, and only one or possibly two since 1907. This situation is not confined to the district around Palermo.

The Roman inscriptions with six exceptions are all funerary, in large part obtained in the excavations of known *columbaria* carried out for the antiquities trade during the eighteenth century. Here they are grouped by the sites and the collections from which they came. These collections of various Sicilian antiquaries serve to illustrate the history of taste, scholarship, and archaeological forgery in that period, subjects now being fruitfully studied.

A few remarks on specific points. No. 3: The plate shows that the correct reading is *Herm(es?)*. Not No. 20 but 202 = Dessau 1655 (same error on p. 295). No. 21: The name of Severus Alexander was restored in erasures in 238, not under Gallienus; see e.g. Bersanetti, *Massimino*, p. 18 (cited but disregarded by the editor). No. 27: *Turma prima* does not indicate a military post in the cavalry; see Mommsen, *Staatsr.*<sup>3</sup>, III, p. 523. No. 45: Bivona rightly remarks that the lettering makes one hesitate to accept an early second century date for the proconsul Iulius Iulianus (*PIR*<sup>2</sup>, I. 762). No. 97: However *cera Candidiana* is to be explained, the adjective should be capitalized. No. 130: I would suggest that *coh. IIII (centuria) Centuli* be read. For the rare *gentilicium* Centul(i)us see Schulze, *Eigennamen*, pp. 149, 403, 406-7. Misled by the editors of *CIL* VI, 3609 and not helped by Mommsen who saw the stone, Bivona prints *cent(uria) (I) uli*, which assumes the repetition (*centuria*) *cent(uria)* followed by another error. No. 186: Iaulenus "non compare in Schulze," but surely a variant of the rare *gentilicium* made familiar by the consul and jurist Iavolenus. No. 196: Abin-nerichus is a Semitic name; see e.g. *TLL* I, cols. 49-50. Nos. 200-202: Discussed by Chantraine, *Freigelassene und Sklaven*, p. 311. No. 285: Zabdas, again a Semitic name. No. 292: One's first thought that the *cognomen* of M. Valerius Adhibe is perhaps *ex imperativo nomen* (*TLL*, I, col. 638) may be right; cf. the centurion called *cedo alteram*, Tac. *Ann.* I.23. But if such *cognomina* or nick-names occur, they seem to be neglected by Kajanto. No. 333: This puzzling epitaph of a child and the relief ought to repay study. Perhaps the *ses(s)or* in the last line is the rider represented as holding a child, in the manner of the father in the *Erkönig*. The word has been expanded as *ses(s)or(es)* because of the unexplained *inundatores* which follows. *Sessor* could be a *cognomen*, but I am not prepared to suggest a pun.

In short, this is a work which will permit scholars to make immediate and full use of the epigraphical collection in Palermo, and one that should retain its value for a long time.

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KURT VON FRITZ. *Grundprobleme der Geschichte der antiken Wissenschaft*. Berlin and New York, de Gruyter, 1971. Pp. xxxvi + 759.

In its outward appearance von Fritz's new work resembles the first installment of his *Die Griechische Geschichtsschreibung* published in 1967 although there is no companion volume for the Notes, which have this time found their place at the bottom of the pages. The arrangement points to a more fundamental difference. The *Grundprobleme* contain

less systematic investigation; few large subjects are "covered" in the sense that exploration has penetrated into every niche and corner. Research there is, to be sure, and it seldom lacks the thoroughness which we associate with v. F.'s name; yet what prevails is thought, reasoning, even speculation; the tendency is toward synthesis. Part I is definitely and frankly synthetic. Comprehended under the title "*Der Ursprung der Wissenschaften bei den Griechen*," twelve chapters take us—in a sequence roughly corresponding to the historical development—from the earliest physical cosmology to the emergence of logic, ethics, and finally to Aristotle's anthropology, teleology and method of *τύπω περιλαβείν*. In the course of this journey we meet mathematics in various stages of its development, including its early connection with Pythagorean number mysticism. When we come to the Eleatic doctrine of true Being (ch. 3), we find Xenophanes in a surprisingly important role. Somewhat later the Eleatic influence on cosmology (ch. 5) receives the attention which it deserves. Atomism (ch. 6) leads v. F. into problems of scientific "*Begriffsbildung*," a topic of persistent interest to him, which he now illustrates by showing how later developments in physics and chemistry required and duly produced new concepts. The longest chapter (7) in Part I is devoted to ancient astronomy (132-96). Part 2 consists of nine chapters differing in length, type of problems and subject matter, although mathematical and physical topics predominate. All of these chapters have been published previously, but none of v. F.'s *RE* articles has been reprinted, and many other studies that we prize highly are absent.

Scholars familiar with v. F.'s contributions will look in Part I for a rich harvest corresponding to four decades of intensive cultivation. Nor will they be disappointed, provided they study the book with patience, tolerate its prolixity and numerous digressions, and know how to find the truly valuable—at times extraordinarily valuable—insights in a surrounding of very uneven quality. For many generalizations have been put down with no proof or very inadequate proof. Much is irrelevant to the argument. There are half-truths—sometimes asserted with great confidence—inaccuracies, contentions that are not up-to-date. Most disturbing of all is the arbitrary selection of what is discussed and what is omitted. Readers will also be baffled by sudden jumps from one topic to another.

A rather glaring illustration of these weaknesses and the resulting imbalance is offered by chapter 8 "*Logik, Dialektik und Beweistheorie*." v. F. regards Greek mathematics as an important source of logic, an attractive thesis, which could be established, however, only if we had far more reliable knowledge about early mathematical demonstration than we actually have. Much of what von Fritz uses to reconstruct the history of Greek demonstration is itself the result of reconstruction (I shall come back to specific points). In a footnote (p. 210, n. 438) he refers to an article by A. Szabó, where the deductive

method of the mathematicians is traced to Eleatic influences, and adds the comment: "wohl weitgehend richtig." If so and if Parmenides and other Eleatics were pioneers in the method of demonstration, why does v. F. not examine their influence in mathematics—and elsewhere? And why, when he comes to Aristotle's syllogistic theory, does he take leave of mathematics (210), and allow dialectic and its discovery of the eristic fallacies to become all-important? Efforts to identify these fallacies probably helped the syllogism to mature, but the gulf between the *Sophistikoi Elenchoi* and the *Analytica Priora* remains large. To speak of the "syllogism" with its forms and "premises" as a basis of the *Topics* (219), is incorrect and misleading. Von Fritz himself knows better, as his fine chapter on *ἐπαγωγή* in Part 2 (see below; cf. also p. 216) shows. Considered as a whole, this chapter has large gaps. The blunt dismissal of mathematics as source of Aristotle's logic leaves us wondering about strict and formal demonstrations in Plato. The *ἀπόδειξις* in *Phaedrus* 245c5ff. is far closer to mathematics than to dialectic. References to modern theories (Mill, Hilbert), while welcome in principle, are not always *ἐν καιρῷ*.

It would be fair to substantiate each of my critical strictures, but while fair it is also repugnant, and I prefer to do what is more truly fair, to report briefly some of the fertile ideas which are scattered through these chapters. For Greek astronomy Babylon provided much more than observations extending far into the past. On their basis mathematical laws and rules had been established. There was intelligence and skill; yet even Anaximander raised questions unknown to the Mesopotamian tradition, and Greek thinkers continued in his spirit (132ff., 141ff.). The tendency to find the most beautiful and elegant figures in the celestial movements begins with the Pythagoreans. From them it passes to Plato, on whose speculative, but by no means exclusively speculative cosmology and astronomy v. F.'s reasoning is balanced and convincing (164ff.). Elsewhere, after discussing Greek attitudes to mechanics, v. F. turns to later centuries to sketch the interrelation of mechanics, experiment and mathematics before and in Galilei (192ff.). Here he trusts the expert guidance of A. C. Crombie and Alexander Koyré. Other scholars of great distinction continue to throw new light on these developments, but v. F.'s intimate knowledge of the Greek achievement secures him an original perspective. Do the "powers" or "quality things," such as hot and cold, bright and dark, in the Presocratic systems have emotional connotations? v. F. would be content if his suggestion to this effect (e.g. pp. 22, 70) proves true in some contexts, though not in others. This should be readily granted. Anaxagoras' *νοῦς* is by no means the same as *νόου φρένες* by which the god of Xenophanes directs everything (77f.). In Anaxagoras the *νοῦς*, acting without the *φρένες*, merely gives the first impulse. Most of us know this from the *Phaedo* and from the fragments, yet he may not have realized that *νοῦς* gives the impulse because he foresees all that

will result from it (79).—Much that is good will also be found in the disquisition on atomism ancient and modern—more accurately speaking, modern versus ancient; for v. F. traces very learnedly the emergence of a new conception (83ff., 99ff.) on the difference between Socrates' and Plato's critical reaction to contemporary Athenian conditions (234ff.), on *ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας* (225), the obvious and legitimate use of teleology as a causal explanation (279ff.), esp. 283ff.) etc. The departure from the conventional opinion about Zeno (42; see also v. F., *RE* s.v.) is timely. Zeno did not defend Parmenides but presented *ἀπορίαι* related to his "Truth." This challenge of the establishment was badly needed, and I welcome it also for personal reasons (cf. *Phronesis* 16 [1971] 116ff.).

Of the chapters in Part 2, three deal with Greek mathematics, three others with what may be roughly described as problems of physical thought. One, "Probleme der historischen Synthese" (701-26) is of a more general, methodological nature and the admirable review article on six papers of the *Congressus Madvigianus* in 1954—papers trying to define the essence of the ancient legacy—is *sui generis* and defies classification. One further chapter, "Die *ἐπαγωγή* bei Aristoteles" (623-76), has been mentioned incidentally above; here v. F. shows conclusively the difference between Aristotle's view of induction and representative modern theories. "Completed" or "exhaustive" induction would be the last concern to Aristotle; a few instances or even a single one, scil. under the right conditions, may suffice to establish a general proposition.—We have also made reference to v.F.'s thesis about the *νοῦς* in Anaxagoras. The chapter in Part 2 (576-93) where this concept is treated in *extenso* provides a substructure for the thesis and relates Anaxagoras in a somewhat sweeping fashion, yet not without true observations to original impulses of physical speculation. On Demokrits Theorie des Sehens" (594-622) I have no comment.

"The *ἄπειρον* bei Aristoteles" (677-700) moves from a summary of Aristotle's theory in *Phys.* 4 to a comparison between Aristotle and Cantor. I am ready to believe that v. F. is as competent on Cantor (and his followers) as he doubtless is on Aristotle. The verdict must be left to historians of mathematics; as for myself, while I incline to think the venture worthwhile, I cannot conceal some reservations about the highhanded manner in which everything that allows no link-up with Cantor is brushed aside as dated and devoid of real interest. What is dated today may be up-to-date tomorrow. Infinity of extension and the infinite Universe are a live issue in post-Einsteinian astronomy. v. F. might reply that the entire framework of relevant concepts has changed so much that a comparison with Aristotle's closed Cosmos is meaningless. I wonder whether experts might not come forward with similar objections to his comparison of Aristotle with Cantor and recent set theory.

Expert opinion by mathematicians (scil. with a historical bent of



mind) is needed also for the chapters on "Gleichheit, Kongruenz und Ähnlichkeit etc." (430-508) and on "Die Entdeckung der Inkommensurabilität durch Hippasos von Metapont" (545-75). Judging from a point at the fringe I appreciate the illuminating pages (566ff.) on *λόγος* in the sense of "meaning" and on the Pythagoreans who when they found the key to "meanings" in ratios between numbers availed themselves of *λόγος* for their purpose and moved on to discoveries about proportion, commensurability, etc. Nor does v. F. become forbiddingly technical when he explains the early method of proving congruency (431ff.). *ἐφαρμόζειν* ("to fit on"), the word used for this method gives away its not strictly scientific character. Euclid, who in some Books conforms to advanced scientific standards, uses in others this earlier method (422ff.). We may recall Proclus' authoritative summary of Euclid's achievement in "Prologus II" of his commentary on Book I (p. 68, 4ff., Friedlein) which includes the words: *ἔτι δὲ τὰ μαλακώτερον δεικνύμενα τοῖς ἐμπροσθεν εἰς ἀνελέγκτους ἀποδείξεις ἀναγαγόν.* In this endeavor Euclid was not everywhere equally successful. There is much in Proclus' historical survey that accords with the conclusions reached by von Fritz through analyses of Euclid's actual procedures.

It is very satisfying to find v. F. so vigorously interested in the methods of Greek mathematics; for he has often caused me to wonder whether in his preoccupation with the growth of mathematical knowledge he did not forget that the method too changed and evolved. If my reactions were just, the chapter "Die *ἀρχαί* in der griechischen Mathematik" (335-429), the longest of the book, might fill the gap; for the *ἀρχαί* (= first principles, esp. axioms, definitions) are pivotal in the method of demonstration. Again I do not question that much is brought to light by v. F., and again I must leave the judgment on important questions to experts. If in the latter part of the chapter I often find it difficult to decide whether the changes on which v. F. dwells are terminological or substantive, the fault may well be mine. But v. F. is at fault when in dealing with Hippocrates of Chios and his squaring of lunules (*μηνίσκοι*), he accepts the words *ἀρχὴν θέμενος* as a genuine reflection of Hippocrates' "method" ("Hippokrates habe sich eine *ἀρχή* gemacht," p. 417) and indicative of a "sehr hoch ausgebildete Methode des streng logischen Schlussverfahrens" around 400 B.C. Yet he knows that all we read is Eudemus' report about Hippocrates, and the Peripatetic Eudemus was apt to reformulate Hippocrates' procedure in Aristotelian terms.<sup>1</sup> As for Aristotle himself, his

<sup>1</sup>To make matters still more difficult for v. F., the *ἀρχή* in question is "proved" by Hippocrates (Simplic. in *Phys.* 61.8f., Diels), hence not a true "principle." Cf. Fritz Wehrli (ed.) *Die Schule des Aristoteles*, vol. 5: *Eudemus v. Rhodos* (Basel 1955) frg. 140 and "Kommentar" 117 about the problematic authenticity. Hippocrates' quadrature is an amazing feat, but inferences like v. F.'s are more than precarious. "Theoretical" consciousness need not keep pace with practice. Gregory Vlastos, who kindly read this review and saved me

account of demonstration in *An. Post.* must indeed be read as his answer to Plato's criticism of mathematical methods in *Resp.* 6 and 7 (360ff.) but this was pointed out more than forty years ago (in a book known to v. F., p. 342), and the relationship between criticism and reply has been explained with the help of Proclus' report about the progress made by the mathematicians *κοινὰς ποιούμενοι τὰς ζητήσεις* in the Academy (op. cit., 67.19f. Fr.), a progress which included remarkable advances in method. v. F. frequently refers to Proclus, but disregards this section in the *Prologus*—which on occasion, as we have seen, confirms his own results. One further question may be raised. When Aristotle, *An. Post.* A 10, distinguishes between "principles" that must be accepted without proof and others that *ἀνάγκη* . . . *δεικνύναι* (e.g. 76a34), v.F. (392f. and pass.) does not hesitate to understand *δεικνύναι* as a proof by construction, although Aristotle never refers to construction. Perhaps I ought to raise no objection, since even the deduction of the regular solid bodies in the *Timaeus* (53c4ff.) is by modern commentators called a "construction," yet it is most un-Euclidean. In any case, if we have to speak of "construction," let us make allowance for a great variety of "orthodox" and unorthodox constructions.

On pp. 677f. v.F. comments with unmistakable interest on a theory of M. Polanyi regarding "intellectual passions." Without "leidenschaftliches Engagement in einer bestimmten vorgegebenen Richtung" no major achievement is possible, no significant truth may be discovered. Polanyi's thesis has great persuasive force. It certainly applies to v. F.'s research, and unless we constantly bear in mind his "passionate engagement"—"einseitig" (ibid.) indeed, though not in "vorgegebener Richtung"—we shall not do justice to this book with its wealth of precious metal that it takes so much effort to mine. After much sighing about the idiosyncrasies of the book and much suffering from its numerous seemingly irrelevant digressions the reader learns to accept the one-sidedness and in the end appreciates even the digressions. For besides containing the most varied information that is of interest *per se*, the digressions broaden our perspective and give us a certain distance from the actual subject so that on coming back to it we are ready for fresh exploration.

This is not simply a book of classical scholarship. The "Vorwort" (pp. v-xxxiii) becomes explicit about what we would infer from many pages and paragraphs, v. F.'s passionate conviction regarding the inexhaustible resources of wisdom by which ancient civilization may help us to diagnose and remedy the ills of our own time. He has no patience with the opinion that whatever the modern world may gain through close contact with the ancients has long been absorbed. Nor, if

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from bad errors, reminds me that Hippocrates *πρῶτος* . . . *στοιχεῖα συνέγραψεν* (Procl., ibid. 66.7f.). How may they have compared with Euclid's?

I understand him correctly, would he be in sympathy with the approach whose classical representative is *Paideia*, the identification of one central idea toward which most that is creative in antiquity converges and from which all or most that in later centuries has proved fertile flows. Insights, attitudes, achievements that bear on our intellectual, cultural, social crises, are found by v. F. in the most diverse contexts and, though he underrates the difficulties of applying say, ancient political doctrines to our changed conditions, the merit of his book also in its humanistic endeavor is paramount. If this review had not become too long even now—in some respects, though not with reference to the book reviewed—I would quote several characteristic thoughts, not only this: . . . “jede Erörterung ethischer Fragen, . . . letztendings alle Erörterung über Fragen der menschlichen Lebensführung [wurde] für sinnlos erklärt: ‘. . . Wovon man nicht sprechen kann, davon muss man schweigen’” (Wittgenstein’s famous dictum.) “Das ist der diametrale Gegensatz der Ansicht des Aristoteles (und . . . der Antike überhaupt), dass die Auseinandersetzung über das was gut oder schlecht, recht oder unrecht . . . den Menschen zum Menschen macht” (xvii).

It is not often that one admires a book not only on account of its author’s range of learning and ever productive mind—quite literally an *ἀεὶ κινούμενον*—but also of his intense devotion to the values of our civilization and his effort, wholehearted and even desperate, to stem its decline.

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B. L. ULLMAN and P. A. STADTER. *The Public Library of Renaissance Florence: Niccolò Niccoli, Cosimo de’Medici and the Library of San Marco*. Padua, Antenore, 1972. Pp. 368. 4 Plats. 8000 lire. (*Medioevo e Umanesimo*, 10)

“The Public Library of Renaissance Florence” with its more explicit subtitle, contains a wealth of information that will facilitate research on the part of many scholars. Founded in 1436 in the Dominican convent at Fiesole, the collection was transferred eight years later by Cosimo to the Convent of San Marco in Florence, “the site of the first public library in modern times.” Upon the death of Lorenzo in 1492 it was combined with the private Medici Library. The complicated relationship between these two collections is traced in some detail. It is interesting to note that the Medici private library, which numbered one thousand volumes, was owned for awhile (1497-1508), by the friars of San Marco. When the Medici manuscripts were transferred in 1510 to the house of Giovanni de’ Medici (later Pope Leo X) in Rome, the San

Marco collection remained in Florence under the enlightened supervision of its librarian, Zenobio Acciaiuoli, who later became the papal librarian.

The historical outline, however, is ancillary to the main purpose of this work, the identification of as many San Marco manuscripts as possible in their current locations. The core of the volume is the publication of the catalogue preserved in the Archivio di Stato in Modena, where it is assumed to have been deposited by a member of the Este family in Florence. Dating from about 1500, it serves as the basis for identification of the surviving San Marco codices, many of which are now in the Laurentian and National Libraries in Florence. A student of the late B. L. Ullman, by whom the importance of this document was recognized more than thirty years ago, Stadter had access to Ullman's unpublished notes. He states that his purpose is not to describe the San Marco collections, but "to identify the items in the old catalogue." In spite of the fact that in 1768 all the manuscripts and incunabula were rebound, fortunately the flyleaves were preserved, making it possible to check the inventory numbers, the bench numbers, and the provenance of the items. As a result of this investigation 626 manuscripts and 65 printed books have been identified, respectively 60 percent and 34 percent of those listed in the Modena Inventory. Data concerning the provenance of these books should prove useful in research on the text tradition of certain classical authors. Supplementary to this document as a tool of investigation is a sixteenth-century Index of the San Marco collection now in the Ambrosian Library in Milan. The text of this document and its concordance with the Modena Inventory is published in Appendix I.

The material on the History of the San Marco Library concludes with a section entitled "A Slow Decline (1509-1883)," which represents on the part of the authors exhaustive research not only in printed sources, but also entails examination of hundreds of manuscripts. Comparison of the Modena Inventory and the Milan Index reveals changes in the collection of Greek manuscripts in the first half of the sixteenth century. While 17 new codices appear in the later document, 47 of those in the earlier one are missing, some of which turned up in the Vatican Library and in Munich. No fewer than 22 Latin and 70 Greek manuscripts previously in the San Marco collection are now in the Laurentian Library, where they were first listed in the 1589 catalogue of the Medici collection. The interest of Cosimo I in enlarging the building that contained the library and in increasing its contents led to the transfer of manuscripts from some monasteries, including San Marco. The extent of this loss to the San Marco collections has now become evident through a comparison of the published inventories with surviving manuscripts. Although the attribution to San Marco has usually been removed, careful study of the contents together with the use of the ultraviolet ray lamp has revealed their origin.

During the French occupation of Tuscany (1809), manuscripts and

printed books were removed from the convent of San Marco and were eventually distributed between the Laurentian and National Libraries in Florence. Some, however, were shipped to England, where they later became part of the Phillips collection (about 1832), and later found their way to Germany and the United States. Appendix V contains a table showing the current location of the Phillips manuscripts.

Students of the Italian Renaissance whose interests lie less in bibliographical details than in cultural history, will also find in this volume much material. The documents relating to Niccolò Niccoli's library throw new light on the relationships among some of the leading humanistic scholars of the time. Niccoli's "passion for copying and collecting manuscripts" is attributed largely to the influence of such scholars as Coluccio Salutati and Luigi Marsili. The manuscripts discovered at the Council of Constance by Poggio Bracciolini were soon in Niccoli's hands either in the original or in direct copies. From Poggio's exemplar of Lucretius and Niccoli's copy of it more than 23 manuscripts were derived. Vespasiano da Bisticci mentions that 200 of Niccoli's codices were out on loan; Poggio estimated that he owned 800; somewhat more than 400 entered San Marco. Those that have been identified are listed with their present signatures, their inventory numbers when known, and their numbers in the San Marco catalogue. "A Profile of Niccoli's Collection" (76-89) gives important information concerning the activities of this humanist. Appendix II is devoted to documents regarding the transfer of his library to San Marco. This material makes it possible to assess with some degree of accuracy the relationship of Niccoli's personal library to the one with which it was incorporated.

An informative section is devoted to the literary activity of Giorgio Antonio Vespucci (1434-1514), who is described as "the most generous contributor to San Marco, second only to Cosimo in the history of the library." Stadter has published (39-43) the list of Vespucci's manuscripts and incunabula not only from the San Marco collection, but those ascribed to him elsewhere. Most of these books are still in Florence, but others are in England, Vienna, and (one) in the Morgan Library in New York. From these documents it is clear that Vespucci vied with Niccoli in his collection of Greek codices.

Of this collaborative publication Stadter takes responsibility for editing the Milan Index and its concordance with the Modena Inventory; the history of Niccoli's library and its concordance with the same document; Appendices on the books of Cosimo, Salutati, and Niccoli. Supplementary to the 540 manuscripts which Ullman had identified with entries in the Modena Inventory Stadter added 90 manuscripts now in the Medici collection of the Laurentian and he identified the incunabula.

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22 JUL 1975

